

International Journal of Human Sciences Research

ENACTION AND NEURO- PHENOMENOLOGY IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE DIRECT REFERENT¹

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1. Modified from: Arístegui (2017) Enaction and Neurophenomenology in Language, in Ibáñez, Sedeño, García: Neuroscience and Social Cognition: the Missing Link; Springer

Abstract: The conception of language in action is situated in the context of the research program of the cognitive sciences. It focuses on the formulation of the synthesis of hermeneutics and speech acts, and the vision of language according to the metaphor of structural coupling. The exclusion of expressive speech acts in this design is problematized. It examines the critical steps to the theory of language as a reflection and the linguistic correspondence of cognitivism. We examine the foundations of the proposal in the line of language and enaction as an emerging phenomena not reducible to autopoiesis. An integration of hermeneutic phenomenology, genetic and generative phenomenology. The inclusion of expressive speech acts based on the functions of language in the Habermas-Bühler line is argued. An opening of enaction to the expressive dimension of language and meaning holism with the referential use of language is proposed.

Keywords: enaction, neurophenomenology, performative, expressive speech acts, background, meaning holism.

INTRODUCTION

The cognitive sciences research program, which integrates neuroscience, psychology, linguistics, artificial intelligence and philosophy, is aimed at the scientific and objective study of cognition. Recently it has been proposed that the central orientation of the cognitive program is incomplete, since it has left aside the dimension of emotions, affectivity and motivations. Human subjectivity has not been addressed in the study of the mind. It is what has opened a growing interest in phenomenology. At the same time, it has been suggested that it is necessary to complement the study of the mind with the contributions of psychology, neuroscience and biology.

In the development of cognitive sciences, four stages are distinguished². An initial stage is linked to cybernetics. Emerging in the late 1940s, it laid the foundations for establishing models of cognition understood from the metaphor of goal-oriented recursive mechanical systems. With the possibility of self-regulation through feedback mechanisms, this conception is still presented, with an emphasis on machine schemes.

Next, the approach of cognitivism, which was presented in the 1950s, integrated the dimension of the machine, with internal mental processes formally represented. It is built in analogy with a computer program, or software, where the body would correspond to the hardware. The functional model does not consider consciousness or the body in the human subjective dimension.

The next stage, connectionism, emerged in the 1980s and proposed the metaphor of cognition as a neural network, with multiple connections. The strength of the mind varies with the ability to integrate learning rules and with the history of experiences. Nor does this model consider subjectivity.

Finally, enaction proposes a metaphor of the mind as a dynamic system embodied in the world. He understands cognition as a temporary phenomenon, as a response to perturbations of a human system. It is not understood as a product of repetition of standardized instructions. Furthermore, he considers that cognitive processes involve the embodiment of sensorimotor skills in autonomous individuals.

Although it is recognized that the central orientation is given by cognitivism in discussion with connectionism, the foundations of both positions are questionable. Both the cognitivist and connectionist models do not propose the relationship of cognitive processes with the world, understanding mind and world as separate. The mind is thus

2. Varela, F. (1990) *Know*. Barcelona: Gedisa. We will closely follow the author's sequence in the next section.

understood in a formal, abstract dimension.

The scientific and philosophical study of the phenomenon of knowing and consciousness highlights an explanatory gap regarding subjectivity.

The enaction project, at the same time, questions the foundations of this predominant orientation, proposing an alternative via phenomenology. It subsequently gives rise to a novel position called neurophenomenology, which emerges from enactive cognitive science.

In the context of the neurophenomenology program, enaction and phenomenology share a view of the mind as it intentionally constitutes objects. Furthermore, enaction presupposes autonomy; and phenomenology characterizes intentionality as the main feature of the living. Which opens a field of dialogue, where phenomenology provides a philosophical framework for the scientific investigation of consciousness and subjectivity.

We are interested in delving into the foundations of the alternative to knowledge from enaction, since we maintain that the emergence of the enactive neurophenomenological orientation in the cognitive sciences supposes the approach of an epistemological change in the understanding of experience and cognition, understood further as a phenomenon situated in the social world.

