

# International Journal of Human Sciences Research

## POLITICAL RISE OF COLONEL MARCIONILLO ANTÔNIO DE SOUZA

---

*João Reis Novaes*

Adjunct Professor at ``*Universidade Estadual do Sudoeste da Bahia*`` - UESB, Department of History. Master and PhD in Social History by ``*Universidade Federal da Bahia*`` - UFBA

All content in this magazine is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License. Attribution-Non-Commercial-Non-Derivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).



Individuals constantly consider and try to implement their life projects. The success of their investigations does not depend only on their individual actions, on their own rationality capable of tracing a logic of action destined to guarantee the materialization of their desires, on the contrary, even having a space that allows them to make certain decisions, many. Sometimes, they are led to negotiate with groups that make up the society in which they are inserted. This negotiation takes place under the influence of an atmosphere that generates tension, at the junction of different life projects and subjective social components belonging to the cultural framework of their community. In this sense, when problematizing any bibliographic event, the researcher must pay attention to the fact that the social individual cannot control, in its entirety, the unfolding of events, as he is inserted in a context of relationships that transcends his individual experience. On the other hand, we cannot “circumscribe the subject in such a way to his social context and the determinisms of the group, that he ends up giving up analyzing individual outputs”, his ability to read and take advantage of certain events, as “we cannot there is an individual outside of his time, just as there is no subject completely caged by his context” (Schwarcz, 2013, p. 58 and 71).

Thus, placing individuals in their social group and in their historical context will certainly help to prevent us from transforming social agents into heroes, or the “construction of biographies that behave almost like destinies; or true defense courts” (Schwarcz, 2013, p. 52). Added to this is the need to create a problem, a question to guide the narratives of approaches that have certain life stories as their object of study. In this process, the social subject must be placed as the center and key of an analytical exercise that, in addition to highlighting the individual’s values, ratifies social and cultural parameters based on

values, customs, beliefs, projects, aspirations and frustrations of a given society., situated in a specific time and space.

Following this logic, the present work is guided by the following question: How was an individual who did not belong to the elites of Bahia, in the study in question, Colonel Marcionillo Antônio de Souza, able to insert himself and exert influence on the Bahia political scene in the period called by historiography such as the First Republic (1889 to 1930)? In an attempt to answer this question and to guide my narrative, I divide the analysis that follows into three parts. The first is related to the moment when Colonel Marcionillo Souza established residence in the Municipality of Maracás and managed to join, through marriage, the ranks of the local elites. The second will discuss the reasons that led this Colonel to emerge victorious from the conflicts established in Maracás and the region from 1915 onwards. The third will analyze the participation of Colonel Marcionillo Souza in the call: “`Levante Sertanejo`” (1919 to 1920) and how the result of this attack guaranteed him political “control” of the city of Maracás and the region. Obviously, I am aware that this division was a way I found to give coherence and facilitate the understanding of my narrative, since:

Strictly speaking, even though this idea is extremely attractive and seductive to common sense, there is no chronological and logical sequence of events and occurrences in a person’s life. Our lives are not a Sartrean project and do not have a teleological meaning. Biographical events do not follow a progressive and causal linearity, a flying linearity that connects and gives meaning to all the events narrated by a person. They do not concatenate into a coherent, cohesive whole tied by a chain of interrelations: this construction is carried out posteriori by the individual or researcher at the moment they produce an oral report, a narrative. (Montangner, 2007, p. 251).

Furthermore, when I problematize the trajectory of a social agent, such as Colonel Marcionillo Souza, I am not arguing that the importance of research is limited to the observation of the prominence of the selected object, but his trajectory can illuminate social experiences of his time. In other words, the trajectory of Colonel Marcionillo Antônio Souza is understood as a key to analysis that, in addition to highlighting personal values, demonstrates values experienced by the society in which he was inserted and the political group of which he was part.

### ENTRY TO THE LOCAL ELITES

Colonel Marcionillo Antônio de Souza, son of Captain Rodrigo Fernandes de Souza and Maria Altina de Oliveira Dutra, was born on April 30, 1859, in the municipality of Condeúba, in Bahia. Initially, it carried out commercial activities, using troops of mules, transporting goods – such as tobacco and leather from the North of Minas Gerais to the Bahia Central Railway Station, in João Amaro, close to Iaçú, from where it was sent to the capital of the Province (Portela, page: 35). Along this route, the Imperial Village of Maracás was located, which was an indispensable route as it was an excellent landing point for animals and troop leaders, in addition to being another location to be commercially explored.<sup>1</sup>

While passing through the town of Maracás, the troop leader Marcionillo Souza used to rest at Farm: ``Alegria``, approximately two leagues away from the town's headquarters. This farm belonged to Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Joaquim Alves Meira, who frequently rented his pastures to the troops that passed through there. On one of his trips, while passing through Maracás, Marcionillo

was accidentally injured by a shotgun blast and, as he maintained business and friendship relations with Lieutenant-Colonel Francisco Joaquim Alves Meira, he was hosted at his house until he recovered from the injury.

In the meantime, he met Francisca Joaquina Alves Meira, daughter of the Lieutenant Colonel and Rita Joaquina Alves Meira – who was tasked by her father to take care of her guest's wound. After recovering his health, on May 29, 1882, Marcionillo Souza married Francisca Joaquina, with whom he had ten children: Tranquilino, Rodrigo, Maria, Etelvina, Altina, Rita, Antônio, Malvina, Adolpho and Francisco Antonio de Souza<sup>2</sup>. After the marital ties, Marcionillo Souza abandoned his activity as a troop leader and took up residence in Maracás.<sup>3</sup> Possibly, he realized that this marriage could better correspond to his personal ambitions, as his father-in-law was a person respected by the community of which he was part and enjoyed a certain economic stability.

Furthermore, marriage was an excellent opportunity to abandon an activity that required many sacrifices from the troop leaders, who had to face:

[...] long journeys, touching the donkeys and paying attention so that nothing wrong could happen and hurt an animal or damage the goods. Furthermore, the troop leaders needed to be physically fit to work, as they carried a lot of weight, walked a lot and slept and ate in inadequate conditions. The work was hard and the discipline was rigorous: they got up early, picked up the animals, got down and started walking until they reached another landing or their destination. (Novais, 2008, p. 105).

It is well known that, even so, it was an itinerant activity developed by groups of troop men, brought a certain prestige to its

1. The information present in this work is part of the research that resulted in my dissertation, see NOVAES 2009.

2. Some time later, Colonel Marcionillo Souza married Rosa Amélia de Souza with whom he had three more children, namely: Marcionillo Antônio de Souza Filho, Rosa Gaudência Bloisi and Maria Madalena de Souza

3. AFWT, Real Estate and Mortgage Registry Office, Titles and Documents, Book B-01, number: 181, page: 84v.

members, since they, in many cases, became agents of connection and intermediation of commercial and personal relationships, as, in addition to goods, the troop leaders carried correspondence of friends and loved ones separated by distance. This occurred during a period of difficult communication, whether due to the poor conditions of the communication routes or due to the harsh hardships that an individual was subjected to during a trip. Furthermore, the troop leaders were responsible for bringing news of the latest events to the locations that maintained commercial relations. This way:

[...] The troop leader was generally well known in the village, recognized as a good person who, living from this work, became a creditor of great trust and esteem among the merchants. This trust can be explained by the fact that the troop leader brings together some characteristics such as honesty and loyalty, when taking care of orders and delivering them with great care, in addition to being considered practical and honorable in business. (Novais, 2008, p. 105).

