THE THEORY OF NON-KNOWLEDGE AND THE NEW SCIENCE: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION APPLIED TO PRACTICAL LIFE

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ABSTRACT: The Theory of Non-Knowledge (TNK), although initially paradoxical, proposes a reasoned rejection of conventional attempts to acquire absolute knowledge, through the introduction of nullification, a tool that allows the denial of knowledge without generating contradiction. With the application of this tool, New Science (NS) emerges, a pragmatic and effective approach that proposes solutions applicable to real life, in a field without the limitations and/or presumptions of traditional theories. This article analyzes the origins and implications of TNK and NS, confronting them with traditional philosophical and scientific theories, showing how TNK offers a more efficient and pragmatic approach for a more prosperous, fair and practical society, from the individual to the large social and political spheres.

KEYWORDS: theory, knowledge, absolute, contradiction, positivism.

A TEORIA DO NÃO-CONHECIMENTO E A NOVA CIÊNCIA: UMA REVOLUÇÃO FILOSÓFICA E CIENTÍFICA APLICADA À VIDA PRÁTICA

RESUMO: A Teoria do Não-Conhecimento (TNC), embora inicialmente paradoxal, propõe uma rejeição fundamentada das tentativas convencionais de adquirir conhecimento absoluto, através da introdução da anulação, uma ferramenta que permite a negação do conhecimento sem gerar contradição. Com a aplicação dessa ferramenta, surge a Nova Ciência (NC**)**, uma abordagem pragmática e eficaz que propõe soluções aplicáveis à vida real, em um campo sem as limitações e/ou presunções das teorias tradicionais. Este artigo analisa as origens e as implicações da TNC e da NC, confrontando-as com teorias filosóficas e científicas tradicionais, mostrando como a TNC oferece uma abordagem mais eficiente e pragmática para uma sociedade mais próspera, justa e prática, desde o indivíduo até as grandes esferas sociais e políticas.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: teoria, conhecimento, absoluto, contradição, positivismo.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout history, humanity has strived to seek knowledge. From ancient Greece, through the Middle Ages and the Scientific Revolution, to the present day, philosophers and scientists have attempted to offer definitive explanations about reality. However, this search never seems to have reached an end point, always falling into either 1. *Infinite regression* of definitions (try, for example, to define a "cup" and you will see that you will have to use several previous concepts, which themselves need definitions and, thus, infinite regress), or 2. *Contradictions* (the term is and is not definable at the same time) and/or 3. *Limitations* (the terms do not have practical applications at a satisfactory and/or ultimate level of clarity) that prevent the attainment of a universal truth or perfect knowledge.

The Theory of Non-Knowledge (TNK) was developed to respond to this failure in the process of acquiring knowledge. Instead of trying to justify absolute knowledge, TNK seeks to create a *non-contradictory* and functional unity through *nullification*, allowing us to finally deal with real problems without the need to reconstruct infinite philosophical theories or try to reach a *universally applicable* truth, since TNK itself is, in itself, the starting point and the only reliable truth for creating applicable units of knowledge. From this solid foundation, New Science (NS) emerges, which, unlike traditional science, offers pragmatic, functional and effective solutions to the contemporary challenges of human life.

CHAPTER 1: THE FAILURE OF TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL AND SCIENTIFIC THEORIES

The challenge of definitions and standard reality

On Infinity

We know that the concept of *infinity*, whether philosophical or mathematical, makes another concept quite difficult: that of definition. The knowledge of the existence of something that can extend, and consequently, divide indefinitely, makes it impossible for us, for example, to establish a starting point for the perception of the existence of this something, as well as its middle or end.

This impasse becomes clear when we discover the set of real numbers and know that between any two numbers, supposedly allocated on an abstract real line, there are infinite numbers greater than the smaller one and smaller than the larger one, and that this process can be repeated using these same numbers that we admit and so on, ultimately making it impossible to assume that it is possible to establish *even one* number on the line.

Now, if the numerical space existing between two numbers can be infinitely divided so that the result of this division makes us allocate more numbers in it, it implies that the very *starting point* of the analysis, that is, one of the two numbers, can also be considered one of these "spaces", if in another analysis it is between two others. In other words, it can also be infinitely divided and, therefore, the mission of numerical allocation becomes an indefinitely long task, humanly (logically) unfeasible: without an end point or a starting point.

On the "exact" sciences

There is also a debate that remains unresolved to this day: has Physics given rise to Mathematics or vice versa? Immanuel Kant (2001, B15) says that, although synthetic *a priori* judgment can exist, no knowledge could have begun outside of experience (i.e., *a posteriori*). But, wouldn't that require us to have, beforehand, an abstract mental apparatus (however rudimentary) to interpret the elements of the environment? It reminds us a lot of the idealism-realism debate[1] (also without a possible solution). If, on the one hand, natural science uses the algebraic formalization of the so-called universal language, mathematics, this would not have emerged without the perception of the physical environment in which it supposedly emerged; that is, if mathematics really be a human creation.

Since the history of the emergence of numbers, about men who needed to count their flocks with stones without numbers, but based on a one-to-one connection, or Geometry itself, which shamelessly uses intuitive entities, acquired through experience and observation of the "real world" (the point, the line and the plane), from which all spatial studies that we know today arise, there has always been an intrinsic and, apparently, non-primacy relationship between theory and practice. It is very convenient, therefore, to affirm the physical independence of mathematics if we begin its study ignoring where its premises came from and, therefore, that old excuse that the point is by *its own definition* something indivisible is a beautiful way to begin the abstract study of numbers without contradictions being perceived, such as, for example, the allocation of a number on the real line. Mathematicians will always use the "there exists an x such that P(x)" ($\exists x: P(x)$), that is, a point that, in fact, represents the number in its geometric manifestation. However, the fact is that, if you can still divide, then that number has not yet been represented.

But, if the point arose from that object that our means of observation were unable to distinguish from another of the same size and distance, that is, because oef a physical-biological limitation of our eyes, then, perhaps with greater technology or even a closer approximation, we see that the points were, in fact, two objects that were very different from each other and very divisible, and with that, we notice the importance of studying the real origin of such premises, since, depending on which one it is, we will be able to obtain various answers to the contradictions that are strangely masked, due to the fact that ignoring them is *useful in practical life*, economically, even.

1. According to Itaparica (CORTEZ, 2020, p. 213): "realism and idealism are different theses regarding the independence of entities in relation to human representations. Realists claim that there is a mode of existence of things that is logically independent of human representations (p.31), and idealists defend, in turn, the thesis according to which we can only know objects that depend on the mind (assertions, beliefs, thoughts, etc.), but never the world itself". However, this debate is endless: the idealist claims that, without a mental perspective, there would be no world, because there would be no one *to say* that there is a world (language would be a condition for existence), while the realist simply affirms the pretentiousness of this hypothesis, contingently affirming its truth, after all, nothing really prevents the world from persisting without someone to perceive it.

On Language

Since we have come this far, we cannot talk about so many languages without first analyzing the one used to create this text. What most people call language, in which everything is written or spoken. There are several, but mathematics and music (which makes extensive use of mathematics in its theory)[2], for example, are commonly seen as "universal languages". We ask ourselves: after all, would it be possible to set up a verbal/written communication system that does not use mathematical concepts and, therefore, avoid all the aporias related to this language?

What use would the different demonstrative pronouns (this, those, that, etc.) be to us if we did not have the notion of distance or the verbs that indicate space (to fit, to enter etc.) if we did not know about volume or the words that indicate verb modes, that is, adverbs (slowly, forcibly, calmly, etc.), if we had not learned to measure the different ways of acting. If language emerged to name these physical manifestations, how would we be, first of all, capable of naming something that needed language to emerge in our abstract-analytical *perceptive* field?

How can we name something without that something already having a name so that we can manipulate it and, then, name it? How can I say "from here to there are x meters" if, to use "from here", I need to know what "a starting point" is (a mathematical concept, given in a description that is also a name. Which one came first and on what grounds did I associate them with each other?), but, to have established it linguistically, so that it can be referred to in a sentence, would I already need this expression to create (make an association with) this mathematical concept? It is impossible to speak of a point without first knowing how to refer to it: "point" or, at least, "that thing over there". However, the word "point" emerged precisely to name a point, which, to be named, would already need to have a name "that thing over there".

Apparently, Saul Kripke did not see this problem[3] when he tried to argue that definite descriptions would be an insufficient model for defining what is *of necessary* for a term. To say that only proper names pass the test of possible worlds is to ignore the fact that there is no "Socrates" who *could not have been* a philosopher, but a baker, because, on what would the descriptive object/entity "Socrates" be supported, if not on a *minimal* definite description, in order to be able to have the property "philosopher" replaced by any other? And, even accepting the descriptions, Kripke could not conveniently arbitrate which descriptions of the object are minimal or not.

2. For more details on the relationship between music, language and mathematics, check out my other work: Art and language (2024).
3. According to Lycan (2008, p. 74): "(Kripke) was right to insist that some kind of causal-historical chains are necessary for reference and that descriptions do not do nearly the job that Russell or even Searle thought they did; but (as critics argue, including Kripke) there are nevertheless descriptive conditions as well. The trick is to move back in the direction of descriptivism without going as far as Searle's weak descriptivist doctrine."

If there is one thing that all these languages have in common, it is what, apparently and in a certain way, gave rise to them: logic. It is thanks to the associative capacity (*Intentionality*)[4] that human beings have that it became necessary. In fact, logic (not formal science, but from the point of view of associative capacity) is not something created by humans. Biologists or someone in the field of living beings can talk about *instinct*, which, roughly speaking, would be an action that does not require reasoning or analysis, but no one can guarantee that. It is not by analyzing the behavior of the brain or similar animals that scientists can say whether or not there is some line of logical thought going on there. After all, if logic is capable of perceiving, establishing and predicting patterns, and animals have their own, it is acceptable, at the very least, to think that there is some there (this is where *enactivist* theories of language come from[5]). Furthermore, if logic is really capable of this, there is nothing to stop that stone that has been there for millions of years from exercising its set of rules present in its ability to think. This is the beauty of theory: with it, we are able to suppose the various possibilities and, perhaps, if there be interest, to carry out the respective tests.

Whether human beings are capable of testing everything, we do not know. This varies over time and with their own actions, whether through curiosity and/or economic interests/viability, security and more. However, since the reverse path does not stop, that is, the search for the origin of knowledge, another discussion arises once again: has logic really given rise to language? How would we be able to associate terms with logic without the terms already existing, that is, language? The paradoxes of the origin of communication, knowledge and existence are all interconnected, have the same logical form and are *insoluble*.

The approach so far has naturally been somewhat philosophical. It is true that those who are experts in science and languages, especially the specific ones mentioned, will probably always have arguments that they believe are capable of contradicting what has been said here. However, it is not difficult to see that none of the areas of knowledge under consideration are what we call *fundamental* (they are all, in fact, the result of a philosophical impulse). This becomes clear when, eventually, they find contradictions within themselves. Surely, there must be something wrong, an evil that has not yet been "nipped in the bud". By the way, this expression represents, in popular terms, what we call *efficiency*.

4. John Searle defines Intentionality (1983, p.1) as "that property of many mental states and events by which they are directed to, or are about, or come from, objects and states of affairs in the world".

5. Theories that defend how language has an *embodied* character, that is, it depends on the environment in which the agent is inserted. According to (SILVA, CAVALCANTI, MOTA, 2020, P. 140): "An enactivist proposal, coordinated with social and deontological linguistic inferentialism, states that what is special about us is not what we have inside our minds, but rather what we do in the world. How we act in the world is what makes us special. We are creatures who, even before mastering language, give ourselves rules, norms, and criteria to evaluate things and our actions in an unstable and mysterious world. We make this world intelligible to ourselves by acting in it based on rules and agreements that determine a framework of inferentially articulated authorizations and prohibitions." Here we could point out the absurdity of assuming that there are rules, norms, and criteria before the "mastery of language". It is almost a performative contradiction. Furthermore, if here we are even questioning the Cartesian cogito, which, in turn, already questioned the body, this Enactivism would not be a valid approach.

On Efficiency

Common sense sees everything that is efficient as positive. As for science, it is indeed the science that is constantly bringing so-called positive results to life: comfort, health, transportation, information, in short, efficiency to prosperity on Earth. As correct as these efforts might seem, the famous side effects, miscalculations and unpredictability that nature manifests are nothing new, always bringing news, controversies, contradictions and fatalities in the most diverse media. This highlights one of the crucial problems that we will try to solve in this article: the *false impression* that scientific and technological advances are, *a priori*, something necessarily beneficial to humanity. When, in fact, there is a particular subjectivity and an economic-historical arbitrariness justifying it.

The precision and certainty that scientists boast about so much, despite being efficient, because they get more right than wrong, still get it wrong, and something that gets it wrong is far from being the real explanation of a phenomenon. Something that is wrong does not have something without contradictions in its structure, that is, a *foundation*. Based on this, we can only imagine one thing that is right: a *self-logic*. As for the prediction errors in physics, for example, this does not mean that the logic of nature is inconsistent, but that we are not yet capable of interpreting it completely (if it is, in fact, consistent; if consistency exists and can be demonstrated, among other considerations). However, we can create something that is right, something that I own and that is indisputable (leaving aside, of course, all the mathematical aporias of language, as we saw above). Let's suppose that my logic is: this is that. Nothing and no one is capable of contradicting it, because these are the rules and that's it. Whoever says that "this is not that" is not included in my logic. That is 100% efficient; too bad it is useless.

On Faith

How can we not mention the so-called "mortal enemy" of science? More than Philosophy, although many consider it to be so, faith is something that is much more opposed to the scientific method, since it not only states that things happen the way they do because "that's how they happen" (that is, without rational justification), but also believes that there is a force outside of our understanding, outside of our world, our universe, that can act directly on our lives and, what's more, we can even count on such a force to fulfill some needs and desires.

Faith is so intriguing and challenging to the scientific method that the only test capable of proving its effectiveness is itself "working". There is no supposition, there is no halfway, there are no mistakes, there are no doubts. "It is and that's it", "I believe", say the faithful, *intransitively*. More than science, which at least boasts of its efficiency, being right more often than wrong, but which at least admits that it is wrong, faith is the greatest convenience possible, even more so than self-logic, since the latter generally has no practical effect. "Wow, my illness is cured! Thank heavens," the faithful ones insist. But, was it really "thanks to them"?

In theory, faith is indubitable, infallible and, above all, efficient, with 0% failure, acting directly on human life, which truly believes that successes in its life are due to the faith of which it is so proud. There is nothing more convenient than faith. However, in addition to this efficiency being *insufficiently justified* by rationality (even if we do not ask ourselves the justification of the justification itself), such power does not exist without great consequences. Religion, beliefs, as well as our not so accurate science, have already taken, and continue to take, many lives, destroyed and destroy many things, from physical to cultural structures. For some, faith is at least justified due to the "certainty" of their convictions (holy wars in the Middle East), even more so than those who say "it was for the sake of knowledge" (vaccine tests, radiation and atomic bombs).

On Reality

This is the reality we live in, which we call real life, tangible reality, "down to earth", the most *apparent*, the "standard reality" and the one we understand the least, when compared, naturally, to other realities created based on their own logic (fiction, for example). This will be better explained if, first, we explain the notion of reality.

The first way we usually find when talking about it is: "reality is what is real, now", says common sense. It is everything that happens when we are not dreaming or having the proven hallucinations. In fact, this ends up being yet another of the discussions of science that, if once again taken to a philosophical analysis, that is, when considering all the *possibilities*, including those that it prefers to hide, those that contradict it, become insoluble. After all, still ignoring the measurement problem caused by the existence (or non-existence) of infinity, the first notion of reality has to do with nothing more than the greater amount of time we spend in what psychology might call the "same mental state/condition".

Roughly speaking, considering the most common forms and assuming that they are different from each other, there would be three states: 1. Dream/imagination, 2. Post-dream and 3. Hallucinations. The state that remains the longest in someone's life will be considered, by them (from a subjective and idealistic point of view), *their* reality. It has become *conventional* that, since most people report living more in the post-dream state (wakefulness, the opposite of sleep), as well as many, if not all, truths in the world, which are established by a majority or an *illustrious group* (supposedly worth more than ordinary people), this state has become the normal reality, the standard. In it, we find what we know well: we can exercise our five senses (for those who have them) spontaneously, naturally and according to our will. This standard reality seems to be what is truly common to all beings. *Objective* (realistic) *reality* is almost a miracle, since there seems to be a consensus that several people can identify the "same" object, although from perspectives, histories, beliefs, descriptions, opinions and intentions (that is, an inherent idealism) that are very different from each other! However, since there are still different ways of thinking, as mentioned, there are some particularities, such as the possibility of more senses existing, in short, several exceptions that do not need to be taken into consideration at the moment.

On the taxonomy of reality and efficiency

But, finally, let us consider: 1. While science is the most real path of thinking in existence, despite its doubts that make it doubt itself, thus making it not completely real, but partially inefficient, 2. There is also faith, which is partially real (completely real to the faithful one), but the most efficient possible (entirely efficient, in fact) and of course, 3. Self-logic, which is completely inefficient, but the only completely real one, because, in its logic (without pretensions of universalization, as religious people try to do), all members (even if it be just you) believe in it by *its own definition* and it works, for whatever purpose it serves, within itself. In other words, there is a *balance* of metaphysical, practical and epistemological values that complement each other within these three ways of thinking.

Now, making a semantic parallel with the aforementioned mental states: dream → faith (the ideal); post-dream → science (the practical); hallucination → self-logic (the crazy one). There is, therefore, a relationship between reality → mind (relationship between world and human beings). This means, once again, that a basis is necessary, something that exists before the ability to relate factors, that is, reality, which is the necessary plan for any logic that will be created/inserted and applied to exist. Logic would, indeed, be the basis for any and all knowledge, but this basis has another basis that supports it. It is a shame that, since we can only think logically (since logic would be necessary to try not to think logically), we end up finding yet another question: is reality the fundamental basis, the first, last and only one? Is there no other basis that supports it? This is yet another attempt by human beings to try to challenge the extent to which they can know, which is, of course, knowledge itself. If reality → knowledge, that is, reality exists before and is still the creator of knowledge, it is not, obligatorily, within our capacity to understand. Although we can use it, it is impossible to understand it.

On Denial

But, what is this "using something" that we are unable to fit into our heads? Is it really possible to use something that escapes our understanding? Before answering this, it is interesting to ask ourselves how we are able to ask ourselves something. We have the power to refer to things through *unknowns*. Through them, we can refer to things that we do not understand and, perhaps, be able to solve them, with a certain level of efficiency, being this level contingent, arbitrary and subjective. This is the charm of language and its "will" to investigate. But, as we have seen, reality is an unknown whose resolution is, by definition, unattainable. It is epistemologically beyond knowledge and, today, we are left with only "legends", that is, statements that can very well be denied or at least dismembered, with at least one argument, with a simple: "it is not".

We therefore ask ourselves: why "it is not"? And why is it so, if there is *always* at least one thing that a given judgment does not support epistemologically? This is easy to see, for example, when talking about the statistics of an experiment. An experiment will never be

able to predict with certainty the next result that will come, since science is not completely exact (even the probability x of y happening does not guarantee that y might, one day, happen, even after this chance has been established with x, in fact).

We can use against any mathematical assertion, now, in the field of language, that this infinite space between numbers, which makes the assumption of at least one number on the real line absurd, prevents any other operation more complex than that. We can also say that God does not exist simply because the faithful ones *only* say that he exists, without proof or attempts to convince, since faith, by definition, dispenses with this epistemological effort. So, why not defend precisely the opposite (and, worse, do so at the same time as I affirm it, if that be possible)? Nothing stops me!

However, in the face of this analysis, one's self-logic always comes out on top. One's self-logic is the only statement that cannot be denied within itself (but can be denied outside of it), while the others can be contradicted within themselves. The mere fact that a religious person can say "I don't believe in my faith", no matter how much he continues to believe, means that his religion can be denied, even by himself (and outside of it), as in: "my self-logic does not agree with this faith", we can say. After all, religion and science have a commitment *to adapt* to standard reality, that is, they still demand, with more or less rigor, that the material world "confirm" what is being said, which does not occur in one's self-logic.

On the Creator

So, now it is clear: the only way to understand realities is to discover who has created them as *his/her* self-logics, because only in this way we can be *sure* of what we are talking about. After all, every logic is infallible, within itself, and, of course, unless we can get out of reality itself, discovering "who is behind" (assuming that everything has an origin) is discovering what we really need to understand everything else with *certainty* (beyond the naive certainties mentioned by Wittgenstein and his "hinges"[6]).

6. That is, certainties (hinges, fundamental grounds etc.) such as "I have one hand," "I was born of my parents," "the Earth existed many years before I was born," among other scientific contingencies. Sharrock (2015, p. 8) lists the 8 necessary characteristics of hinges: (1) non-epistemic: they are not knowable, (2) indubitable: doubt and error are logically meaningless as far as they are concerned, (3) non-empirical: they are not conclusions derived from experience, (4) grammatical: they are rules of grammar, (5) non-propositional: they are not propositions, (6) ineffable: they are, *qua certainties*, ineffable, (7) displayed in action: they can only be shown in what we say and do, (8) foundational: they are the unfounded foundation of thought and action. Our analysis of this is: although quite plausible to the layman's eye and *uncommitted* to philosophy, the very assumption of "core" (hinge) certainties is, basically, an affront to the investigative activity itself, since (1) it demands "trust" in them; (2) it is based on a circularity, since I would have to assume as *certain* the meanings of the very language that I use, when that is what is under investigation; (3) it abstains from experiments to verify them, even though this is not necessarily a good criterion of rigor; (4) it compares core certainties to *arbitrary* definitions of grammar, which is not true, since I can doubt the *content* of the former, even though it seems, to a certain relative extent, that I disarticulate all semantics, but I cannot do the same with the latter without losing the very domain of content *production*; (5) as a consequence of the previous item, it would not be, by definition, subject to falsifiability; (6) as a consequence of the two previous ones, it ends up being ineffable, since such certainties would *determine*, in advance, the meaning of what is meant; (7) it uses the fallacy of faith, that "it is enough to see" or "it cannot be explained, only lived", which can be linked to any justification, disregarding the fulcrum; and (8) it closes the petition of principle, defending a definition of "fulcrum certainty" that does not have appropriate instances that differentiate it, either from any fallacy or from a fanatical belief.

We need to *create* a new scientific revolution, or rather, a revolution of knowledge, and no longer have any doubts. But, let's take a closer look: why did the word "who" appear? Will this analysis ultimately succumb to the idea that everything that exists was created by a creator? Is the human mind only capable of resorting to divine explanations? If so, which of the gods is the real one? And the most challenging of all, how to show that any of them is true? There is a whole metaphysical tradition that would propose answers to these questions, but we will assume that they are insufficient and inadequate, since our aim in this work is to obtain *positivist* and not speculative results.

What do philosophical traditions say about absolute knowledge?

The main philosophical schools of the Western tradition, such as *Cartesian rationalism* and *empiricism*, face insurmountable obstacles when they try to justify absolute knowledge. Descartes (1641), when developing his *methodical doubt*, questioned everything, including the very existence of the external world, reaching the famous conclusion: "Cogito, ergo sum" (I think, therefore I am). His attempt to arrive at an unshakable truth encountered limitations, since the search for knowledge based solely on absolute certainties results in a gap between the things we can know with certainty and what we can actually "prove", that is, in the real, external world, as proposed above. It is also natural to think that nothing prevents him from doubting his own ability to doubt, contrary to what he argues, for the simple fact that paradoxes are not, ultimately, "real" *impossibilities* (when, in fact, we ask ourselves what reality itself consists of: whether it is only true propositions and/or contradictions, as well).

Empiricism, in turn, represented by philosophers such as David Hume (1748) and John Locke, brought the premise that knowledge originates from sensory experience. However, *induction*, the basis of empiricism, suffers from the fallacy that, even if we can observe a large number of specific cases, this does not guarantee us a universal truth. Hume's classic example about crows illustrates how induction leads us to erroneous conclusions, since a limited observation of crows does not guarantee that all crows are in fact black (or that the Sun will rise every morning).

These philosophical currents, when trying to justify knowledge based on rational (absolute, called "indubitable" by Descartes) or empirical bases, fall into the trap of an endless cycle of definitions, not only because they are always creating insufficient methodological strategies to try to justify their conclusions, but also because with each new concept used, *more concepts* will be used to explain each of the previous ones, which leads us to an epistemological impasse, without reaching a unified or definitive understanding of reality.

The limitations of modern science

Despite the immense progress of modern science, the great theories that define the contemporary understanding of the world, such as Einstein's Theory of Relativity (1916) or Quantum Mechanics, are limited to certain contexts. Modern science, although extremely effective in solving specific problems, still finds itself confronted with unresolved questions, such as the search for the *theory of everything* or the unification of fundamental forces (PENROSE, 2004).

These theories, although revolutionary, continue to be limited by *internal contradictions* and by the inability to offer a complete and universal understanding, without the need for new explanations or integrations. Quantum physics, for example, was revolutionary, but its principles continue to defy intuitive understanding, with phenomena such as the superposition of states and Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, which deny the possibility of predicting, with certainty, the behavior of subatomic particles.

Furthermore, scientific theories are constantly changing as new evidence is discovered, reflecting the inherent limitations of human knowledge and the lack of a complete and definitive understanding of the universe. Social sciences such as psychology and sociology suffer from similar problems, as theories often fail to apply their models to all social or cultural realities.

CHAPTER 2: THE CONCEPT OF NULLIFICATION AND THE CREATION OF THE NEW SCIENCE

The great innovation of TNK is the introduction of the concept of *Nullification*, a philosophical tool (a logical connective) that allows us to deny, *by definition*, knowledge, without falling into the contradiction of using the classic connective of negation, which is part of knowledge, to deny knowledge *itself*. Instead of searching for an absolute truth or justifying knowledge based on an infinity of definitions, nullification allows us to reject conventional knowledge without generating paradoxes.

Instead of creating a new theory based on a *holistic* system of knowledge (that is, a system that encompasses concepts that define each other), TNK proposes a pragmatic approach: *arbitrary units of knowledge*, represented by "*X (NS)*", where X is any unit (*token*) of knowledge from traditional science, but which receives the new property (NS), to indicate that, regarding this knowledge, it *is not necessary* to ponder infinitely about its adjacent definitions, supposedly fundamental, or this would put us in an infinite regression. In other words, they are suitable for specific and non-holistic situations.

It is extremely important to highlight that the terminology "(NS)" is not just a new and idle *notation*, but an element that makes the traditional knowledge token "dense[7]", acquiring

7. According to Brent G. Kyle (no year/page specified), a thick concept "expresses an evaluative concept that is also substantially descriptive at the same time." This means that, in addition to presenting a description of a given object, it has a moral-judgmental dimension that determines the value of this object, whether in society, as an artistic element or

an epistemological value and justifying itself as *non-contradictory*, based on all the theses presented here, that is, that this knowledge was obtained by *rejecting*, through nullification, traditional knowledge, which considers adjacent definitions pertinent (which is the problem we want to solve), this knowledge being, now, "itself", but without being a contradictory unit (not only because *it is not* a product of a "negation of the negation", but also because every traditional concept is defined by an infinite regression of other traditional concepts. In other words, its definition makes it indefinable).

"(NS)" is also a sign of *methodological reconditioning*, where the agent should no longer think about considering "all" the elements involved, putting him in a prescriptive state of *arbitrary* action and *acceptance* (indulgence) of the *contingent* consequences of such a decision, without questioning (leading him to peace of mind, moral clarity, a conscience clear of regrets, ataraxia). In other words, the "mere" presence of the notation (NS) not only brings conceptual, metaphysical and epistemological security to the traditional term, but attributes to the agent a purely *rational* (non-Kantian[8]) *morality* that he is doing what must be done.

This feat will be contingent and arbitrary (measured at that "exact moment" of the action), and might generate any type of effect in the world, but without additional considerations regarding its semantic structure and/or physical, psychological and moral "damages". It is, in fact, a *fatalistic* and, perhaps, *amoral* strategy, in the eyes of many, mainly at the beginning, but it will undoubtedly be a *fully justified* action. After all, in the final analysis, no human being who depends on traditional science is truly physically "safe" (free from pleasure and pain, that is, from external stimuli) or fully aware of their own desires, purposes, behaviors and values in order to do what they (think that they) must do.

These X (NS) units are pragmatic and effective in concrete contexts, allowing us to apply valid and functional solutions in any area of knowledge, without resorting to a universal justification. Imagine how much was not done, how much hesitation was made regarding certain actions/states (e.g. "Will my car support this weight? According to the manufacturer, it would not support such a load…"), decisions (e.g. If I go to the US this year, I might suffer from xenophobia, because I know that they…"), definitions (e.g. "The number 2 is a natural number, but also an integer, real, it is obtained by dividing 4 by 2, 8 by 4, it is prime, it is allocated in a space infinitely divisible between 1 and 3, it is approximately 1.9999999…"). The method of nullification is, therefore, a *radical* solution to the problem of the infinite regression of definitions, which *limits* traditional philosophical

even as an integral part of the consistency of an argument.

8. Considering the relevance of the metaphysical key in this article, we should mention Whesley Fagliari (2020, p. 21), who brings the Kantian idea of the categorical imperative, an *a priori* law, which supposedly guides human actions, saying what and why to do something. He says that it was important for Kant to consider an analysis free of experience to reach a "pure" conclusion about human morality (the same method we are using here). The imperative says that we, as rational agents, must always act thinking about whether this action can be universalized, also placing humans as an end in themselves and not as a means. However, this speculative determination would only leave us in a totally inert state of actions, since there is no ultimate thing which we would not be so sure about universalizing it.

and scientific theories. By allocating the above examples in place of X in "X (NS)", decisions would be made instantaneously, although we cannot predict what they will be (they are, therefore, arbitrary and relative to the moment. E.g. that 4 is equal to 2 + 2, without having to thinking that it is also 16/4 = (3+1) or *vice versa* etc.), that is, there would be no supposedly "appropriate" reasons for making decisions.

From a moral point of view, it is worth highlighting that factors such as responsibility or high *social performance* would therefore be suspended, since, in the last instance, there would be no other alternative for action other than the action *itself* that occurred at a given moment. Once again, this might seem too radical for a so-called "stable" society. However, it is worth highlighting that, even in today's traditional science, we will always be exposed to trials, juries, opinions, investigations, evidence that is in itself dubious, in short, an entire imprecise and, therefore, unfair, amoral scrutiny, sometimes decided by judicial corruption and/or arbitrary biases that are *universally unjustified*, putting us in a chaos of inadequate decisions, false verdicts, in addition to, of course, excessive expenses in an idle and partial legal system. Actions of type X (NS) would be absolutely *justified* epistemologically and metaphysically.

From the point of view of languages and sciences, for example, in mathematics, we can define an addition operation that is valid for a specific set of numbers, without the need to justify this operation by a universal mathematical theory, in addition to not *questioning* the natural contradiction that we know how to sum up numbers, even before we understand, if it is really of interest to understand, that the number 2, for example, is the collection of all collections whose number of members are linked one-to-one, in a biunivocal relationship, at a given moment and at a subsequent moment (3 would be represented by a collection of collections whose members would be linked in the same way, an additional time, and so on)[9]. This allows an efficient application of knowledge, without falling into the endless attempt to justify all operations (and the relationships between them) or to seek a consistent definition of arithmetic or natural numbers.

The consideration of this holistic thinking of traditional science even seems like an advancement of our knowledge, but, in fact, it is what promotes chaos and a fatal fall into contradiction, immorality and inefficiency, where nothing has definition... and *not even that* would have it, and not even that would have it, and so on, infinitely.

9. Bertrand Russell (2006, p. 27-28) proposed that a number is a collection of collections with the same number of elements. It is a definition in terms of *events* in which, although we did not know the *quantity* (i.e., the *numeral*) of elements in each collection, since, at this stage, the concept of number itself was yet to be defined, we knew that they had the *same* quantity of elements, since they are linked one-to-one (i.e., no element was left unlinked). The initial event would therefore be the number 1, that is, the collection of all collections that are linked one-to-one, a "first" time. Unfortunately, the circular definition of still using the terms "one" and "first" was still inevitable.

CHAPTER 3: APPLYING THE NEW SCIENCE TO THE REAL WORLD

The NS, created by TNK, is not a mere theoretical speculation. It offers practical and applicable solutions to a wide range of problems, both at the individual and collective level. By adopting the concept of non-contradictory units of knowledge "X (NS)", NS allows us to deal with complex issues in a pragmatic way, without the need to justify a universal theory.

Applications in the economic world

In an economic context, NS could be applied to the formulation of more efficient public policies, based on practical solutions and not on universal economic theories. The concept of "X (NS)" could be used to create policies adapted to local and specific realities, without the need for a global economic model that proves ineffective in different contexts.

An example could be *tax reform* (the simplification and promotion of greater transparency of the tax system) in a country in crisis. Instead of applying conventional economic theories that fail in specific contexts, NS would allow reform to be based on pragmatic units that work for the local economy, generating growth and stability more effectively. This methodology would be epistemologically justified and all the exaggerated and doomed intellectualism of current sciences would be *overcome* by the metaphysical grandeur proposed by TNK and people, in various dimensions of society, would inevitably act as prescribed by NS.

Transformation in the political world

In the political field, NS could be applied to promote more efficient governance based on practical data. Public administration could adopt units of knowledge "X (NS)" to deal with specific issues, such as health, security and education, without the need for universal political theories that do not apply to all situations. This would result in public policies more focused on the real needs of the population.

If it is better to be feared than loved (MAQUIAVEL, 1513, chapter XVI), where the "best" is a highly subjective value; Debates about the best type of government, for example, between capitalism and communism, would be settled, since the endless consequences of this conceptual struggle are clear: capitalism offers freedom of choice, production and identity, but does not guarantee rights to the population, while communism, despite guaranteeing rights, is standardized, equalized and dictatorial. In other words, neither one nor the other guarantees happiness, whether individual or general (not even the term "happiness" is clear). So why waste our time with this useless intellectualism? The decision would be made instantly, without any further consideration.

Advances in the scientific and educational world

NS would also have a profound impact on education and science, allowing the creation of *pragmatic curricula* focused on *solving practical problems*, instead of overloading students with complex philosophical and/or scientific theories that are far from reality (e.g. the existence of nothing or complex numbers). Teaching would be oriented towards the application of specific "X (NC)" units of knowledge, adapted to the needs and realities of students, preparing them to face the challenges of the modern world effectively.

Crossing a road

NS might be in a crossfire between the accusation of *irresponsible primitivism* and the claim of *pure action*, free from the anguish of second thoughts. Let us break it down precisely:

CROSSING THE ROAD: IS IT A "PRIMITIVE" OR "HOLISTIC" DECISION?

Answer by NS: The decision to look both ways and cross if there are no cars is a perfect example of X (NS):

a. It is the result of a *first practical unit*.

b. It *does not require* multiple reflections, infinite inferences or absolute guarantees.

c. It starts from *perception*, judgment and *immediate action*, in coherence with what is *seen*, nothing more.

d. It might seem holistic, but it is not, because the person does not calculate statistics, does not project all possible scenarios, does not ponder the mechanics of the car's brakes etc. They see, *decide* and act, period. This is action based on X (NS): arbitrary, but functional.

HOW DOES THE NS DEMONSTRATE THAT THIS IS THE "FIRST DECISION"?

The NS does not need to prove that it was the first *chronologically* (this demand would presuppose thoughts about time), but rather that:

a. It was the only arbitrary unit *assumed* as the basis of the action.

b. There was no *infinite chain* of doubts or rationalizations, that is, it did not fall into the cycle of self-contradiction.

c. It was a legitimate act of *imposition*, as every NS decision should be.

d. If the person stopped for hours thinking "what if a car appears out of nowhere?", "what if I trip?", "what if a drone hits me?", then, yes, we would have *holistic delirium*. But if he imposes the unit: "it's clear, I'm going to cross", he is in NS.

WHAT IF THE PERSON IS RUN OVER? IS THE NS GUILTY?

Here comes the key point of NS ethics:

a. The NS does not promise *"success"*. It promises *freedom* from contradiction.

b. If the person was run over, that *does not invalidate* the decision.

c. The accident is a *fact of the world*, not a failure of the logic of action.

d. Tragedy does not corrupt the *epistemological nobility* of the act of deciding just once.

It is like saying: the death of a warrior does not invalidate his courage. In the same way, the pain of the accident does not contradict the *legitimacy* of the action.

SO... SUFFERING DOES NOT MATTER?

On the contrary! Suffering is recognized by NS as *inescapable*. But, NS says:

Suffering comes precisely from the attempt to avoid it at any cost, by endless rationalizing.

The only way to deal with suffering in an *epistemologically clean* and *metaphysically dignified* way is to act based on a single well-imposed decision, even if it bring pain. NS does not promise *comfort* (would you believe in any promise like this?): it promises freedom from the endless agony of thought that never decides.

In summary, the *trivial* case of the crossing is exemplary. NS does not kill prudence: it reconfigures it as a finite, direct, honest action, without the promise of total control. If the crossing resulted in death, that death was the only one possible within *maximum* epistemological freedom. And this, within the NS, is not failure, but it is *absolute dignity*.

CHAPTER 4: A NEW ERA

The TNK is, therefore, a theory of non-knowledge. It seems counterintuitive at first, but it does, in fact, have a *positivist* claim to give real status to a first unit of non-contradictory knowledge. Since concepts suffer from an infinite regression of definitions whenever we try to define them, what we call knowledge today is doomed to failure in terms of accuracy (including the very concept of accuracy and the concept of inaccuracy of accuracy etc.).

Therefore, we must reject knowledge. However, denying knowledge with its own negation would also be contradictory. Thus, we created a tool called nullification[10], which

10. We could compare nullification to what we currently call *paraconsistent negation* (SOUZA, 2003, p. 81), with which contradictions such as (A ^ ¬A) would not succumb to triviality, since the *principle of explosion* is negated. However, the problem with this type of negation is that it assumes an *inherent* and *unjustified* arbitrariness: that there are real *contraries* in real life. For example, paraconsistency claims to be able to resolve impasses such as contradictory medical diagnoses, where one says that patient X suffers from a fatal disease and the other does not. Now, wouldn't it be much easier to affirm that this supposed contradiction actually resides in the *lack of precision* of medical concepts than in the *analyticity* present in the relationship between genuinely (logically) contrary concepts, by definition (the true A ^ ¬A)? Nullification, on the other hand, assumes the perfect case, where its only property would be to be able to negate the negation itself, in general, without falling into contradiction, *by definition*.

contains in its *definition* the property of denying knowledge (and negation itself) *without entering into contradiction*. This is not a mere methodological convenience, but is its own definition, since it is from nullification that we create the first non-contradictory unit, by nullifying (denying) knowledge in an appropriate way.

With this unit, we create the non-holistic units "X (NS)", in which X is any and all arbitrary knowledge of conventional knowledge, finally *justified* (that is, the problem of traditional science is not the inevitable arbitrariness and lack of universalism, but the arbitrariness *not justified* by a TNK), where there would be no room for infinite considerations, even if it generate "new" consequences in human practical life, to which we would *get used* to, because we would be doing the right thing! After all, any system of rules generates a set of consequences, but those of NS would be *fatalistically justified*, with respect to the precision of knowledge. This would be the perfect model of valid knowledge.

It is also clear that the notation (NS) would not need to be exposed, generating additional work in the manipulation of terms. NS could be applied in a single formal-institutional event, televised and made official worldwide, in order to make scientists and philosophers *aware* of the change, explaining to those already educated how they would behave and teaching science to new citizens based on this new form, which, for them, would be the first and only one.

CONCLUSION

TNK and NS intend to represent a revolution in the understanding of human knowledge. By rejecting the search for absolute truths and embracing nullification and pragmatic knowledge, TNK offers a non-contradictory, pragmatic and functional approach, capable of solving real-world problems.

Compared to other philosophical and scientific theories, TNK presents itself as a more effective solution, since it offers a way to deal with the complexities of life, without falling into the infinite regression or contradictions of traditional knowledge. By applying NS, we can create a more just, prosperous and efficient society, capable of solving social, economic, political and scientific problems with a practical approach, focused on what is useful and necessary.

The article presents a radical, yet coherent framework for understanding epistemic and moral action beyond the traditional bounds of knowledge-seeking. By establishing the TNK and its practical counterpart, the NS, it is proposed a post-holistic model of action grounded in the acceptance of arbitrariness and the rejection of infinite reflection. Rather than advocate for recklessness, the theory insists on action that is immediate, imposed, and singular, free from the paralyzing contradictions of recursive reasoning. NS highlights its call to finitude, courage, and moral clarity in the face of life's inherent risk. It does not eliminate suffering: it acknowledges it as inevitable, and offers a framework in which suffering is not epistemically amplified by endless doubt.

This work is not only intended to be intellectually provocative, but offers a metaphysical and ethical framework that is as severe as it is liberating. In a philosophical landscape saturated with recursive critique and epistemic anxiety, the TNK and NS offer something rare: a way out.

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