In this context, we find particularly relevant the alternative epistemological position of enaction in the domain of the epistemological assumptions of the theory of knowledge as reflection, since this conception of knowledge compromises a version of language as reflection. We refer to the pictorial theory of language language. According to the tradition of reflection, cognition and language are in a correspondence relationship with reality. Enactive cognitive science involves a new vision that confronts the theory of truth as correspondence with the conception of language as reflection. Language, understood

as enaction, makes a change with respect to the traditional pictorial theory of language that prevails in the cognitive sciences. Understands the way of being-with others in the world through a coordination of action in language modulated by expressiveness.

Until now the enaction research program has been mainly limited to the main domain of perception. Varela actively characterizes and describes perception as perceptually guided action. At the same time, there is a parallel development applied in the field of language (Winograd & Flores, 1986), expressly recognized by Varela (2002) proposing that Flores' work in language is enaction.

In this specific context, the proposal of enactive understanding of language (Winograd & Flores, 1989), is carried out through a crossing of hermeneutics (from Heidegger) and speech acts (Austin, Searle, Habermas), as an alternative to the rationalist orientation. in the language. Advancing along the line of enaction, they propose the metaphor of structural coupling in language, through speech acts as commitments to make breaks ("breaks") infrequent. This enactive orientation in language has given rise to a prolific development in communicative competence, in the field of philosophy with a hermeneutics of language perspective. In addition, he has integrated areas of management, organizational psychology and constructivist psychotherapy.

The above raises the notion of enactive cognitive science by bringing to hand, or to the forefront, a research program that integrates the perspective of the first person embodied, with the third person, and the position of the second person embodied in the relationship. social. Unlike the traditional scientific, objective, third-person position that confines the mechanisms underlying the mind and consciousness to the subpersonal, typical of the position of cognitivism.

To explicitize the focus of enaction in embodied language that involves a social practice also establishes a difference with respect to the notion of a bridge between the first and third person, which is the alternative of enaction in the field of research in perception. . In other words, we propose that enaction, addressing the dimensions of first, second and third person in the investigation of subjectivity, including the dimensions of perception and language, reformulates the meta-theoretical and methodological field, of the theoretical problematic itself. of cognitive science, which involves the question of the being of embodied consciousness.

By introducing the perspective that values first-person reports, language is introduced and consequences follow both for the field of the study of cognition - as well as for some connected disciplines such as phenomenology, psychotherapy and especially for mindfulness meditation practices³, which we will comment briefly at the end. We are interested in highlighting that adding the methodological option in first and second person means entering into the phenomenon of language as the use of ordinary language, insofar as the constitution of the shared meaning occurs when considering the terms themselves used in communication.

Although it is established within the enaction approach, it has been insisted from neurophenomenology that it is important to consider the first-person perspective compared to the traditional third-person focus in science. At the same time, to consider the first person, it is essential to analyze or consider focusing first-person reports on a second-person position or perspective. In addition to the third and first person relationship that stands out. These reports, although they can be recorded in a widely used

3. Since Mindfulness turns out to be a crucial exemplification in that it provides an entryway to first-person experience, based on the first-person methodology, via open awareness of the tradition of open awareness and full presence in support of the argument that leads from cognitivism and connectionism to embodied cognition conceived as enaction.

way through objective records, represent a way of understanding first-person language in the context of an intersubjective relationship. In this context, the neurophenomenological vision becomes pertinent.

Our perspective consists of investigating whether there is a consistent approach to enaction to address the case of language use. Specifically in those first-person reports in the context of an interaction with a second person, which raises an interest in knowing how the understanding of language is approached in enaction and in neuro-phenomenology. At the same time, from a methodological point of view, we propose to examine a contrast between a traditional conception of language as an image - or of linguistic correspondence, as a pictorial theory of language formulated in third person statements - in relation to an enactive conception of language. that integrates the pragmatic dimension of the uses of first and second person in relation.

It seems to us that it is relevant to examine the way in which enaction in the relationship, in the case of being understood or interpreted in language, includes the use of language in its performative dimension. The above opens the enactive dimension of expressiveness in language. It seems to us that this focus is important in that it brings into play the capacity for a coherent approach to enaction, anchored in the emotional experience, the body and the language.