Before establishing residence in Imperial Vila de Maracás in 1877, Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Joaquim Alves Meira lived in Bom Jesus dos Meiras (currently Brumado). Upon leaving that location, he left properties under the care of his son Justiniano Alves Meira and his son-in-law Silvino, married to Melvina Alves Meira. It is likely that the troop leader Marcionillo Souza was in charge of taking and bringing news of those loved ones to the lieutenant colonel who would become his father-in-law, as Bom Jesus dos Meiras was located on the commercial route where he carried out his activities.<sup>4</sup>

The reasons mentioned above may have been responsible for the fact that Lieutenant

Colonel Francisco Joaquim Alves Meira hosted and allowed his daughter to marry a foreigner. Without a shadow of a doubt, the troop leader's settlement on Maracás soil was the first step so that, sometime later, Marcionillo became Colonel and exercised control over the political and administrative institutions of Maracás and began to significantly influence the political plots carried out in Bahia at the time.

It was not possible to specify the date on which Marcionillo Souza acquired his rank of Colonel of the National Guard. According to Emerson Pinto Araújo, this occurred in 1910 (Araújo, 1997, page: 35). However, documents<sup>5</sup> from the 1890s report to Marcionillo Souza as Colonel. On the other hand, at that time it was common for the population of a community to refer to wealthier people as Colonel, even if the individual did not legally hold that title. This is what was recorded in historiography as a Colonel without rank, this is not the case with Marcionillo, as at the time of the call: *''Levante Sertanejo''*, the situationist press denounced those colonels who did not have a rank, with Marcionillo's name not appearing among those mentioned.<sup>6</sup>

After establishing residence in Maracás, troop leader Marcionillo Souza realized that his entry into the party-political game could serve his personal ambitions. Thus, he sought to get closer and closer to Pedro Gonçalves do Nascimento Ribeiro, who had moved to Maracás in 1865, after his marriage to Maria Rita Ribeiro de Novaes and his appointment as Parish Inspector of that village. Ribeiro was the cousin of José Gonçalves da Silva, Governor of Bahia between 1890 and 1891, and had managed to be appointed Intendant of the municipality with the support of his

4. Public Archive of the State of Bahia (APEB), Judiciary, Inventory of Rita Joana Alves Meira: shelf 1, box 143, March 235, document 7.

5. APEB, Judiciary, Inventory of Rita Joana Alves Meira: shelf 1, box 143, March 235, document 7; Judiciary, Inventory of Francisca Joaquina Alves Meira: shelf 1, box 144, March 238, document 8.

6. *''O Democrata''*, May 24, 1920.

cousin.<sup>7</sup> Later, he was elected State Deputy for the 5th Electoral Section, of which that municipality was part.

The first step taken by troop leader Marcionillo Souza to get closer to Deputy Pedro Gonçalves was to invite him to be best man at his wedding with Joaquina Alves Meira.<sup>8</sup> The support of this Deputy was essential for the former troop leader's insertion into the local political scene.

According to Osvaldo Portela, at one of the moments when Deputy Pedro Gonçalves had politically distanced himself from Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Alves Meira, the latter would have demanded a similar attitude from his son-in-law Marcionillo Souza, whose refusal led to the breaking of friendship ties between the two. As time passed, this enmity increased, reaching the point where Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Alves Meira accused his son-in-law of having killed, by poisoning, his daughter and his wife, Francisca Alves Souza.<sup>9</sup>

The disaffection between Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Alves Meira and his son-in-law reached a point – according to Gentil Meira, in a letter published by the newspaper: *“Diário da Bahia”*; the first allied with the Mocós Teotônio Meira, Colonel Antônio de Miranda, Captain Antônio Pereira, José de Miranda Rebouças and Armando Miranda Lacrose, to hire the Cauassús, in 1915, in order to murder Colonel Marcionillo Souza and his son Tranquilino Antonio de Souza. This was not carried out due to the fact that Marcionillo had traveled to the Capital at that time and, upon returning to Maracás, knowing what had happened, he would have

taken precautions to guarantee his life and that of his son.<sup>10</sup>

Francisco Alves Meira was quick to publicly deny the accusations, blaming Colonel Marcionillo Souza for being behind such an act. He began his defense by stating that, “intrigue, slander and lies are the weapons that this individual who is cynical, cowardly and lackluster uses it to undermine the honor and dignity of those who offer obstacles to his follies and crimes”. He then challenged his son-in-law to sign the denunciations, asserting that there were many things he would like to make public, such as the murders of Notary Macedo and Colonel Clemente Gondim<sup>11</sup>.

At that time, Colonel Marcionillo Souza, with the political support of State Deputy Pedro Gonçalves do Nascimento, was already the main leader of the Rabudos group in Maracás and the region. On the other hand, his father-in-law joined the Mocós faction led by Marcionillo's main opponent, Colonel José Antônio de Miranda, supporting all attacks aimed at weakening his son-in-law's politics. From then on, the rivalry between Rabudos and Mocós gained greater importance in the local political scene.

Furthermore, due to the fact that the political and administrative structure of the municipalities in the region under study did not have the capacity to simultaneously accommodate members of the aforementioned groups, violent clashes occurred between the two factions for control of these positions. The height of this conflict occurred in 1915 and 1916. In 1915, the Cauassús<sup>12</sup>, also known as white rats, based on an alliance

7. APEB, Colonial and Provincial Section. Pack 963 – Acts of the Provincial Government, 1835-1848, p. 371.

8. AFWT, Property and Mortgage Registry Office, Titles and Documents, Book B-01, number: 181, page: 84 v.

9. AFWT, Crime Procedure, number: 597, March 38, page: 13 (front and back).

10. *“Diário da Bahia”*, December 19, 1916.

11. *“O Democrata”*, January 6, 1917.

12. The ancestors of the Cauassús lived in Lavras Diamantinas, and from there, in an attempt to escape the political conflicts, they had had for years with the Gondins, they ended up dispersing to places such as Maracás, Jequié, Brejo Grande, Vitória da Conquista, Amargosa and Boa Nova. Soon after settling in these places, they went through a period of relative quiet, which allowed them to dedicate themselves to commerce and agricultural exploration on their main farms. This tranquility was only



signed with the Mocós, triggered a series of actions against the Rabudos, culminating in the invasion of the city of Maracás on the morning of October 24 of the same year, when Colonel Frutuoso Cerqueiro, political ally of Colonel Marcionillo Souza, occupied the municipality's Quartermastership.

