VERIFICACIONISMO Y FALSACIONISMO: CRITERIOS DE DEMARCACIÓN DE LA CIENCIA

• DOI: https://doi.org/10.22533/at.ed.99124190713

• Palavras-chave: Falsacionismo, verificacionismo, Karl Popper, Epistemología, Circulo de Viena.

• Keywords: Falsificationism, verificationism, Karl Popper, Epistemology, Vienna Circle.

• Abstract: The article explores verificationism and falsificationism as two fundamental approaches in epistemology that seek to define and demarcate scientific knowledge. Verificationism, promoted by logical positivism, holds that a theory is scientific if its statements can be empirically verified. This approach has been criticized for its inability to handle the problem of induction and for excluding many significant theories that cannot be directly verified. In contrast, falsificationism, proposed by Karl Popper, suggests that a theory is scientific if it is falsifiable, that is, if it can be disproved by empirical evidence. Popper argues that scientific knowledge advances by the elimination of false theories rather than by the cumulative confirmation of false theories. However, falsificationism also faces criticism, especially regarding the practicality of falsifiability in actual scientific development. The article compares and contrasts these approaches, highlighting their strengths, limitations, and the influence they have had on modern epistemology. It concludes that, although both approaches have been fundamental to the advancement of epistemology, neither is completely satisfactory on its own, suggesting the need for a more integrated and flexible approach to understanding scientific knowledge.