In this regard, it is especially important to examine the assumptions of the conception of enaction in language rooted in the synthesis of hermeneutics and speech acts. Which leads us to propose from the outset that there are two dimensions of language involved in said synthesis.

The semantic function of openness in language and the pragmatic function of

communication in language (Lafont, 1993). Particularly if the question of how to agree about what is said in speech is addressed, as a condition for speaking about the same thing. In particular, in the context of the aforementioned synthesis, consider the function of language opening that is performed through the interpretation of the meaning of a speech act issued in the first person.

It is of particular interest to ask about the conception of language that the hermeneutic position implies in determining the propositional content of a speech act. At the same time, differentiating propositional content from illocutionary force means additionally examining the dimension of communication in language.

Enaction in language involves addressing both dimensions of language. Our purpose is to ask ourselves if the understanding of first-person reports that neurophenomenology centrally proposes as a development from enaction requires a clarification of the assumptions of philosophy of language - of the hermeneutic semantic core and of communicational pragmatics - for understanding expressive speech acts.

In this context, the present chapter addresses a specific metatheoretical development of enaction. In relation to a conception of enactive language, it includes the expressive dimension of language, including expressive speech acts. Expressive speech acts have been omitted in the enactive approach to language noted previously.

To develop our purpose, we will now focus on the following steps:

1. Enactive orientation.
2. Enaction in language.
3. Analysis of the metatheoretical assumptions of enaction in language and the possibility of extension in the domain of expressive speech acts.

ENACTIVE ORIENTATION

In the context of cognitive sciences, Varela (1989) proposes the new program that proposes an alternative vision of cognition, understood as representation. Varela is interested in the problem of cognition, which according to etymology, in its Latin root, refers to knowing through the senses, seeing, knowing, recognizing (Ojeda, 2001). He introduces his vision, alluding to the motion of cognitive sciences, as heirs of the traditional Greek formulation of the term “epistemology”, which refers to the theory of knowledge. The central question posed by epistemology is how do you know?

It defines cognitive sciences as the modern scientific analysis of knowledge understood in all its dimensions (Ojeda, 2001). Reformulating the epistemological question -how do we know?- in the field of cognition, he proposes that it leads to the scientific study of the mind, considered as a valid scientific enterprise (Varela, Thompson, Rosch, 1991).

Varela (1989) characterizes the stages in the tradition of cognitive sciences in the following terms:

I Cybernetics begins the artificial intelligence project
II The cognitivist position is symbolic. Computing symbolic representations
III Connectionism is sub-symbolic. Self-organized network interconnections

Varela (1989) is oriented in opposition to the tradition of representation. Beyond connectionism’s dissatisfaction with representation, understood as formal processing. He questions three principles underlying the tradition: A-We inhabit a world defined by particular properties.

B - We capture or recover these external properties of the world by representing them symbolically through formal representations.

C - There is an internal entity, a subjective we that does all of the above.

As an alternative to representation, considered the core of the cognitive science tradition, he proposes “enaction.” The term enaction means to execute or put into action or perform a performance. It centrally questions the notion of representation that assumes a pre-given world and a pre-given mind.

Cognition is rather the putting into action of a world and a mind that emerges. It emerges from a history of actions carried out in the very act of being-in-the-world.

ENACTION IN LANGUAGE

In the context of cognitive sciences, the cognitivist orientation has prevailed. We can recognize that the position of enaction represents an alternative to cognitivism in that it integrates experiential, emotional and bodily factors into scientific study. In the same sense, by including the development of language as enaction, the need to clarify whether the variant of enaction applied to language allows us to recognize the presence of the emotional affective dimension is present. This is because in this specific synthesis by Winograd & Flores (1989), which crosses Heidegger’s hermeneutics with Searle’s theory of speech acts, it does not include expressive speech acts. Although, from the hermeneutical perspective, it recognizes the background of states of mind, which is connected to the condition of sincerity of speech acts. However, he does not address it explicitly within a conception of speech acts including the expressive dimension.

