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RELATIONAL ENACTION AND ANALOGICAL HERMENEUTICS: A POSSIBLE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PATH AS A MIDDLE WAY FOR RELATIONAL ENACTIVE MINDFULNESS

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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to situate analogical hermeneutics as a possible epistemological place for the development of the perspective of relational action as a horizon of understanding mindfulness. By means of a metatheoretical reflection, some epistemological tensions are presented and a middle epistemological path is proposed. Subsequently, some epistemological ambiguities and challenges are presented in the framework of the conceptualization of enaction, to later present some epistemological conditions gathered from the work of Francisco Varela, which are prudently adapted to analogical hermeneutics. Finally, an integration towards analogical hermeneutics is made, putting in dialogue the phenomenological tradition of enaction with hermeneutics, giving way to a conceptualization of Relational Enactive Mindfulness. The theoretical scope and possible implications in the area of cognitive sciences and Mindfulness practices are discussed.

Keywords: Relational action, Analogical Hermeneutics, Epistemology, Mindfulness.

INTRODUCTION

In this paper we propose a dialogue between a new perspective of mindfulness anchored in enaction (relational) in a cross dipping with analogical hermeneutics as a possible epistemological space for the development of a viable alternative of enactive and relational mindfulness to traditional mindfulness situated in a modern paradigm. In turn, this paper aims to offer a deepening of the alternative epistemological framework, in the context of cognitive sciences that gives rise to enaction, particularly in its relational perspective raised by Araya-Veliz, Aristegui & Fossa (2017). To this end, a metatheoretical proposal is made that nourishes novelly an epistemological floor derived from the recent discussion to recover realism made by Dreyfus & Taylor (2017),

1. From the work of Chilean biologist Francisco Varela
2. By Mexican philosopher Mauricio Beuchot.

where the confrontation of contact theory in opposition to mediationalism is addressed; the latter being considered as the focus of greater relevance to question the core of correspondence-reference underlying the traditional version of mindfulness ("accepting reality as it is"). Some epistemological conditions are identified from the enaction[1] , and from the specific development of relational enaction, and a significant metatheoretical affinity with a turn towards analogical hermeneutics is proposed. [2]

The itinerary to be followed is condensed and summarized in the following four slogans of analogical hermeneutics that deepen the relational action, which we make explicit as conditions of performative-propositional satisfaction to be fulfilled in our analysis. We project them at the beginning as an orientation to be contrasted as a guide for the critical analysis to be developed, being able to oscillate as required in the development of the following elaboration. We make them explicit below:

We propose then a crossing of Relational Enaction and Analogical Hermeneutics that fulfills to be:

Neither objectivist nor subjectivist.

Neither ultimate foundation nor nihilism.

Virtuous, in view of the structure and one's own experience.

Not so fundamental, but original.

Thus, the present study aims to complete and articulate the ontological turn of relational action in the direction of analogical hermeneutics insofar as it meets the conditions just outlined.

Being a proposal that goes beyond the objectivist-subjectivist duality, it brings to the discussion the role of epistemological virtues, it does not aspire to a final foundation, but neither is it diluted in a negative nihilism, and finally it is constituted as a proposal

that offers a metaposition, by means of an original hermeneutic mechanism that serves for the foundation of relational enactive mindfulness. We affirm that this proposition offers a foundation for a renewed vision of the epistemological space of relational enaction open to the background of analogical hermeneutics.

In order to develop our proposal, we will focus on the following points:

I. Metatheoretical and Theoretical Background: Epistemological Tensions and Contact Theory.

II. Specific Background: Enaction and ambiguities. Relational Enaction. Possible epistemological conditions.

III. Crossing deepening: towards Analogical Hermeneutics and Enaction.

IV. Contact Theory and Relational Active Mindfulness.

METATHEORETICAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: EPISTEMOLOGICAL TENSIONS

TOWARDS AN INITIAL PRE-UNDERSTANDING OF THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL BREAKTHROUGH BACKGROUND WHERE THE RELATIONAL ACTION

The openness of this work consists in examining how the contact between two hermeneutic-phenomenological constructs is made: relational enaction and analogical hermeneutics. If the enactive and hermeneutic encounter proposed in this work is a sign of novelty, how much more the analogical relational approach. As far as we know, no hermeneutic possibilities of enaction and mindfulness in an analogical key have been observed in the literature, despite the similes that can be observed in the enactive program and analogical hermeneutics.

However, we consider as a previous step to make explicit the epistemological discussion that arises around relational action, which requires an understanding of traditions and backgrounds from a metatheoretical reflection. At present, it is possible to distinguish at least three epistemological tensions that are intertwined. This is what we point out below:

I. 1.-In the first place, we encounter the tension between the modern and the postmodern.

I. 2.- Secondly, if we go deeper into this tension we find ourselves with the problem of representationalism, and the apparent polarity between epistemology as close to modernity and hermeneutics, which seems to supplant epistemology in postmodernity.

I. 3.- And finally, with the tension between the mediational and contact theories, which give greater novelty to the previous points.

We will begin our tour following the itinerary outlined as the first movement.

THE TENSION BETWEEN THE MODERN AND THE POSTMODERN

This is a topic that has generated much discussion in recent years. Modernity has been characterized by a rational and scientific approach that seeks to discover universal laws that explain the world and reality in an objective, linear and mechanistic way. Postmodernity, on the other hand, questions the idea that there is a single objective and universal truth, and instead defends the social, local and subjective construction of reality.

Since the mid-twentieth century, it is possible to observe how the postmodern perspective has shaken much of the work and reflection in the broad spectrum of social sciences, including studies related to cognitive sciences. When talking about postmodernity, this could be a category applied to different fields, a historical period of time, a philosophical approa-

ch, an artistic trend, among other applications that are discussed. Postmodernity has developed as a set of conceptions of the world, of people and their relationships that wants to overcome or go beyond modernity. For Harvey (1988) these are reflections that in response to univocal ideas appeal to new ideas of a plurivocal character. Similarly, Polkinghorne (1992) indicates that postmodern thought is a reaction to the edges of modernity's own epistemology. It has been observed that postmodernity has its full development in Derrida (1978) and Rorty (1979), and their anti-realist and socially constructed approaches (Fiet, 2023). Another important exponent of these new ideas has been Kenneth Gergen (1994) who has defined postmodernity as the emphasis on the pragmatic and communal construction of knowledge, a way of seeing objectivity as a rather relational achievement and language as a pragmatic means for the constitution of local truths.