### **RABUDOS, MOCÓS AND CAUASSÚS: ALLIANCES, CONFLICTS AND COHESIONS**

To better understand the triggering of the events that will be discussed, it is important to know the political scenario of Maracás at the beginning of 1915, when, as it was a time of elections for the Municipal Intendency, the emotions of the members of the Rabudos and Mocós were at their peak. The two groups used the most violent methods to gain control of the Municipal Executive. The streets of Maracás became the scene of constant fighting between the two factions, who populated them with their hordes of gunmen. Leading the defenders of the interests of the Mocós, in addition to Colonel José Antônio de Miranda, were José Miranda Rebouças, who was nicknamed Juca Rebouças, and the president of the Municipal Council, the rabble-rouser Nestor Sá. The Rabudos were led by Colonel Marcionillo Souza, and his co-religionist and friend: João Isaías dos Santos.

The height of the conflict between the Rabudos and Mocós occurred when the second group, as they did not have enough men in arms to face the former's bandit, decided to establish alliances with the Cauassús to fight the common enemy.

According to Vicente Silva Fróes, Colonel José Antônio de Miranda met with the brothers José Olímpio and Eduviges Cauassú, in the town of Tamburi, with the aim of materializing actions that would weaken the power of the

broken with the murder of Augusto Cauassú at the behest of Colonel José Marques da Silva, a political ally of Colonel Marcionillo Souza. This murder would have deepened the rivalry between the ``rabudos`` and the Cauassús.

13. ``A Tarde``, April 16, 1916.

Rabudos. Thus, the Colonel would have hired the Cauassús for the sum of six contos de réis so that they could face and defeat the army of gunmen that occupied the streets of Maracás, commanded by men trusted by Colonel Marcionillo Souza. Encouraged by the fact that the Rabudos were common enemies, the Cauassús invaded the city of Maracás on the morning of October 24, 1915.<sup>13</sup>

The invasion lasted for forty-eight hours. Residents had to leave the city to escape the intense firefight between Colonel Marcionillo Souza's men and the Cauassús. Commerce was looted, houses were invaded, and their walls were pierced to facilitate the maneuvers of the invaders during the fighting. What motivated this undertaking was the desire to demonstrate to the state government the need for intervention, evidently in favor of the Mocós, as Marcionillo Souza's group would be revealing its inability to maintain "order and tranquility" in Maracás, since the Intendant was a political ally of this Colonel. Furthermore, the action of the Cauassús could be seen as a result of the personal enmities of the leader of the Rabudos and not as a maneuver that could guarantee the Mocós control of the municipality's political and administrative institutions. This strategy of creating a climate of instability that led the Government to intervene in local conflicts was very common throughout the First Republic, not only in Bahia, but in Brazil as a whole.

As was customary at the time, whenever conflicts between political factions affected the normality of the backlands, Bahia society and the state government were called upon to intervene in local issues. Individuals who were linked, directly or indirectly, to one of the parties involved in the dispute, and who in some way believed it would be beneficial to raise public awareness through newspapers

and printed matter, thus reaching a larger contingent of people in different regions, even though these arrived at their destinations with some delay – they headed to the capital and tendentiously described the direction these conflicts were taking and their possible consequences for the local community.

This attitude was sometimes intended to present the actions of members of the rival group as harmful to the inhabitants of the region affected by the conflicts and as an affront to the “order” established by the institutions of the republican State.

In addition to trying to attract public opinion to the complainant’s side, it aimed to induce the Governor to intervene in local clashes, preferably alongside the group that promoted the complaint. It was, therefore, another way of weakening, since it had not been achieved through direct confrontation, the power of the opposing faction.

According to this logic, shortly after the Cauassús’ attack on the City of Maracás, Colonel Marcionillo Souza went to Salvador with the intention of denouncing the alliance established between the chief of the Mocós and the leaders of the Cauassú family. Thus, on November 12, 1915, in a conference with the Seabra Government at the Rio Branco Palace, Marcionillo reported the attack by the Mocós allies on Maracás. According to the newspaper: “*A Tarde*”, the Colonel was reportedly threatened with death by rival José Antônio de Miranda, which led him to ask the Governor for action to prevent this from happening. Responding to this request, Seabra “[...] promised the Colonel to speak to the Chief of Police, where he sent a telegram to Mr. José Antônio, holding him responsible for whatever happened to Colonel Marcionillo.”<sup>14</sup>

Soon after the Cauassús invasion of the municipality of Maracás, conflicts between local political factions were temporarily

14. “*A Tarde*”, November 13, 1915.

15. “*A Tarde*”, November 17, 1915.

alleviated due to the intervention of the State Government which, responding to the appeal of a group of Italian traders who lived there, sent the then Secretary of Police, Álvaro Cova, to pacify the city. He, in turn, boarded the steamboat to Cachoeira on November 16, 1915, accompanied by Lieutenant Colonel Paulo Bispo, Ensign Cassimiro de Castro, clerk Pontes and the Italian Consul. However, before starting his journey, the Secretary of Police telegraphed the police detachments of the municipalities close to Maracás, ordering them to move to Tamburi and there await his arrival to carry out new orders.<sup>15</sup>

The leaders of the Rabudos and Mocós, upon learning of the arrival of the Police Secretary, tried to collect their bandits, avoiding combat with State agents, which would possibly cause political losses for both groups. Upon arriving in Maracás, Álvaro Cova undertook a movement aimed at disarming the two factions, ordering their leaders to hand over their weapons. The mocó Nestor Sá did not want to comply with the Police Secretary’s order, which resulted in his arrest, being released days later, in the town of Tamburi, at which time Álvaro Cova, together with his subordinates, returned to the capital as he understood that the order had been reestablished in the municipality (Portela, pages: 9 to 13).

Upon returning to Salvador, on November 23, 1915, Álvaro Cova ensured the reestablishment of “order” in Maracás and, to guarantee the continuity of that situation, he left on standby a detachment of 35 soldiers under the command of a regional delegate and Ensign Cassimiro. However, defending the interests of his co-religionist, Colonel José Antônio de Miranda, the Secretary of Police, during the clarifications provided to the capital’s press, omitted the invasion of Maracás by the Cauassús that occurred

the previous month. On the contrary, he stated that the local clashes occurred due to Colonel Marcionillo Souza's jealousy. He would have felt overlooked due to the fact that his Philharmonic, Lira Maracaense, was not invited to play at the feast of the Patron Saint of Maracás, Nossa Senhora das Graças, as had happened with ``*Filarmônica União Popular*``, which belonged to the Mocós. The result, according to the Secretary of Police, was the entrenchment and burning of more than ten thousand cartridges during the battle between members of the two political factions. The situation only became more serious because Paulo Bento abolished the presentation of musical groups from the celebration's program.<sup>16</sup>

As for the Cauassús, after withdrawing from the city of Maracás, they continued invading and looting the properties of residents of the region, especially those who, in some way, were linked to the Rabudos faction. The support center for the Cauassús' attacks was Farm: ``*Boa Vista*``, owned by the First Substitute Judge of the District of Maracás, Colonel Francisco Alves Meira and his son Theotônio Alves Meira, father-in-law and brother-in-law of Colonel Marcionillo Souza, respectively. The Farm: Boa Vista occupied a strategic position, as it was close to the headquarters of the municipality of Maracás, the town of Porto Alegre, the cities: Jequié and Boa Nova.

The attacks of the Cauassús, at first, generated good results for the Mocós, because while the leaders of the Rabudos were concerned with defending themselves against the actions carried out by that family, Colonel José Antônio de Miranda, on his trips to the capital of Bahia, he managed to get the Governor, J. J. Seabra, to appoint him Intendant of the municipality of Maracás. This appointment took place at a time when significant changes occurred in the rules of 16. ``*A Tarde*``, November 25, 1915.

the political game.

These changes are directly related to the measures adopted by Seabra to increase the colonels' dependence on the State Governor. Taking advantage of the political disarticulation of the opposition, aggravated by the murder of Pinheiro Machado on September 8, 1915, Seabra consolidated his power through control of the Legislature, the reform of the State Constitution of 1891 and the promulgation of the Municipal Organization Law, or Law 1,102, of August 11, 1915. This Law established that the Intendant would no longer be elected, as governed by the 1891 Constitution, and would be appointed by the State Governor, as well as the exercise of his mandate would be reduced by four for two years.

Seabra, making use of this legal provision, before the end of his mandate, in the period from December 1915 to March 1916, appointed Intendants in 135 of the 141 existing municipalities. Among these was Colonel José Antônio de Miranda, who would occupy the Maracás Quartermastership until 1918. Thus, the alliance celebrated between the Cauassú and the Mocós, at first, was profitable for the latter group. But, as time went by, the Mocós lost control over the Cauassús, who began to loot an increasing number of properties, generating panic among the region's inhabitants. As they embarked on a looting journey, the Cauassús acquired an increasing number of enemies. Possibly, due to this fact, they did not feel safe enough to establish housing in a certain location. From 1915 onwards, they turned to banditry, leading a nomadic life. Their survival was guaranteed, at least as long as possible, through the use of weapons and spoils made on properties in the region in question. This situation lasted until the second half of 1916, a period in which the death of the leader of this family, José Cauassú, was recorded.



The feeling of insecurity generated by the Cauassús' attacks took several residents to the Capital, with the aim of, through the press, sensitizing public opinion and, at the same time, demonstrating to the Governor the need for his intervention to put an end to the panic situation that had arisen in Maracás and region. Responding to this call, in May 1916, Governor Antônio Muniz sent Lieutenant Farias to Maracás, with the order to appease the region. Upon returning to Salvador, the Lieutenant reported to the Government that he had managed to successfully carry out his mission. This was nothing more than a clear mistake, as complaints about the actions of the Cauassús continued to reach that capital.

This situation led the State Government to send an expedition made up of 50 soldiers to the region, under the command of Lieutenant José Pedro Simões. This expedition was supposed to put an end to the actions of the Cauassús.

Upon arriving in Jequié, in April 1916, after eight days of searching, they had their first contact with the gang led by José Cauassú, who fought violently with the Police Force. During the conflict, it used guerrilla tactics, dividing itself into several smaller groups that, as they knew the region's geography better, began to occupy the highest points of the terrain, causing the Police Force to be cornered, which forced it to beat retreat.

Days later, Lieutenant José Pedro Simões telegraphed the Secretary of Police informing him of what had happened and requesting that reinforcement be sent. In response to the request made by the Lieutenant, a second expedition was sent to the region. The new Police Force was made up of 100 soldiers led by Lieutenant Colonel Paulo Bispo do Nascimento, who had Ensign Cláudio Correia as his assistant. Furthermore, the Secretary of Police telegraphed Captain José de Meira

Pinheiro, who was in Maracás, ordering him to go to Jequié to assist the new expedition during the attempt to capture the Cauassús<sup>17</sup>.

The second expedition had the help of 70 gunmen from Colonel Marcionillo Souza, led by Tranquilino Antônio de Souza. This help, without a shadow of a doubt, was essential during the persecution of the Cauassús, since they were men fond of the fights fought in the forests of the conflict zone, and, like the persecuted group, they knew the geography of the region very well, which allowed them to lead the Police Force through the backlands, avoiding ambushes like the one that was responsible for the failure of the first expedition.

The relationship between the political leaders of Maracás and the State Government was changed from April 1916, when Antônio Ferrão Muniz de Aragão, with the support of Seabra, was elected Governor of the State. Muniz had been chosen by Seabra for "being his oldest and most dedicated friend", which would allow him to maintain control of the Bahia Executive and prepare the ground for his return four years later. When Muniz was appointed to replace Seabra, Colonel José Antônio de Miranda telegraphed him congratulating him and making himself available to help the new Government with whatever was necessary. During the election, he received 639 votes, which was not enough to win his favor.<sup>18</sup> This procedure indicates that, with few exceptions, support from the state government could decisively influence the outcome of local clashes. This becomes clear when we see the strengthening of Colonel Marcionillo Souza's power when he began to count on the support of Antônio Muniz.

Antônio Muniz's approach to Colonel Marcionillo Souza occurred when the Governor, aiming to strengthen his personal power, adopted a series of measures that

17. "A Tarde" May 9, 1916.

18. "Gazeta do Povo", September 4, 1915 and January 16, 1916.

displeased both Seabra and the majority of PRD members (Pang, 1979, page: 131). Among these measures, one can mention the replacement of Seabrism stewards with people they trust. Unlike his predecessor who, in most cases, was reluctant to interfere in local conflicts, he began to support the colonels involved in fights with Seabra's supporters. This is what happened in Maracás, when Antônio Muniz asked the leader of the Rabudos to help with the police attacks against the Cauassús. As a result, there was the political strengthening of Colonel Marcionillo Souza and the beginning of the political decline of José Antônio de Miranda.

With the arrival of the second expedition to Jequié, the persecution of the Cauassús began again. The command of the Police Force decided to divide it into two groups, one under the leadership of Lieutenant Simões and the other under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Paulo Bispo. Seven leagues after leaving the city of Jequié, the first group met the Cauassús, engaging in a violent shootout that lasted from the early hours of the day until dusk, at which point the Cauassús retreated. The outcome of the fight was negative for this group. Ten of its members were killed, while the Police Force had only one of its soldiers slightly injured.

After becoming aware of the fight, Lieutenant Colonel Paulo Bispo, concerned about the fighting strength of the Cauassús, telegraphed to the Secretary of Police, informing him of what had happened and requested reinforcements from two more officers and some enlisted men. Responding to the Lieutenant Colonel's demands, the Security Secretariat sent a third expedition to the region on May 24, 1916, made up of 50 enlisted men and two ensigns, Malaquias Pereira and Francisco Gomes. This expedition left Salvador carrying 10,000 cartridges to

19. ``A Tarde'' May 24, 1916.

20. ``O Democrata'', August 19, 1916.

21. ``A Tarde'', August 19, 1916.

reinforce the Police's firepower against the Cauassús. This way, the police contingent sent by the Government reached the number of 240 soldiers, to which were added its officers and the bandits provided by Colonel Marcionillo Souza. This contingent began to pursue the Cauassús, who had just over 100 men under arms and accustomed to the conflicted region.<sup>19</sup>

The persecution against the Cauassús was intense, as, in just over three months, the group was reduced to 14 men. Many were killed, others deserted when they found themselves trapped by the actions of the Police and Colonel Marcionillo Souza's gunmen. On the other hand, the casualties recorded in the Police Force were two dead and one injured. The "hunt" for the Cauassús, at least for the Police Force, was concluded on July 26, 1916, when José Cauassú was injured and died days later.

In August 1916, the Cauassús, in reduced numbers, dispersed to other locations, and "peace" once again reigned in Maracás and the region. From then on, the State Government authorized the return of troops to the capital of Bahia, leaving there, as a precaution, a small detachment of 30 soldiers and an officer<sup>20</sup>.

According to the newspaper: ``A Tarde'', the first detachment disembarked in Salvador on August 17, 1916, leaving behind a series of barbarities committed in the name of "order". The action of the Police Force, assisted by Colonel Marcionillo Souza's men, in some cases, surpassed the level of cruelty attributed to the Cauassús.<sup>21</sup>

The development of the events mentioned so far produces the perception that the biggest beneficiary was Colonel Marcionillo Souza. The other parties involved in this process were somehow harmed. At first, Colonel José Antônio de Miranda had been favored

by the actions of the Cauassús, as he was appointed Intendant and president of the Directory of the Democratic Republican Party in Maracás.<sup>22</sup> Over time, as it did not have control over the Cauassús, and suffered the negativity of the alliance established with the leaders of this family, precisely during a period of government change, it experienced a sharp decline in influence on the local political scene. As for the Cauassús, the results of the battle established with the Rabudos were negative, as a significant part of their members were killed or arrested by the Police Force. It is added that after the battles fought with Colonel Marcionillo Souza's gunmen, the Cauassús were forced to change their area of activity.<sup>23</sup>

For all this, it can be said that Colonel Marcionillo Souza, from the moment he was summoned to assist the Police Force in the hunt for the Cauassús, having access to weapons and ammunition, became stronger politically and militarily.

This allowed him, in 1919/1920, to raise an army of bandit and, together with other colonels from the country side of the State, march towards the Capital in an attempt to prevent the inauguration of the then elected Governor, José Joaquim Seabra.

## THE BOSS OF ``RABUDOS`` IN THE BAHIA LIBERATION CAMPAIGN

The period from 1919 to the end of the 1920s was one of the most tumultuous of the First Republic in Bahia. This situation began in the electoral election of December 26, 1919, at which time the opposition to the Bahia Republican Democratic Party (PRD) began to interfere more incisively in the state's political scenario. Aiming to defeat Seabrism, he launched his own candidate and sought the support of colonels from the country side who were unhappy with the situation. It was in this scenario that Colonel Marcionillo Souza demonstrated his political strength and military power, by participating, together with colonels Horácio de Matos and Anfilófilo Castelo Branco, in the movement that was recorded in historiography as ``*Levante Sertanejo*`` or ``*Revolta Sertaneja*`` (1919/1920).<sup>24</sup> This movement, according to what was reported by the opposition press, aimed to prevent governor José Joaquim Seabra, elected in the 1919 election, from assuming the position of governor of the State.

The ``*Levante Sertanejo*``, led by colonels Marcionillo Souza, Horácio de Matos and Anfilófilo Castelo Branco, occurred during a period of social and political turbulence experienced by the State of Bahia. Even though there were periods of relative tranquility, this State was going through a severe economic crisis that affected the country at the end of the 19th century. This crisis began in the imperial period and fluctuated during the First Republic and, in most cases, followed the trends of the external market. This, in turn, generated a considerable increase in the price of food at certain times and made life particularly difficult for the poor population.

---

22. ``*O Democrata*``, June 16, 1916.

23. ``*A Tarde*``, December 24, 1917.

24. The present work opts for the first name because it understands that this movement did not aim for radical changes in the economic, political and social structures of Bahia at the time.

This scenario became even more complicated, as the population of Bahia suffered from a smallpox epidemic in the capital and yellow fever in the countryside.

Added to the above is the fact that the country side colonels had not yet come to terms with the approval of the State Law, number: 1,104, of May 9, 1916. The adoption of this Law, as already mentioned, was intended to weaken the influence exerted by opposition colonels from the country side in the political game, at the same time that it aimed to centralize the political decision-making process in the hands of the State governor. The main articulator of this strategy was Seabra who, since 1915, demonstrated the desire to promote reforms in the Constitution of Bahia.

Furthermore, the opposition, disjointed since the death of Senator Pinheiro Machado in 1915, in an attempt to strengthen its bases, held the Government responsible for all the evils that affected the State and, taking advantage of the splits made within the situationist party, which coincided with the extinction of the Conservative Republican Party, it gradually strengthened, to the point of launching its own candidate to compete against Seabra for the Government in the election of December 29, 1919. It is important to highlight that “opposition, in the context of the First Republic, it did not imply significant ideological divergences, but was rather reduced to circumstantial disputes for power” (Ferreira, 2002, p. 24).

Republic Senator Rui Barbosa became the unifying element of this opposition. In practice, “Rui, senator for the PRD, never accepted Seabra as leader, much less recognized the legitimacy of his position as leader”, although he maintained a friendly relationship with Seabra, as he always had his support in the electoral processes for the Senate of the Republic (Pang, 1979, page:

125). However, when Seabra nominated Antônio Muniz to succeed him in the State Government in 1915 without consulting Rui Barbosa, who considered himself the main articulator of Bahia politics, clashes between the two became constant. The situation became even more complicated when Seabra was elected Senator of the Republic on June 26, 1917, filling the vacancy left by José Marcelino, who had died two months earlier. From then on, Rui Barbosa saw his place as Bahia’s main spokesperson on the national political scene threatened. The definitive split occurred in 1919, when Rui Barbosa ran for President of the Republic. Seabra managed to convince the Bahia PRD to support Epitácio Pessoa and not his fellow countryman. During the presidential campaign, accusations exchanged between the two Bahia senators became common place.

After being defeated at the polls, seeking to avoid an even greater loss of influence to his rival, Rui Barbosa used all his prestige to prevent Seabra from returning to the position of Governor. Aware that defeating situationism, due to the electoral structure of the period, was very difficult, mainly because it was up to the State Senate to recognize the elected candidate and because Seabra had the support of the majority of the bench, Rui Barbosa tried to prevent his candidacy, adversary. He didn’t succeed, as Seabra ran for State Government. The opposition chose the name of federal judge Paulo Martins Fontes to contest the elections with the president of the PRD.

During the course of the campaign, the opposition, by keeping alive the result of the last presidential election, in which Rui only obtained the majority of votes from the electorate in the Capital, focused all its forces on preventing this from happening again. Thus, Rui goes on a crusade through the country side, in an attempt to persuade

local political leaders to support Judge Paulo Fontes' candidacy. His trip, which lasted 35 days, began on December 3, 1919. While traveling through the municipalities: Serrinha, Bonfim, Nazaré, Santo Amaro, Cachoeira and Feira de Santana, "the Evangelizer of Civics" began to publicize that only the "countryside" could free Bahia from the yoke imposed by Seabrisism.

The dispute for the Executive in 1919 was preceded by a series of acts of violence carried out by both the opposition and situationism. Both, in many cases, preferred to hold the election in the comfort of their homes, forging the electoral records and thus guaranteeing the victory of their candidates. Once the election was over, the two groups presented different results for the vote. According to the government's count, Seabra would have obtained 45,584 votes, while Paulo Fontes 10,374. Rui's supporters guaranteed that this result was false, as Paulo Fontes had obtained 25,874 votes against Seabra's 12,240 (Sampaio, 1998, P.150).

As it was up to the Senate to officially count the votes and the majority of its members were Seabris, the opposition channeled its hopes of changing this situation into the actions of the country side colonels. To this end, he tried to demonstrate to these colonels that the moment was ripe for promoting a movement that would culminate in the recognition of Paulo Fontes' victory and, what interested those colonels most, the political weakening of Seabra.

From then on, the opposition began to encourage the actions of colonels from the country side against the State Government, as they knew that only federal intervention could guarantee the victory of their candidate or, in the worst-case scenario, the holding of a new election. Thus, nurturing the hope of intervention by the central Government in Bahia's internal conflicts, the Ruist sought to

create a climate of sociopolitical agitation that would draw the attention of the President of the Republic to the inability of the Government of Bahia to maintain "order". With this aim, the opposition organized "a committee, headed by Pedro Lago, João Mangabeira, Simões Filho and Rodolfo Martins, with the task of making the colonels and their bandits march to the Capital" and prevent the recognition of Seabra as Governor of the State (Sampaio, 1998, p. 151).

Simões Filho, aware of the closeness of his friend Manuel Alcântara de Carvalho to Colonel Horácio de Matos, tasks him with convincing him to lead the armed march. Conducting correspondence signed by Simões Filho and Pedro Lago, Manoel Alcântara, together with Colonel João Arcanjo, from Brotas de Macaúbas, headed to Chapada Diamantina, where he managed to persuade Colonel Horácio de Matos to join the opposition's plans. Soon afterwards, speaking on behalf not only of the opposition, but also of Horácio, Manoel Alcântara headed towards Maracás and managed to convince Colonel Marcionillo Souza to take up arms against situationism. Manoel Alcântara's journey did not end in Maracás. From there, he left for Remanso and convinced Colonel Anfilófilo Castelo Branco to join the movement (Moraes, 1984, p. 81).

The ease with which colonels Anfiófilo Castelo Branco, Horácio de Matos and Marcionillo Souza adhered to the appeal made by the rustists was a consequence of interventions, whether by the Muniz government (1916/1920) or by Seabra (1912/1916), in local conflicts. In the specific case of Colonel Marcionillo Souza, who has always declared himself against Seabrisism, his support for the opposition movement is directly related to the events that took place in Maracás and the region in 1915, which made it possible for Colonel José Antônio Miranda



to be appointed to the Intendency of that city.

Knowing of Colonel Marcionillo Souza's adherence to the opposition led by Rui Barbosa and fearing future complications, the State Government began to encourage the actions implemented by the Judge of the District of Maracás, Francisco Leonardo da Silva Lessa, against the Rabudos.

This judge, together with the Mocós, organized an army that, in addition to the local police, was made up of gunmen and members of the Cauassús family. Furthermore, according to opposition newspapers, in yet another attempt to convince public opinion that Colonel Marcionillo Souza was forced to take energetic measures to guarantee the "interests" of the local population, the group led by Judge Leonardo Lessa carried out "illegal arrests, publicly beating defenseless citizens, shocking families, who begin to leave the city, terrified by the regime of terror".<sup>25</sup>

In the meantime, the opposition leaders in the Capital had already agreed with the colonels from the country side on the strategies that each must adopt for the success of the movement. Thus, as a way of guaranteeing the movement of reactionary forces, as well as preventing the sending of police expeditions into the country side, the colonels must take control of the main communication routes that linked Salvador to its regions. It would be up to Colonels Anfilófilo Castelo Branco, Horácio de Matos and Marcionillo Souza to occupy, respectively, the railways of Juazeiro, Central da Bahia and Nazaré, which began to be carried out at the beginning of February 1920, when Colonel Horácio de Matos took possession of some villages and the municipality of Lençóis.<sup>26</sup>

Among the three main leaders of "Levante Sertanejo", the Colonel Marcionillo Souza was the one with the greatest freedom of action at the beginning of the movement. Colonel

25. "A Tarde", January 28, 1920; "O imparcial", January 29, 1920.

26. "A Tarde", February 3 and 4, 1920; "Diário da Bahia", February 3 and 4, 1920.

Horácio de Matos could not move with all his people because he had to conquer Campestre (currently Seabra), as this city could serve as a base for attacks against his stronghold. Colonel Anfilófilo Castelo Branco, in turn, was faced with the possibility that Remanso would be attacked by the expedition that was stationed in Juazeiro. This way, Colonel Marcionillo Souza, defeating the situationism in Maracás, could move towards the Capital in a scenario that would offer him fewer obstacles, compared to those of his marching companions.

However, on February 9, the Government sent a new expedition to the municipality of Areia, a city neighboring Maracás, made up of three hundred soldiers. Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Gonçalves Kuin was tasked with commanding this expedition. His mission was to stop the advance of the forces led by Colonel Marcionillo Souza who had initiated the seizure of the Nazaré area.

This maneuver, carried out by the leader of the rabudos, occurred before the expulsion of government forces from Maracás. Possibly, the operating base was centered on his farm: "Gruta Baiana", currently located on the limits of the municipality of Ipiaú and close to the City of Areia. The capture of Maracás, considered a strategic point for the occupation of Jequié, Poções and Vitória da Conquista, was announced on February 11th. The Colonel justified his actions by claiming that Judge Leonardo Lessa enticed members of the Cauassús family with the intention of murdering him.

With complete control over Maracás, Farm: "Contendas" became the center of operations of the forces led by Colonel Marcionillo Souza who, according to the opposition press, after gathering seven hundred men under arms, divided them into two columns, one under the leadership of Colonel Cassiano Marques da

Silva, another led by Major Zacarias Pereira da Silva. The first was responsible for occupying Jequié, Poções and Boa Nova, the second for dominating the Nazaré area. In the meantime, Colonel Marcionillo Souza would have sent seven of his sons to surrounding regions to recruit bandits and integrate them into his troops. His eldest son, Captain Rodrigo Antônio de Souza, was in charge of preventing the movement of police forces along the roads that gave access to the Municipality of Areia.<sup>27</sup>

From then on, while Colonel Anfilófilo Castelo Branco, together with his allies, created the São Francisco Revolutionary Junta, at the same time that he decided to take Juazeiro, Colonel Horácio de Matos decided to carry out the march towards the Capital, and Colonel Marcionillo Souza began the siege of the municipality of Jequié and continued his march to dominate the Nazaré area. According to Marcionilio, “the villages of ‘‘Caldeirão’’, ‘‘Pé da Serra’’ and Baeta; [Maracas districts] – received them with indescribable joy, offering comfort to the liberating forces on their way to the flourishing and future city of Jequié, which is surrounded”. This municipality, as well as the “villages of Boa Nova and Poções”<sup>28</sup> which, at that time, were dominated by troops commanded by Colonel Cassiano Marques, were strategic points for taking the municipality of Vitória da Conquista and to avoid surprise attacks on Maracás.

In accordance with the plans agreed with the opposition leaders, Major Zacarias Pereira da Silva, commanding a detachment of forces controlled by Colonel Marcionillo Souza, invaded and dominated the villages of ‘‘Veados’’, ‘‘Tartaruga’’ and ‘‘Milagres’’.

On another front of action, his men took control of the villages of Jaguaquara, São Miguel and the city of Amargosa, paralyzing

the activities of the Nazaré Railway. The tracks of this road, to prevent the movement of situationist troops who were in Areia, were destroyed at two points between that municipality and Jequiriçá, and in São Miguel. Concerned about the advance of Colonel Marcionillo Souza’s forces, the State Government sent a new expedition to Areia, made up of eighty soldiers and senior officers.<sup>29</sup>

At that moment, Captain Rodrigo Antônio de Souza, leading a group of bandits, dominated the city of Jequié, forcing the head of the local situation, José Alves Pereira, to sign a document recognizing the victory of judge Paulo Martins Fontes (Araujo, 1997, p. 278). Concomitant to this, Santo Antônio de Jesus and Vargem Grande, one of the Police’s operating bases in the Nazaré area, were occupied by the contingent led by Major Zacarias Pereira,<sup>30</sup> a fact that left Marcionilio on the verge of achieving his goals. However, it is necessary to highlight that some of the cities dominated by the chiefs of the ‘‘Levante Sertanejo’’, they had a reduced police force, in addition to being poorly equipped. On the other hand, the majority of its population was unaware of political struggles. This way, there were few locations in a position to resist the attacks of the “liberating armies”. This factor facilitated the advance of opposition forces that entered these cities and, shortly afterwards, declared that they had them under their control.

Meanwhile, the forces commanded by colonels Horácio de Matos, Anfilófilo Castelo Branco and Francolino Pedreira, on the march against the capital, had been occupying and defeating the Government’s allies in various parts of the state. These colonels, together with Marcionillo, commanded a contingent, according to the opposition

27. ‘‘A Tarde’’, February 21, 1920.

28. Telegram written by Colonel Marcionillo and published by ‘‘Diário da Bahia’’, February 2, 1920.

29. ‘‘A Tarde’’, February 24 and 21, 1920; ‘‘O Imparcial’’; February 21, 1920.

30. ‘‘A Tarde’’, February 23, 1920; ‘‘Diário da Bahia’’, February 24, 1920.

press, of approximately 3,000 well-armed men, willing to carry out the orders of their leaders. To combat them, the Police had 2,600 poorly equipped men who did not have much incentive to participate in the fighting, as their salaries were low and received with constant delays. General Alberto Cardoso de Aguiar believed that the corporation's real combat strength was 1,500 men (Pang, 1979, p. 146).

As time passed, aware of the advance of opposition forces through the country side and fearful that the intervention would occur without having been requested by the State Government, the situation decided to request it from the Union Government on February 16th.

The telegram sent by Antônio Muniz to the President requested, in accordance with the 6th Chapter of the Constitution, assistance to reestablish "tranquility and public order" in the country side of Bahia. Epitácio Pessoa accepted the Governor's request, but warned that the intervention would be carried out by the Army.

Epitácio Pessoa's official communication regarding the intervention in Bahia took place on February 23rd. However, on the 17th of that month, the President of the Republic, citing the need to protect federal properties, had already moved Army contingents from other states to Bahia, an attitude that indicated the first steps towards intervention by the central Government. Fearful of how this intervention would be conducted by the President and which group it would benefit, the opposition and the situation began to publish in their newspapers which constitutional measures must be applied in the case of Bahia. Ruístas argued that Antônio Muniz must be removed from the Government, with an intervenor being appointed to take his place and organize a new election. On the other hand, the

31. ``Diário da Bahia``, February 25<sup>th</sup>, 1920.

32. ``A Tarde``, February 24, 1920; ``Diário da Bahia``; February 25, 1920.

33. ``A Tarde``, February 26, 1920; ``O Democrata``, February 27, 1920.

Seabrist argued that the intervention must occur to guarantee the will of the constituted powers, that is, the recognition of their leader as Governor of the State. Pressured by the oligarchies of states such as Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo, as they feared that the example of Bahia would spread to other places, Epitácio Pessoa led the intervention in order to ensure the assumption of the elected Governor.<sup>31</sup> This way, as happened in 1912, Seabra would occupy, for the second time, the Bahia Executive thanks to the intervention of federal forces.

To mediate the negotiations between the State Government and the rebel colonels from the country side of Bahia, Epitácio Pessoa appointed General Cardoso Aguiar and explicitly ordered him that, "before any attack on the armed groups, you must invite them to lay down their arms, promising guarantees, even after pacification according to the authorization that the government will give".<sup>32</sup> Acting as determined, General Aguiar, Commander of the 5th Military Region, began telegraphing the rebel colonels, requesting them to lay down their arms.

However, what stunned the opposition most was the censorship imposed on the telegraph service.<sup>33</sup> This fact made communication difficult between the leaders of the capital and the leaders of the country side, as well as between the latter and their marching companions. By acting this way, General Cardoso Aguiar aimed to negotiate separately with each of the seditious colonels, whose objectives were very different from those of the opposition in the capital, who only aimed to reach the government.

At the beginning of the negotiations, Colonel Marcionillo Souza was reluctant to lay down his arms, stating that this would depend on the measures to be adopted by

General Cardoso de Aguiar and demanded the recognition of Paulo Martins as elected Governor of Bahia. However, aware that his marching companions were about to lay down their arms and fearing a possible bombing of Maracás, Marcionillo once again renegotiated with the Commander of the 5th Military Region. As a result of these negotiations, on February 27, the leader of the rabudos gave up on invading the city of Areia and returned to his stronghold, from where he began negotiating directly with General Cardoso de Aguiar. These negotiations culminated in the signing of the Castro Alves Agreement on March 20, 1920, the date on which colonels Horácio de Matos and Anfilófilo Castelo Branco also signed, respectively: the *agreement of "Lençóis city"* and the *São Francisco Agreement* putting an end to the "liberation" campaign of Bahia. The common point between these three agreements was the guarantee, by the Union Government, that neither the colonels nor their allies would be held "civilly or criminally" responsible for acts carried out during the seditious movement.

The agreements contributed to strengthening the power of the heads of "*Levante Sertanejo*", as they established that in Baixo São Francisco, the political leadership of the municipalities would pass into the hands of the allies of Colonel Anfilófilo Castelo Branco; that the state and federal governments could only appoint the officials who would occupy public positions in Maracás after hearing from Colonel Marcionillo Souza; and that in Chapada Diamantina, Colonel Horácio de Matos would control 12 municipalities, in addition to receiving the prerogative of nominating the name of a state deputy and a federal deputy.<sup>34</sup> This agreement shows that, for a certain period, the policy of compromise between the colonels of the country side and the Governor of the State was suspended, since

34. "*A Tarde*", March 12 and 27, 1920; "*O Democrata*", March 13<sup>th</sup>, 1920; "*O Imparcial*".

35. "*A Tarde*", March 28<sup>th</sup>, 1920.

these colonels began to negotiate directly with the President of the Republic.

The reflex of "*Levante Sertanejo*" for Maracás and the region it was the consolidation of the political hegemony of Colonel Marcionillo Souza. So much so that, making use of the powers that the Castro Alves Agreement guaranteed him, he demanded the immediate transfer of his rival, the Judge of Law of the District of Maracás, Leonardo Lessa, to another term.<sup>35</sup> From then on, opposition to the Colonel's actions, in his stronghold, became insignificant.

## FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The analysis of the trajectory and strategies used by Colonel Marcionillo Antônio de Souza to become political head of the municipality of Maracás and region, makes it possible to highlight three important moments. The first occurred when he abandoned his profession as a troop leader, married Francisca Joaquina Alves Meira and established his residence in that municipality. His wife's father, Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Joaquim Alves Meira, a respected person in Maracá society, was initially responsible for and encouraged Marcionillo's entry into the local political scene. Over time, motivated by personal ambitions, Colonel Marcionillo Souza became an enemy of his father-in-law, allying himself with State Deputy Pedro Gonçalves do Nascimento, when he broke off relations with Lieutenant-Colonel Francisco Joaquim Alves Meira. From then on, counting on the support of this Deputy, Marcionillo became the main leader of the Rabudos group. On the other hand, his father-in-law joined the Mocós faction led by Marcionillo's main opponent, Colonel José Antônio de Miranda, supporting all attacks aimed at weakening his son-in-law's politics.

One of these attacks culminated in the invasion and looting of the headquarters of the Municipality of Maracás on October 24, 1915. This action was possible thanks to the alliance signed between the Cauassús and the Mocós. After the invasion of Maracás, the mocós lost control over the attacks of their allies who began to loot several properties in that municipality. This fact led the State Government to send four police expeditions which, supported by a group of Colonel Marcionillo's gunmen, put an end to the Cauassús' attacks. This Colonel emerged stronger from this event, which enabled him to increase his military power and his ability to influence the local political scene, conditions that prepared the ground for his participation in 'Levante Sertanejo'.

The participation of Colonel Marcionillo Souza in the 'Levante Sertanejo' consolidated his status as local political leader, capable of influencing the state's political scenario, as federal intervention in Bahia's internal affairs contributed significantly to the strengthening of colonels from the country side, especially those who led the 'Levante Sertanejo'. From then on, Colonel Marcionillo Souza became the main political leader of Maracás and the region. This situation would last until 1930, the year in which he was arrested, along with other colonels from the country side, following the example of his allies from the 'Levante Sertanejo', Horácio de Matos and Anfilófilo Castelo Branco, because, at that moment, new winds were changing the political scenario not only in Bahia, but in Brazil.

## REFERENCES

ARAÚJO, Êmerson Pinto de. **Capítulos da História de Jequié**. Salvador: GSH Editora, 1997.

AUAD, Márcia do Couto. **Anésia Cauaçu, mulher-mãe-guerreira**: um estudo sobre mulher, memória e representação no banditismo na região de Jequié-Bahia. Dissertação (Mestrado em Memória Social e Documento) – Universidade do Rio de Janeiro e Universidade Estadual do Sudoeste da Bahia. Jequié, 2001.

CHAGAS, Américo. **O Chefe Horácio de Matos**. Salvador: EGBA, 1996

FERREIRA, Maria do Socorro Soares. **A Tarde e a Construção dos Sentidos: Ideologia e Política (1928 – 1931)**. Dissertação (Mestrado em História) – Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Universidade Federal da Bahia, Salvador, 2002. (mimeo), p.24.

NOVAES, João Reis. **De Troop leader a Coronel: ascensão e declínio de Marcionillo Antônio de Souza (1915-1930)**. Dissertação (Mestrado em História) – Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Universidade Federal da Bahia, Salvador, 2009.

NOVAIS, Idelma Aparecida Ferreira. **Produção e comércio na Imperial Vila da Vitória (Bahia, 1840-1888)**. Dissertação (Mestrado em História) – Faculdade de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Universidade Federal da Bahia, Salvador, 2008. (mimeo), p. 105.

MONTANGNER, Miguel Ângelo. **Trajetória e Bibliografias: notas para uma análise bourdieusiana**. Sociologias, ano 9, nº 17. Porto Alegre, 2007, p. 240-264

MORAES, Walfrido. **Bandits e Heróis: a civilização do diamante nas Lavras da Bahia**. 3ª Ed, Salvador: Edições GRD, 1984

OSVALDO, Portela. **Biografia**. S/E. Maracás S/A.

PANG, Eul-soo. **Coronelismo e Oligarquias (1889-1934): a Bahia na Primeira República Brasileira**. Trad. Vera Teixeira Soares. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1979.

SAMPAIO, Consuelo Novais. **Os Partidos Políticos da Bahia na Primeira República**: uma política de acomodação. Salvador: Centro Editorial e Didático da UFBA, 1998. (Estudos Baianos).

\_\_\_\_\_. **O Poder Legislativo da Bahia: Primeira República (1889-1930)**. Salvador: Gráfica da Assembléia Legislativa da Bahia, 1985.

SCHWARCZ, Lilia Moritz. Biografia como gênero e problema. **História Social**, vol. 1, n. 24. Campinas, 2013, p. 51 a 73.