At the same time, considering that enaction is characterized precisely by constituting an opening for the study of the emotional dimension - therefore expressive - the omission of this expressive dimension of language constitutes a limitation of the possibilities of the approach. In this sense,

we think that it is necessary to develop the relevant concepts and that the discussion in this regard allows us to open this dimension to research. The need to reflect and examine the foundations of enaction in the language that compromise with said limitation (Varela; Winograd and Flores; Flores) becomes clear to us. We propose to clarify the restriction regarding the study of expressive speech acts.

To carry out this approach, this project of enaction in language, in this first part we will examine Winograd & Flores’ approach in three stages.

- Critique of enaction to the project of understanding natural language in cognitivism
- Synthesis of hermeneutics and speech acts
- Conversation for action in social organizations.

ENACTIVE CRITICISM OF THE COGNITIVIST POSITION OF LANGUAGE

In order to examine the enactive conception of language according to Winograd & Flores, we will now turn to examine the critical characterization of the tradition of rationalism. The criticism of rationalism focuses on correspondence and the model of language understanding in cognitivism.

It is considered that this tradition traces its origins to antiquity (Plato) and that it underlies unaltered the modern foundations that are currently continued in the tradition of the analytical philosophy of ideal language, which includes authors such as Frege (1949), Russell (1956), Wittgenstein (1961), Carnap (1970).

Initially, a critique of the tradition of rationalism is addressed, according to which language is understood as a representation of external reality. This criticism is made explicit according to the following formulation:

- The main function of language sentences is to describe the external world.

- At the same time, the terms in a grammatical construction are assumed to represent parts of the world or its attributes.

- Finally the word is considered to denote reality.

This conception enters directly into the field of cognitive science through a conception of reference-correspondence and linguistic-correspondence. Language is understood as a reflection of reality.

The conception of linguistic correspondence supposes that the sentences or sentences of ordinary language are reduced to a formal background language through the application of a system of rules:

- There is a system of rules by which ordinary language is translated into a formal background language.
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- In the formal background language, correspondences are established between the parts of the sentence and the objects of the world through which the meaning is established.

- There is also a system of rules by which truth conditions are assigned to sentences, by which correspondence is established.
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- The structure or standard form of sentences for grammatical understanding corresponds to the indicative sentence.

The enactive conception in language questions the way in which these rules are applied to the understanding of natural language. Because it is assumed that an external reality exists.

Following this characterization of linguistic correspondence, language describes the externally existing properties of the object and words are understood insofar as they denote these properties.

Critically characterizing this tradition, enaction points to the questioning of the propositionally interpreted background.

Propositions, assertions or sentences, according to this tradition, obtain their meaning through a recourse to the understanding of the linguistic background

propositionally, through an understanding of the literal meaning, without context.

For example, in the semantic version of truth, it is understood according to correspondence that the sentence “the snow is white” is true if and only if the snow is white.

Winograd & Flores provide examples in which the meaning of the sentence is not the same, depending on the colloquial context of the moment. For example, “Do you mean the snow on the mountain?,” or “the state of the snow in the freezer?”

In analogy with the formal system of an ideal language, enaction proposes that the understanding of language is characterized in terms of formal representation. The cognitivist theory of mind focuses on the computational theory of mind. In cognitivism, the position of Cartesianism is assumed as a form of understanding according to which mental processes correspond to software while the body, physiology, corresponds to hardware. The manipulation of formal symbols is cognition.

ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE IN ENACTION: SYNTHESIS OF HERMENEUTICS AND SPEECH ACTS

An alternative vision or intersection of hermeneutics and speech acts is constructed, resorting to notions of Heidegger’s hermeneutics, in Dreyfus’ version; and from Austin’s theory of speech acts, Searle, in the conception of critical hermeneutics, from Habermas’s theory of communicative action.

At first, a vision of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology (Dreyfus) is assumed. Starting from the conception of the structure of being-in-the-world, it is possible to differentiate the following modes of being-in-the-world: available-at-hand, unavailable-at-hand, present-before-the-eyes, purely-present-before-the-eyes.

The distinctions allow us to question the tradition of the subject-object paradigm and object representation.

Available-on-hand Comprehension	Unavailable-at-hand Interpretation	Present-before-the-eyes Statement	Purely present-before-the-eyes Calculation
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Heidegger's conception of being-in-the-world allows us to consider cognition not as a position of a subject (subjectivity) in front of the object (objectivity) that adopts the attitude of representation (the mirror mind). It is precisely in this context where the notion present-before-the-eyes (and purely-present-before-the-eyes in formalization) allows us to characterize the idea of linguistic correspondence.

When applied, both to the understanding of language and the position of a subject in front of the world, it represents it objectively, as a derived mode of being.

However, from the enactive position of language it is considered that representation is not primary. By resorting to the position of the first person, it is also situated in the world, in a background of availability-at-hand. By understanding that what is primary is not representation, the notion of being-in-the-world gives an account of how it is posed in a world, in which we behave in language analogous to being immersed in the world of action. Similar to the way of understanding the role of a tool in the set of utensils, as part of an equipment whole. The basic way in which the world appears does not occur in the representation of the object, but in the arrangement of utensils. In the background of social practices, meaning arises from being part of an already understood social functioning.

When the possibility of accessing the expected background is not at hand and there is a flaw in the availability of what the world has been, we speak of unavailability. In the same sense, in analogy with the way

of understanding language according to this metaphor of the use of utensils, when understanding is available an availability flows. If there is interruption or a misunderstanding arises, it becomes necessary to practically restore a background of understanding. A competent speaker who knows the tradition draws on a background of prior understanding that is not primarily representational or propositional. Rather, he relies on a practice acquired by habit, which has allowed him to have acquired communication skills through repeated use.

When understanding cannot be restored through recourse to the background of practice following a commonly used interpretation, enaction proposes that a break in the background would occur. This situation would give way to the reflective attitude, according to the model of having or putting something in front of you, as an object of representation. It is the position called present-before-the-eyes. The critique of the cognitivist tradition is then aimed at questioning the belief that primary access to the world would be via representation. What is characterized as the before-the-eyes position, or presence-before-the-eyes. This leads to directly questioning the theory of truth as correspondence and the conception that basic meaning consists only in designating objects. This criticism faces natural language understanding programs based on the notion of linguistic correspondence.

Finally, when the meaning is totally abstracted from the context, generalizing it to be used at anytime, we are in the purely-present-before-the-eyes dimension (calculation). This is where formalization takes place according to logical-linguistic formulations. Formal representation, in the deep structure, as a place of meaning, underlying the surface uses of ordinary language. It corresponds to the formal structure that is used to disambiguate

the meaning and that ensures correspondence-reference. It refers to the truth conditions of language expressions translated into the formal background language. It is the language of linguistic correspondence. In this space, the understanding of language is understood as literal meaning.

On the other hand, in the tradition of hermeneutics, availability is highlighted as access to a background based on the understanding-interpretation of competent speakers-hearers in a social and historical context. In a tradition of language use in a context of use. The notion of background becomes central to the alternative of understanding natural language. Following Heidegger's conception of language's position, enaction adopts the notion of a background of shared practices.

BACKGROUND AND SPEECH ACTS

The context in which the alternative of the synthesis of hermeneutics and speech acts is proposed in the face of the tradition of cognitivism, opens up the alternative of hermeneutical understanding of language in a context. Enaction also means highlighting the option for ordinary language, the language spoken in everyday life.

In line with accessing the social context, it adopts the conception of Austin's theory of speech acts, who introduces a fundamental distinction between constative and performative. Statistical accounts for language as a representation of an external reality through representation, truth and reference. Instead, performative is used to do things in the world. It corresponds to what is done when saying, through the use of language in the first person, present, indicative. With which they establish the differentiation with respect to the tradition of the use of language as representation.

Moving in that direction, Austin introduced the distinctions of what is said, as locutionary. What is done by saying, the illocutionary. And the effect of what is done when saying, the perlocutionary.

Austin's procedure and distinction opposes the treatment of language exclusively in terms of truth conditions. It is not necessary to take language only in the constative dimension. It is possible, therefore, to leave the itinerary of linguistic correspondence and access the structure of performative action. The conditions of happiness account for the appropriate use of language in certain circumstances or conditions of use. For example, coming to have tea, after an invitation, is not true or false. Rather, they are conditions of compliance following certain invitations, commitment responses, or declarations of intent. The state of the world is not constituted by the representation of facts in this case, but by the declaration of intention.

Access to the background of linguistic practices is done through a treatment of Austin's speech act theory, according to Searle's taxonomy. Winograd & Flores consider the illocutionary structure of speech acts (Searle), which distinguishes, as a central structure, illocutionary force and propositional content (the F(p) structure). Furthermore, it characterizes each type of speech act according to its essential condition in the deep structure. This implies that in the design of the deep structure of speech acts, it addresses the form of speech acts following the logical-linguistic dimension of performativity. This is manifested in that illocutionary points or types of speech acts are included

In the first development of the enactive theory of language carried out by Winograd and Flores (1989), the intersection of hermeneutics with speech acts considers the five illocutionary points or types of speech acts. We graph it below:

State-ments	Commit-ments	Direc-tives	Asser-tions	Expressive Excluded in the conversation design for action
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They integrate Declarations, Directives and Commitments in the background of illocutionary forces. They modify the essential condition of assertions, so that the illocutionary force is integrated into the background of illocutionary forces of the remaining speech acts considered in the background. They displace the propositional content, in the articulation dimension of unavailability, in the break, so that the before-the-eyes dimension of the propositional content is present. They classify speech acts in the present-before-eyes dimension, considered as the expression of an internal representational state, which does not integrate the illocutionary forces of the background. They also consider that the condition of sincerity is reinterpreted by the dimension of states of mind, in line with Heidegger's hermeneutics.

The following diagram allows you to schematically visualize the options of the crossing of Hermeneutics and Speech Acts indicated. Considering the structure of being-in-the-world, of Heidegger's Hermeneutics, the types of speech acts are considered in their structure of illocutionary force and illocutionary point.

Unavailable	Unavailable	Present before the eyes	Purely Present
Comprehension	Interpretation	Statement	
Statements			
Directives			
Commitments			
	"Assertion"	Assertion	
		Expressive	

APPLICATION OF CONVERSATION IN ACTION TO SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

Developing a systemic type design in analogy with a closed system or autopoietic hermeneutic, Winograd and Flores propose what they call an action conversation that they apply to the human relationship of organizational systems, thus exemplifying what they call the action conversation in a social system.

In a development of the proposal, they give an account of an organizational system as a network of conversations that needs to complete a conversational cycle for its closure or good form. They assume a cybernetic, second-order design, that is, social and non-mechanical systems, in conversation.

Using a crossing of what would be the metaphor of a structural coupling, they account for the commitments in the language allowing breaks to be made infrequent. To this end, they propose a structural coupling system based on the conception of autopoiesis, making an extrapolation to the social level, understanding the social system as a closed system of action conversations. In this conversational system, conditions of satisfaction of the commitments generated in the action conversation are met, according to distinctions in types of speech acts.

Applied to an organizational system conceived as a network of closed conversations, the interaction is classified according to the following coordination scheme of recursive actions in language.

Statements-Directives-Commitments-Assertion-Declaration

The background of action conversations includes Declarations, Directives and Commitments.

Assertion is like a form of self-referential self-regulation (not "control") of the conversation system.

However, by instantiating what they call action talk, they suppress or eliminate expressive speech acts. In application to an organizational social system (Mintzberg), action conversation establishes a division of linguistic labor (Flores). Distributes the types of speech acts by certain levels of the organization, according to the roles played.

At the strategic apex, the statements

At the management level, directives

At the operational core, the commitments

Assertions allow us to verify whether the output of the system accounts for compliance with the conditions of satisfaction of the commitments. If this is indeed the case, a new state of the world can be declared. The key to developing this application to the organizational world is given by the possibility of training the communicative competence of the participants in the distinctions of the conversation system.

ORGANIZATION AS A NETWORK OF CONVERSATIONS

ANALYSIS OF THE METATHEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF ENACTION IN THE SYNTHESIS OF HERMENEUTICS AND SPEECH ACTS

In this section we propose to make explicit some metatheoretical assumptions of the enaction perspective in the language that we have presented. According to our vision, the metatheoretical assumptions of enaction and neurophenomenology can be clarified by examining some propositions that emerged in the development of the language turn. To this end, we will develop the following points:

- Previous analysis framework following guidelines of the language turn.
- Explication of the assumptions of enaction in language in the critique

of cognitivism and in the alternative synthesis.

- Expressiveness and social application of enaction.

PREVIOUS ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK FOLLOWING GUIDELINES OF THE LANGUAGE TURN

The linguistic turn develops in the dimension of analytical philosophy and at the same time in continental philosophy. It is proposed to make explicit the very terms of the problems being examined in a way that would not be possible if language is not taken into consideration. An assumption that is assumed is that it is possible to absolutely determine the meaning, structure, content and reference of a language in a background language. This vision of philosophy, as a philosophy of language, is inaugurated with Frege's approaches that question the previous distinctions of modernity, subject-object, introducing a new vocabulary with the new distinctions of meaning and referent.

The reception of Frege's position took place both within the analytical philosophy of language and also in continental philosophy. In a way. We can see by looking at the development of philosophy of language programs that ideal language philosophy addressed problems by focusing on reference. And that continental philosophy assumed the dimension of meaning.

In the context of analytical philosophy, two variants are presented: the analytical philosophy of ideal language in conjunction with the theory of truth as correspondence, and the philosophy of ordinary language. Analytical philosophy of ideal language.

In the context of the analytic philosophy of ideal language, Russell continued to develop a view that pointed to reference (denotation). In order to establish a philosophical structure in the language to establish the reference,

he addressed the difficulties that ordinary language presented for the formalization and disambiguation of terms, proposing an underlying deep structure, where it would be possible to establish a logical form. That would allow exact reference. This way, the philosophy of ideal language was constituted as a logical-linguistic structure outside ordinary language.

In a next step Wittgenstein and also Russell provided a theory of truth as correspondence where the logical form of the propositions of language allowed a correspondence to be established with the logical structure of the world. An intensional isomorphism was proposed (Wittgenstein, 1921) between the atomic molecular structure of language, composed of propositions and words, and the atomic molecular structure of the world, composed of facts and combinations of objects. This is what is called the pictorial theory of language. In this context the words of the proposition were considered to denote objects in the world.

The developments of the Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein line in the philosophy of ideal language, strongly impressed the members of the Vienna circle that sparked interest around the 1930s in transferring to the domain of science, conceived as an analytical philosophy of science., the conception of referential language as a focus to promote scientific development.

The doctrine of logical empiricism proposed to consider three types of terms: logical, theoretical and observational. He then proposed translating the theoretical terms into observational terms, using correspondence rules (operationalization). In this period Carnap transitioned from the syntactic stage to the semantic stage. At first he assimilated the philosophy's conception of ideal language and the developments of the theory of truth as correspondence, integrating them into a semantic system, in which he distinguished:

1. Linguistic or syntactic rules
2. Transformation or semantic rules
3. Rules of truth, to establish the conditions of truth

By applying the semantic system, it is possible to determine in the language of the background linguistic framework, singular term and general term, in addition to establishing the connectives, the logical apparatus and the quantifiers. The meaning in a language is established by translating to the background framework, where the meaning and reference of the terms are established.

ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF ORDINARY LANGUAGE

The variant of philosophy of ordinary language, opened by the second Wittgenstein, questioned the approaches of the philosophy of ideal language. He proposed that the focus of analysis be not on formal deep structure, but on the use of ordinary language, as it occurs in ordinary conversation. He directly questioned the reference-centered language game of science considered as a single game. He advocated the use of language in contexts of use through language games connected to forms of life. In a certain sense, this movement of Wittgenstein II is considered to open or inaugurate the pragmatic turn of language. This completes a process that began with the syntactic stage, the semantic stage and now the pragmatic stage.

Within the context of the philosophy of ordinary language, a prominent development is given by Austin's theory of speech acts, who proposed the performative-constative distinction. Constant language uses reflect external reality, represent the world or the state of the world.

In this sphere of language use, it is developed the theory of truth as correspondence. Performative uses, on the other hand, are a way

or form of language use that says something, therefore they have a constituent role. In the dimension of the constative-performative distinction, it differentiates the notions of locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary. These formulations allow us to differentiate the dimensions of saying and doing. They correspond to the following definitions:

- Locutive, what is said.
- illocutionary what is done when saying
- