The vital minimum as a guiding criterion of distributive justice in the context of human rights theories and the theories of justice of Rawls and Sen
The vital minimum as a guiding criterion of distributive justice in the context of human rights theories and the theories of justice of Rawls and Sen
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.22533/at.ed.55841924060610
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Palavras-chave: justicia distributiva, teorías de justicia, mínimo vital, calidad de vida, derechos humanos.
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Keywords: distributive justice, theories of justice, vital minimum, quality of life, human rights.
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Abstract:
Using the term “Justice” can lead to polysemy. However – mainly in the Anglo-Saxon world – there are connotations of the term that refer to aspects of distributive justice: How to distribute burdens, obligations, rights and prerogatives within society in order to refer to a “fair” distribution of responsibilities. Using a criterion or metric for said distribution becomes relevant. John Rawls and Amartya Sen have been two reference authors when dealing with the topic related to the metrics of justice and have developed their approaches in a very complete manner. Besides; In the context of the theories of Human Rights and Fundamental Rights, the concept of well-being and quality of life linked to the minimum vital income connects in terms of material content with the indicated distribution criteria. For both domains, a significant aspect is the object of each model; Both deal with similar problems, but start from different budgets. The thesis that I maintain in this essay is that there are points of agreement that allow us to present a proposal that links the guiding criteria of Theories of Justice and Theories of Human Rights and Fundamental Rights so that they form part of a Constitution.
- Basilio A. Martínez-Villa