THE PROBLEM OF REPRESENTATIONALISM

In order to understand postmodernity's critique of modernity, it would be necessary at least to delimit the metatheoretical assumptions of representationalism, which is one of the paradigms on which much of the spirit of modernity is organized, and the tensions observed between the epistemological and hermeneutical levels. It is precisely here where a tension between epistemology and phenomenology arises that is pertinent to our study.

One of the most important criticisms of postmodernity to modernity is the conception that there is a reality separate from the observer, capable of being known objectively, for this it is necessary to assume that knowledge is a mirror that can reflect reality as it is and that therefore the function of language is to represent it (Anderson, 1997). In turn, such representation is possible if the Cartesian myth of the division of the human being into two substances (res extensa and res cogita) is accepted, since only in this way is it possible to sustain the enterprise of searching for references in reality that support concepts of a mental nature that faithfully reflect it. In modernity this notion was further affirmed, in the scientific context of the natural sciences, where it was intended to sustain an impartial point of view, not only objective, but disembodied, a neutrality from nowhere, which is only interested in the recording of facts. In this way, language is confined to a merely descriptive use, as a mirror of reality (Wittgenstein, 2010) and the mind, therefore, will necessarily have the role of supervising the veracity of these elements, distinguishing the clarity of these representations (Rorty, 1979).

The postmodern critique of modernity can also be traced in the epistemological versus hermeneutic tension. For example, the anti-foundationalist stance of Derrida (1978) and Rorty (1979), directly attacks the floor of the philosophical edifice of modernity, that project that is erected under the assumption that knowledge is the correct representation of the independent and objective reality that the subject must apprehend (Taylor, 1997). In this sense Charles Taylor, without being anti-foundationalist or diluting himself in anti-reality, also manages to criticize the representational epistemology that results in a passive and detached subject, making a bet towards hermeneutics, in which the cognizing agent is involved in the world, interpreting and giving meaning, moving away from a representational subject, and recovering a notion of subject close to Merleau-Ponty's gaze (1945), but without threatening the world in which he is involved.

THE DOUBLE NOVELTY OF RECOVERING REALISM

Another way in which representationalism can be understood is through its relationship with realism; for example, it has recently been suggested that representationalism could be superior to realism in its naive version (Pautz, 2023). On the other hand, realist and non-representationalist approaches also stand out, such as the proposal of robust realism and at the same time pluralist realism by Taylor & Dreyfus (2016), who manage to articulate the recovery of a non-representationalist realism, making the distinction between mediational (or representationalist) theories and contact theories. For these authors, mediation-based or representational theories are understood as an approach in which the reality to be known is "outside the mind", and the knowledge of it is "inside the mind". Thus, knowledge depends on the precision of the "internal representation" with the "external reality", so that it can only be known through or by means of internal, mental or psychological states.

Mediational theories share at least four common features:

(a) The "only through" structure.

(b) The explicit nature of all content.

(c) That it is not possible to go beyond these explicit elements.

(d) Dualistic classification.

In other words, access to the world depends on the mediation of the characteristics of the mind or organism by means of or through ideas or representations; moreover, these ideas are clear, analyzable and distinguishable and one could not go beyond these contents, which leaves us trapped without solution in a duality between the physical and the mental.

- One of the innovative proposals to recover realism, is the proposition that in postmodernity a mediational structure can also be traced, only that the "through" (the mediator of reality) is changed, to the utterances of language. "In this case, the mediating element is not psychic, but linguistic." (Taylor and Dreyfus, 2016, p. 11). It is even pointed out that one of the main exponents of relativism, pragmatism and influential of postmodern thought as Richard Rorty subscribes with at least three of the elements of the mediational structure: the contents of the perception of the world are understood as explicit beliefs, with no other elements beyond or below these, only beliefs justify other beliefs, this generates by antonomasia an unbridgeable dualism between the space of causes and the space of reasons. Thus, it seems that, in spite of the tensions between the modern and the postmodern, from this perspective both epistemological places would have a metatheoretical core committed to mediationalism.

- The second innovation, we place it in the recovery of contact or embodied agent theories, which account for an approach to experience in which the subject does not have an access to the world "from nowhere" but from a background in which an embodied body is situated and contacted. From the contact perspective, we are able to elaborate beliefs naturally, but these are made possible by the preconceptual attachment we have to our environments, which guide and imply understanding (Taylor & Dreyfus, 2016). Following Heidegger (1927/1997). and Merleau-Ponty (1945), the authors bring to the contemporary discussion an understanding of the bound agent, in the sense that the agent is formed by forms of life, history or by its very bodily experience, contrary to mediationalism that involves a conception of a detached agent, one that can only relate to an image that is assembled of the world by means of bits of information by which it can process reality.

The analogy of contact consists in the fact that, at a preconceptual level, the understanding of the world is not constructed or determined by the agent, but is found in a co-production between the I-world. That perception is not found in us, should not necessarily lead us to solipsism or naive realism, but it can lead us to an understanding of interaction, as the intermediate space of contact where the relation between the I-world takes place. For example, your ability to read these words in the place where you are now, are not in your mind or in your body, but in your body in the action of being situated in front of this text following with your eyes the words and the sentences that are put together as you advance in the reading.

SPECIFIC BACKGROUND: ENACTION AND AMBIGUITIES

ENACTION IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCES

In the panorama of Cognitive Sciences, understood as the study and scientific analysis of knowledge in all its dimensions or the study of experience/mind (Varela et al., 1997). Enaction has been proposed not only as a current approach in the sciences (Manca, 2024); but it implies in itself a particular conception of science that could even guide scientific research (Thompson, 2017). Enaction has been described as a stage and one of the approaches of cognitive sciences that overcomes representationalism, disembodiment and theoretical abstraction from nowhere of the cognitive theories that precede it, so that from its beginning it moves away from the mediational structures of its time, cognitivism and connectionism.

- As a first stage, cognitivism seems to present two unresolved barriers. On the one hand, if the transmission of symbols is processed by rules in sequence, the performance of the processing system, which is limited, could affect the performance of the processing itself. On the other hand, it presents the barrier that this processing has the quality of being localized, so that, if a rule of the system is damaged, this would globally affect the entire processing system. Both barriers try to be overcome by connectionism, an approach that proposes a processing system based on simple components that are connected generating networks and patterns of high complexity of interaction, leaving symbols and rules in second place, and prioritizing the connection between the elements that allows the emergence of global states.

- The second stage of connectionism, while moving toward an emphasis on components over symbols, maintains the computational theory in which the cognitive system functions well when emergent properties correspond to specific cognitive skills.

- Finally, the enactive approach, from its inception, is presented as an analogical path and therefore a third alternative to cognitivism and connectionism. The enactive approach explicitly criticizes strong realism, indicating that it is composed of three representationalist assumptions: we inhabit the world and it has particular properties; we capture these properties by representing them internally; finally, a subjective we is separate from the world (Varela et al., 1997). These assumptions are predominantly found in the cognitivist approach, which is affirmed in the computational metaphor, which is that cognition functions as a computer that manipulates symbols.

According to Taylor and Dreyfus (2016), the four features of mediational theories are also compatible with the qualities of cognitivism in its first computational stage:

1. Through a mind that receives inputs from the environment and produces outputs.

2. These inputs, as in computing, are clearly defined bit processes.

3. The brain, like a computer, performs its operations on an external world thanks to the inputs it receives.

4. These operations are mental and are possible within the limits of physical operations of the brain.

AMBIGUITIES OF THE ACTION

Enaction is a concept that contains some epistemological ambiguities that have been described above (Araya-Véliz, Arístegui, Fossa, 2017). The main conceptual ambiguity lies in the fact that at an epistemological level the characteristics of autopoietic systems are maintained in the translation from the biological realm to statements about the realm of cognitive sciences. It was Varela (2000) himself who proposed autopoiesis as an epistemological option beyond cellular life, operating in the nervous system as the foundation of human communication. At this point, although one may look for traces of radical constructivism in Varela's later approaches, from our point of view it would be incorrect to say that the approaches of radical constructivism are present in nuclear aspects of enaction. In this regard, the type distinction between the epistemological/ontological dimensions can clarify the confusion of levels[3] . Thus, recognizing the epistemological foundation of radical constructivism and attributing ontological consequences to autopoiesis would not be a determining factor in attributing the same indistinction to the enacted perspective.

What is at stake in the discussion is whether the epistemological issue at the basis of autopoiesis is radical constructivism and its eventual inheritance to the enactive perspec-

tive. The epistemological problem still seems to be latent, when this notion of autopoiesis is extrapolated to other levels of organization and discourse in disciplines such as sociology (Luhmann, 1984), political science (Jessop, 1990), ecology (Zeleny, 1996), psychotherapy (Ruiz & Gómez, 2017) and family therapy (Botero & Montoya, 2017). This point is even acknowledged by Varela (2000), when he states that the extension of the concept of autopoiesis beyond the area for which it was intended may be unfruitful. Although with his adherence to an "ontological turn" he radically changes the level of discussion with respect to his position (Leiva, 2023, 2020). In fact, as a way to overcome the difficulties of autopoiesis with respect to the understanding of the closed system, Varela proposes a conceptualization outside the original cellular domain, making way for enaction, and which currently follows in a contemporary proposal that has been called the phenomenological turn (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2020). However, while space was gained in enaction, this step implies at the same time a renunciation of intentionality, which in our view is controversial.

When we touch on Varela's vision from the direct referent we are bringing to hand the bifactorial theory of meaning, the tradition of meaning including sense and referent.

In the context of the theory of meaning (Putnam, 1975), it is recognized that meaning is constructed in two dimensions that are organized as an ordered pair, one of sense or of words and symbols and the other as a referent involving experience. It is in this framework that we see in the advance towards enaction another epistemological problem, insofar as the loss of intentionality in Varela enaction supposes a configuration of indirect referent, that is to say that the meaning would be organized out of time of the experience of the biological system, being necessary an alter-

3. Cfr. Feixas, G., y Villegas, M. (2000) al respecto de la distinción epistemológico y ontológico en la discusión del constructivismo

native of direct referent, which does not arise from a representational sense, but neither exclusively from the performative intentional use (Arístegui, 2006, 2017, 2019, 2024; Arístegui et al.,2009). In this regard, it seems necessary to make a brief inquiry in order to clarify and differentiate our position in the face of the ambiguity pointed out. Although this position would appear to be aligned with one of the phases of the discussion about the three components in the definition of mindfulness: Attention, Intention, Non-judgment (Shapiro et al., 2006) where it was proposed in one of the phases of the discussion about the three components in the definition of mindfulness, 2006) where it was proposed at one point to eliminate the Intentional component, keeping only Attention and Non-judgment; from our perspective, a reconfiguration via embodied cognition is possible and recover a notion of intentionality in the distinction of Merleau-Ponty (1945), called operative intentionality, compatible with the orientation of mindfulness (relational enactive). Our position in this regard distinguishes with respect to Varela and following the work of Arístegui (2017), the possibility of addressing the limits of the discussion of the critical approach to autopoiesis from enaction understood as a break implying a turn towards hermeneutic phenomenology that, if it allows this form of intentionality, modifying the formulation of the terms of the scientific definition of Kabat-Zinn. Understanding that intentionality is questionable - the phenomenological that is implicitly placed in discussion with hermeneutic phenomenology - Varela abandons it, conceived from Dreyfus (2002) as cognitive. It is the protocognitivist version of Husserl, which is at the foundation of the rejection of intentionality. Here comes to our aid Heidegger's (1927/1997) line elaborated by Merleau Ponty (1945) of operative intentionality, which we link to the reformulation of the

conception of enaction in line with the direct referent, which involves questioning the view of indirect reference theory in Maturana and Varela's conception of autopoiesis from the position of Arístegui (2017) in addressing enaction in language. In the present study, we continue in this same line.

Considering these ambiguities, it is important not to move forward, neglecting the epistemological and hermeneutical development between the transitions from autopoiesis to enaction and from enaction to relational enaction (relational enaction occurs in the context of the articulation of language and direct referent, as we explained). The proposal we make at this point is to examine the Valerian work with a theory of direct referent such as contact theory, and with a perspective that integrates meaning and referent as Maurice Beuchot does, recognizing the analogical connection between these dimensions (Beuchot, 2012b).

RELATIONAL ACTION

Recently, a theoretical alternative that integrates the relational, intersubjective or second-person dimension has been proposed: relational enaction (Araya-Véliz, Arístegui, & Fossa, 2017). Relational enaction is a conceptual and practical opening of mindfulness. If traditionally in cognitive therapy based on mindfulness, the focus of intervention is placed on the first person, that is, it assumes an individual self that is abstracted from its social and relational context. Relational action integrates the intersubjective relationship in the second person, an approach to the subjective dimension of meaning in the first person in an intersubjective relational context of the second person, from a way of relating to the "self" that integrates mindfulness and self-compassion, which is understood by the same authors as an intentional attitude towards oneself that in turn affects the relationship with others.

If the enaction arises from a concern about the limitations of the metaphor itself computational, probably the great contribution of the relational enaction arises from the concerns about limiting reflection to the subject-world duality, incorporating the second into person as a "being with",[4] which had been until this point a historically excluded third party in the cognitive sciences.

The relational action perspective proposes:

1. Expand research methodologies;

2. to bring the voice of the participants in the first person and thus also consider the relational dimension (in the second person);

3. to value the role of corporeality, to advance to an embodied and enacted look;

4. consider a holistic understanding of experience, without predominance of one dimension over another, as in representationalism that asserts itself in a paradigm of naive realism (Araya-Veliz, 2018).

Firstly, relational action bets on diversifying the different types of studies and methodologies around mindfulness, for example, the reviews made by Moscoso (2018) collects the main evidence and programs of mindfulness, but leaves out research that is done from qualitative and phenomenological methodologies in first person that puts in value the subjective experience of the processes experienced by the practitioners of mindfulness. Secondly, it is emphasized that the construction of mindfulness mechanisms of action should not arise only from quantitative or third-person studies, insofar as these mechanisms obviate the voice of the practitioners. Continuing with the enactive program, the complementation of qualitative and quantitative methodology is proposed, bringing the first and third person into dialogue. In addition, it is proposed to consider the relational dimension (second person) as valid in order to advance in a me-thodological flexibility that incorporates the first, second and third person. Thirdly, corporeality has an important role in cognition and not only as a function. Having an enacted view of the body implies thinking of corporeality and cognition as indissolubly united (Varela et al, 1997). Finally, in an epistemological field, thinking of the relationally enacted perspective invites reflection between the cognitive and affective levels of experience: How is the relationship between the cognitive and the affective established without falling into a cognitivist emphasis? A more relational understanding of enaction invites us to consider cognition as an explanatory but not reductive dimension, in order to avoid an implicit hierarchy in which the cognitive has a certain superiority over the affective.

POSSIBLE EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONDITIONS (IN TRANSIT TOWARDS THE COMPLETION OF THE ONTOLOGICAL TURN)

In spite of these epistemological difficulties, in Francisco Varela's work it can be seen that enaction was looking for an epistemological core that could sustain it and that they did not manage to link it to a framework that could adequately contain it. The first two conditions that can be observed are that the enactive approach is neither objectivist nor subjectivist and that its fundamental virtue is the ability to see our activities as reflections of a structure without losing sight of the directness of experience (Varela et al., 1997). In the chapter "Creative circularities: for the understanding of origins", Varela and Dupuy (1998) extend this view and suggest two additional epistemological conditions for the enactive approach. First, that epistemology does not seek an ultimate "real" foundation, in the style of the hard sciences, and second, that it does not indulge in the nihilism of a permanent

4. In the sense of being-in-the-world with others, according to Heidegger's meaning (Aristegui,2017; Arístegui, Araya-Véliz, 2017).

deconstruction. Second, a middle way is required, a metaposition that does not require an ultimate grounding, but seeks an original mechanism for grounding. These conditions contain a look closely akin to analogical hermeneutics.

In short, the epistemological necessity of Varela's enaction was not blind, it had clear edges:

1. An epistemology that is neither objectivist nor subjectivist.

2. An epistemology that has the virtue of seeing one's own activities as a reflection of a structure, without losing sight of our experience.

3. An epistemology that does not aspire to the ultimate foundation like the hard sciences, but that does not fall into the nihilism of postmodernity either.

4. An epistemology that offers a metaposition that does not require ultimate grounding while striving for an original mechanism for grounding.

These epistemological conditions unfortunately Varela did not manage to articulate them, but one can observe, as Wittgenstein (2010) would say, a conceptualization with a certain family resemblance between Varela's enaction and his epistemological need in transit towards a hermeneutic phenomenological turn and the development of a bridge by way of analogical hermeneutics in the sense that they are proposals that overlap or intertwine in not becoming entangled in the dualism objectivity/subjectivity, with an emphasis on virtue, without fundamental pretensions but neither do they surrender to nihilism and finally they coincide in a position in which, without foundations in the style of naive realism, they do not renounce the possibility of offering original mechanisms for the understanding of complex phenomena.

ANALOGICAL HERMENEUTICS AND ENACTION

TOWARDS ANALOGICAL HERMENEUTICS AS A MIDDLE WAY

For Mauricio Beuchot, hermeneutics is currently in tension between two extremes that have historically polarized the practice of hermeneuticists: univocity or positivist hermeneutics and equivocity or relativist hermeneutics. Although the process of interpreting assumes that the object of interpretation is polysemic, i.e. it has several meanings (if this were not so, there would be no need for hermeneutics), univocism makes efforts to expose a single interpretation as valid, displacing the other interpretations of the text as false, while equivocism in a relativistic spirit accommodates all or most interpretations as valid, categorically rejecting any attempt to situate criteria, objectification or even truth. Analogical hermeneutics (developed by the Mexican philosopher Mauricio Beuchot), is presented as a hermeneutical alternative that dances between the univocal and equivocal extremes (Beuchot, 2023), by seeking the Aristotelian middle ground, intermediate paths to collect the rigor of univocity, without claiming absolute referents, and also learning from the openness and flexibility of equivocity, without being diluted in the drift of meaninglessness. Analogical epistemology is closer to contact theories than to mediational ones, it accepts a realist approach, but not a naive realism like the objectivist one, but a critical realism, in which our knowledge is accepted in its factual quality without falling into an absolutist assumption, for this would be to fall into an interpretative ideal to which modernity aspired, but it also prevents slipping into an interpretative relativism as in subjectivism in which all interpretations are valid as a pretension of the equivocal hermeneutics that often characterizes postmodernity (Beuchot, 2017).

Beuchot, (2015) points out that there are two ways of using analogy, analogy of proportionality and analogy of attribution. The analogy of proportionality allows managing and coordinating several interpretations of the same text, looking for the common denominator between these interpretations, considers the differences it contains, but seeks to match as much as possible that identical part, analogous similarities. In the analogy of attribution, it is possible to distinguish and at the same time attend to the differences, it allows to order by its hierarchical structure several interpretations, considering the greater or lesser degree of adequacy to the meaning of the text. The structural hierarchy of these interpretations derives in main and secondary analogues up to interpretations that are diluted in inadequacy or equivocity, this without pretending to reach the univocity of the main adequacy, but pointing to a main interpretation that articulates those that must be valid.

The analogy of proportion can be further divided into analogy of improper proportion and analogy of proper proportion. The analogy of proper proportion has a structure that is closer to the metonymic and the improper one to a metaphoric structure (Selvaggi, 1955). The analogy of proper proportionality tries to investigate different senses with more equality, in the absence of a main and secondary analogate, it seeks a democratization of the sense. In this form of analogy, each one respects its own portion of meaning, a diverse and distinct meaning. In this way the set of interpretations is woven and these cross at some point, relating to each other in the contribution of adequacy that each one brings without falling into inaccuracy or inadequacy (Beuchot, 2020). Closer to equivocity in the analogy of improper or metaphorical proportion, some of the analogues have proper significance and others metaphorical (Cañas-Quirós, 1999), in other words, it is a type of analogy in which two terms are related, one that receives a literal predicate and another term that receives a metaphorical assignment (Álvarez, 2013).

In analogy of attribution, it is also possible to distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic attribution, allowing modes of interpretation that adhere more or less strictly to the meaning of the text (intrinsic/essential), which leads to an interpretation that assumes a notion of truth of correspondence, i.e., in the analogy of intrinsic attribution, a high level of literal adequacy between the analogues is considered.

INTEGRATION BETWEEN ENACTION AND ANALOGICAL HERMENEUTICS

Gathering the epistemological conditions described above, the following conditions and signs are presented as slogans that are situated in an imminently analogical place. Making use of analogy in different dimensions that are usually polarized, we propose the following slogans inspired by Varela and that find their place in analogical hermeneutics:

Neither objectivist nor subjectivist;
Virtuous, in view of the structure and its own experience;
Neither ultimate foundation nor nihilism;
Not so fundamental, but original.

Neither objectivist nor subjectivist: The first micro process is between the objective-subjective polarization. This epistemological quality is not easily resolved; historically it has been a disputed duality. In this regard, Beuchot (2012a) points out that analogical hermeneutics contains a dialectical mediation similar to Ricoeur's fragmented dialectic, in that it is not a dialectic in search of a synthesis, but allows the coexistence of opposites, allowing tension, not conforming to the univocal/equivocal opposition; objective/subjective, but the analogical remains open, welcoming the best while discarding the drawbacks

of each pole. Thus the author points out that analogical hermeneutics can serve as a mediator between the nature/culture tension. While biologists are univocists wanting to explain everything in causes eradicated in human biology, culturalists mistakenly attribute any understanding as a historical or cultural product. The analogical would thus consider the biological and cultural aspect in their just limits, not attributing to nature aspects that are cultural. This allows the encounter in the limit in which these dimensions cross or touch each other, keeping the portion of each one, without annulling each other. Thus analogical hermeneutics advanced towards an epistemology and paradigm that opens the possibilities of practical and reflexive research.

Virtuous, in view of the structure and one's own experience: The main work for understanding Varela's approach to virtues is found in the series of lectures entitled "Ethics and Action" (Varela, 1991). Varela begins by pointing out that a virtuous person is one who knows what is good and who spontaneously performs it, thus distancing himself from approaches to ethical behavior that begin with research and focus on the rationality of moral judgments. Varela's proposal does not rule out that some aspects of moral behavior come from judgments, but invites the consideration of the following distinction: between knowing how and knowing what, or between spontaneous and immediate ability and response and intentional knowledge or rational judgment to point out that a large part of our actions, including ethical ones, have an immediate, embodied character that depends on a body with sensory-motor skills that are housed in a biological and cultural context (Varela, 1991).

If there is a philosopher who has closely followed the return of virtues in contemporary discussion, it has been Maurice Beuchot (1998). Thanks to this, today it is possible

to speak of analogical virtues and an analogical ethics (Polo, 2017). Regarding virtues, both Varela and Beuchot share the concern to bring virtues back to the philosophical and investigative task. In turn, both draw from the proposal of Gilbert Ryle, who made the difference between knowing how and knowing what (Know That). Following Beuchot (1998), he points out that ability does not depend entirely on rules, but these can help to improve it, while Varela (1991) says similarly "what distinguishes truly ethical conduct is that it does not arise from mere habitual schemes or rules (...) At one extreme are those who argue that wisdom is a spontaneous expression in which reason does not intervene. And at the other extreme are those who think that people should be guided by rational calculation about goals and means." (p.34) Varela thus shows an attitude about virtue that is profoundly analogical, by avoiding extremes in the relation to the use of reason in virtuous action and at the same time by pointing out that it is not possible to deny the truth of our experience in the scientific study of ourselves, but neither can we suppose that science cannot contribute to the understanding of one's own experience.

ONTOLOGICAL AND PERFORMATIVE TURN IN ENACTION

Neither ultimate foundation, nor nihilism: This third micro-process is similar to the first, however, it differs in terms that it evidences much more the investigative attitudes from which Varela was clearly taking distance: the proud aspiration to find the ultimate foundation of the natural sciences and the growing relativistic spirit of postmodernity that dilutes all certainties and opens itself equivocally to a negative nihilism. Varela thus seems to pursue the same enterprise of analogical hermeneutics.

In the key of analogical hermeneutics, under univocal hermeneutics are grouped those who believe to reach an ultimate foundation, rationalism, empiricism, positivism, pretending an objectivity that clarifies this foundation by means of clear and distinguishable interpretations, while equivocal hermeneutics congregates a large group of researchers who reach exaggeratedly relativistic interpretations by means of confused and obscure interpretations, by means of an excessively subjective, skeptical and nihilistic tone present in several postmodern authors (Beuchot, 2012a). On this point, both Varela and Beuchot agree in avoiding both the attitudes that insist on the methodological reductionism of modernity and the irreducible openness of postmodernity.

Not so fundamental, but original: This last micro process derives from Varela's contribution regarding the role of circularities as creative mechanisms for various complex phenomena. The central objective is to find a middle way, which functions as a meta-position, which does not need an ultimate foundation but does seek an original mechanism for its foundation, for which purpose he presents six case studies of complex phenomena such as: metaphysics, biology, currency, social order, evolution and cognition. These phenomena are analyzed by means of the logic of the supplement of deconstruction (Derrida, 1978), but incorporating the notion of creative circularity, providing a fundamental generative logic common to the mentioned phenomena. In this opportunity we will not review case by case, but we will briefly comment on the case of biology.

The logic of the supplement indicates that every philosophical text deconstructs itself, since when a primary concept appears as a self-sufficient logos, it enters into a vicious circularity in which another term subordinate to the primary concept (such as culture or writing) is derived from it, and this second concept ends up being indispensable for the appearance of the first. The main Varelian argument at this point is that there are self-referential qualities in complex phenomena, even though they may be at different operational levels, they share common characteristics. In the case of biology it can be observed that, in the genetic program, biologists have observed that it needs its own production to be executed, moreover for the maintenance and transcription of DNA this is mediated by proteins that are being encoded by the same genetic information that they manage to compose. In the same way it happens with the structure of a cell, it self-produces in a circular determination between its own limits and at the same time composes and produces the limits of the metabolic network that makes its subsistence possible (see figure 1). Thus, the authors theorize about the apparent hierarchy that exists at these levels (genetic program versus proteins) but which are nevertheless inextricably intertwined.


Figure 1. Creative circularity, the case of biology.

In the perspective of analogical hermeneutics we would say that the logic of a fundamental generative shares a certain degree of analogicity between a metonymic point, an evident, real or external sign, and a metaphorical, symbolic point that is joined by a transversal of reference. Thus the secondary term or metaphorical terms inherently need a metonymic reference for the analogical fan to be possible, which facilitates the embracing

of both poles. These poles are crossed by a reference, which makes it possible to connect them by the analogy that moves away from a tangent that makes the reference between them disappear or from the desire to force the sense between them by annulling the analogical prudence (see figure 2).


Figure 2. Creative circularity of analogical hermeneutics. Analogical synthesis emerges

Between the efforts to discover the origin, the fundamental, and the deconstruction of the phenomenon and its dissolution, or between an exogenous and fixed observation and an endogenous gaze, there is a certain degree of complicity, common logic or we could say some degree of analogicity. Thus, in order to go from the first to the second, a dose of supplementary logic, or in analogical key, of equivocity, would be enough to free us from that which seems in the third person to be a fixed and external point. However, the passage back from level two to level one seems to be more complex and it is here that Varela raises the error of nihilism and perhaps of a broad spectrum of postmodernity: to see that there are principles of endogenous emergence, which are interdependent to mistaken, historical or subjective qualities that are capable of making exogenous fixed points emerge, in other words, to lose sight of the first term by extending the equivocal quality of the subordinate term to its ultimate consequences.

CONTACT THEORY AND RELATIONAL ACTIVE MINDFULNESS

CONTACT THEORY, ANALOGICAL HERMENEUTICS AS A PLACE FOR ENACTION

In the renunciation of intentionality, Varela also seems to renounce a hermeneutic aspect, remaining in a phenomenological dimension; without being able to articulate language and perception in a configuration of direct referent[5] that does not fall into the dissolution of interpretative meaning nor into dissociation, so that incorporating a hermeneutic dimension to the phenomenological enactive notion[6] is a challenge, since the solution is not found in the representational epistemology in a disembodied third person, nor in a decompassed phenomenology, that is to say a first person embodied but out of phase with the linguistic meaning. We thus propose a hermeneutic phenomenological bridge, in which analogy, due to its flexible quality but without losing its firmness, can play a role in the understanding between the interpretative and perceptive theory, remaining in an intermediate place, as a second person (being a first person that adopts towards itself the position of the second person) that organizes the possibility of the direct referent and that prudently organizes itself between meaning and experience.

We propose at this point that, just as the computational metaphor is analogous to the representationalism of cognitivism in its first stage and therefore to an epistemological core of naive realism (see figure Nº1, epistemological core Nº1), autopoiesis plays a metonymic role as understood by Varela (Varela, 2000), but since its epistemological core is not clear, it remains only at a phenomenological level

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5. Cf. Arístegui (2017) for the direct referent approach to Varela).
6. Araya-Véliz, Arístegui, Fosa (2017) for a hermeneutic approach in relational enaction.

(see figure N°1, epistemological core N°2). Thus our approach is that although they correspond to different roles, metaphor and metonymy, both characteristics, computational and autopoietic, share an understanding of experience as a closed system, one that is closed and can only metaphorically represent the world, and the other that is also closed but metonymically self-produces as a unit that manages the production of its own components to constitute itself in the world, in any case, both are close to a mediational theory. Thus, both computational metaphor and metonymic autopoiesis are insufficient at their epistemological core for relational enaction. Therefore, we propose that both enaction and relational enaction have epistemological congruence, with analogical hermeneutics being broad enough to be able to contain the complexities of relational enactive experience that attempts to encompass aspects of the first, second, and third person and along with it also assert itself in a metatheoretical core consistent with the background of the enactive program: contact or bound agent theories, which recognize an analogical, prudential, plural, non-representationalist realism (see figure 2, epistemological core 3).

FROM MINDFULNESS IN THE MODERN TRADITION TOWARDS A RELATIONAL ACTIVE MINDFULNESS

In the investigative development of Francisco Varela, the contemplative practice of Mindfulness or full presence/open awareness was promoted as a methodology that facilitates an investigative action between experience and embodied science (Varela et al., 1997), allowing through the study and practice of the Buddhist background-tradition the first-person investigation of phenomena of experience through the meditative exercise. This allowed for the first time, the formal study of experience in a scientific program inspired by a contemplative spiritual tradition, opening the dialogue between the first and third person in the research development. However, following the development and success of the westernization of mindfulness, epistemological tensions also reached its conceptualization and practice, generating a series of criticisms of an atomized mindfulness paradigm in which, for example, contrary to its origin, mindfulness has been presented as a secular practice that facilitates self-development outside of social development (Forbes, 2016); This paradigm has also been called modern mindfulness, differing from mindfulness in abandoning the sense of interdependence, empowering the project of the modern self, and the utilitarian sense of meditative practice, which is not rooted in the Buddhist ethics from which it was born (Somers, 2022); resulting in meditative practices that differ from Buddhist ones in their meaning and purpose (Murphy, 2016).

One of the alternatives to deal with these difficulties has been Relational Mindfulness (Aristegui & Araya, 2017; Arístegui, García Campayo, Barriga 2021; Arístegui 2021). At the basis of an understanding of relational mindfulness is the consideration of identity as a "dense" term that can be distinguished with two uses: an identity as selfhood and ipseity; selfhood in the sense of remaining identical being the "same" over time and ipseity in the sense of remaining open to actualization and recognition of the self in otherness and the new. Traditional notions of modern mindfulness seem to focus on full awareness of selfhood, instructions, attentional focus, and generative resources seem not to come out of a modern view of the individual, even returning to representationalist, disengaged, and non-contact approaches. The argument of relational mindfulness consists in not reducing identity to selfhood (Arístegui, Araya-Véliz, 2017), this would be like continuing the modern project of psychology and psychopatho-

Figure 1. Epistemological cores of 3 moments of cognitive sciences, Cognitivism, Autopoiesis and Relational Enaction.

logy, but integrating the notion of ipseity, to a field of conscious exploration outside the implication of the not-self to which leads to a radical translation circumscribed to selfhood as delimited being and not relational being (Arístegui, 2021), in which selfhood can be understood in a dialectic with ipseity, transcending separation and duality. In this way, relational Mindfulness distinguishes between a romantic, unlinked and delimited self from a relational, linked and non-delimited self (Arístegui, Araya-Véliz, 2017).

If to this discussion we integrate the tension between mediational and contact theories, this consideration leads us to a fruitful metatheoretical interaction in which in its confluence we could speak of an enactive relational mindfulness perspective, (embodied, corporeally felt as a way of life that situates the experience of a mindfulness moment at the level of the direct referential structure) which allows to contain in its epistemological core a robust plural realism of the contact theory with an eminently analogical belt, with a methodology that fluctuates between a metonymic practice of the observation of the identical, the self relating to itself, or a metaphoric practice of

relating to the dimension of the not-self, the others, the novelty, the contingency, or finally an analogical practice that would imply the awareness of the contact, as a meeting place between the self and the not-self, as an experiential hinge that is halfway in the tension of co-production with the world.

Analogical hermeneutics in attunement as a congruent development of the perspective of relational action allows a form of consciousness that gives space to an intersubjective level that makes possible forms of relational interactions that do not fall into the univocal individualistic translation of mindfulness, but neither into a collective and relativistic translation that gives rise to the equivocal; rather it facilitates the practice of virtues as enactive as relational, we could thus speak of an extended embodied relationship.

This new approach with analogical, contact, enactive and relational core allows both to delimit and expand the definitions of mindfulness by broadening the spectrum towards the first-person voice. The analogical spirit allows to embrace and delimit harmoniously to an edge that could be more equivocal as that of McCown (2013)[7], who indicates that there is no true definition of Mindfulness, but

7. We consider that in the case of understanding the expression that there is no true definition, if it is sustained from a notion of direct referent, it places us in a context not determined by a previous meaning, but in an emergent of relational referent. Cfr. Arístegui (2006)

an infinite number of experiences formed by different dimensions integrated between those who work in the moment; (which is a broad enough definition for Relational Mindfulness, Aristegui, 2021) and at the same time taking the best of classical conceptualizations without falling into the metonymic; for example, from the definitions of Kabat-Zinn (1994) who defined mindfulness "a way of paying attention, intentionally, without judgment to the present moment" (p.4) or how Bishop (2004) adds "that every thought, sensation and feeling that arises in the attentional field is recognized and accepted as it is" (p.232).

Between these margins we could then propose an intermediate definition, which takes the best of the relational and the best of the embodied, a place of analogical enactive contact as putting into action a definition via relational direct referent (Arístegui 2006, p.181). Thus, relational enactive Mindfulness can be understood as: *sustaining* a *shared* way of paying attention to each other (joint attention), without judging each other, recognizing each other with awareness in the experiences that are in the present, moment to moment in the *current relational field*. Each "us" is a bidirectional analogical invitation, like two sides of the same coin, i.e., without judging each other, is both in the sense of without judging ourselves (self as legitimate other) and in the sense of not judging the other in the relationship. The effort to sustain, the emphasis on reality, and the relational encounter are keys that imply an ethical and ontological turn, of committing ourselves to take care of taking care of ourselves, recognizing reality (Dreyfus would say recovering it), becoming aware of its relational quality. This view has an almost metonymic affinity with the master Thich Nhat Hanh (1975/2020) when he defines mindfulness as keeping consciousness alive in the reality of the present, but in an analogical and relational key. In turn, this analo-

gical notion of mindfulness is an extension of the approach pointed out by Tang et al., 2017, who states that mindfulness is not just a term or definition, but is a direct experience before a conceptualization, the analogical character implies considering that enactive analogical mindfulness is, therefore, a direct experience of relational contact *between* integrated minds and bodies, not only of mind-body integration of individual subjects.

DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

We proposed a dialogic context for a new perspective of mindfulness anchored in relational enaction in a deep crossing with analogical hermeneutics as a possible epistemological space of development. Considering that this work aimed to offer an epistemological framework for relational enaction as the foundation of relational enactive mindfulness, a metatheoretical proposal was made that nourishes a novel epistemological floor in the direction of analogical hermeneutics. Then, some epistemological conditions were identified from the works of the Chilean biologist Francisco Varela and significant theoretical affinity was found with the analogical hermeneutics of the Mexican philosopher Mauricio Beuchot.

This meeting is condensed and summarized in the re-description of the four slogans that guided the inquiry and crossing dipping carried out (which may vary as required):

1. Neither objectivist nor subjectivist.

2. Neither ultimate foundation nor nihilism.

3. Virtuous, in view of the structure and one's own experience.

4. Not so fundamental, but original.

Thus, from the analysis carried out, we can sustain that analogical hermeneutics fulfills the conditions of satisfaction proposed above, at the beginning of our examination of

the epistemological background in the modernity-postmodernity tension to focus on the confrontation of the contact theory with the mediational theory. At the beginning, we stated and advocated the proposition of an epistemological space of articulation between analogical hermeneutics as a horizon of meaning in confluence with relational enaction in the field of mindfulness foundations. We proposed to investigate a metatheoretical position that would sustain the epistemological conditions of relational enaction in the encounter and confluence at the metatheoretical level with analogical hermeneutics.

In relation to the four slogans proposed from the beginning (p.2) and just pointed out; according to the background examined through the attentive reflection - of the distinctions and argumentation obtained - in the preceding crossing dipping, we can affirm that the analysis carried out is articulated in the following way, expressed in the same sequential order:

The epistemological proposal puts forward a proposal that goes beyond the objectivist--subjectivist duality, brings to the discussion the role of epistemological virtues, does not aspire to a final foundation, but neither is it diluted in a negative nihilism, and finally constitutes a proposal that offers a metaposition, by means of an original hermeneutic mechanism that serves for the foundation of relational enactive mindfulness.

Analogical hermeneutics, as well as the enactive relational perspective, manage to articulate themselves as an intermediate way, alternatives of interpretation that far from integrating opposites in a resolute synthesis, manage to develop from a critical perspective, a dialogue in which the tensions of the interpretative limits of human experience coexist and together with it, delimit with kindness its hermeneutical and phenomenological margins, without falling into the univocity of objectivist approaches nor into the equivocity of subjectivism. In turn, both developments share a way of looking, a way of generating a situated knowledge that takes place in an analogical place, as close as the contact with one's own body, as close as the contact with otherness.

THIS EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROPOSAL HAS AT LEAST THREE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

This work is not without limitations. In the first place, analogical hermeneutics, despite showing itself as a promising theoretical field for cognitive sciences and particularly for relational action, may offer categories and resources that are perceived as distant for monitors, facilitators or therapists working with human groups. Second, "recovering realism" may be an epistemological intention that generates theoretical unease since it may be mistakenly associated with naïve realism. Thirdly, the nascent development of relational action in comparison with the extensive cognitive tradition

- First, it can collaborate in the understanding of relationally focused mindfulness practices, such as dyadic or group experiential exercises or in dialogical contexts characteristic of relational applications of mindfulness (McCown, 2016).

- Second, it can serve as a solid and coherent referential framework for the developments of mindfulness-based interventions oriented to relational contexts such as families and couples with mental health difficulties (Bögels & Emerson, 2019; Fuentes-Ferrada, 2022).

- Finally, this enactive and analog mindfulness approach may hold promise for guiding actions in broader relational contexts, such as school communities that engage in mindfulness practices and require systemic and relational understanding (Hawkins,

2017; McGeechan et al., 2019). Demand for a more in-depth epistemological review considering the realist proposals of the ontological turn, which appears as the most relevant epistemological turn after the linguistic turn (Beuchot, 2016).

"One image held us captive" note Taylor and Dreyfus (2016), perhaps it is time to open ourselves to an epistemology that prudentially distances itself from the image, from the reflection of the mediational theories, but that does not fall into an equivocal symbol or a disembodied metaphor, to an alternative image, that allows us to develop other analogies to the interpreting, without the captivity of static images or the equivocal sound of sirens.

Appealing to prudence, this epistemological encounter is contemplated as a hermeneutic phenomenological possibility, as experiential and analytical categories for the development of relational action in an analogical key. We thus promote a Relational Enactive Mindfulness, as an intermediate way of relating to reality, nature, other beings, people and ourselves. An attitude with which to listen to the polyphony of the first, second and third person, without pride, but also without nihilism, without rigidity, but also without laxity, without foundations that do not allow us to build, nor with fundamentalisms that deconstruct without reconstructing; in short, a form of conscious, enactive and analogical contact relationship.

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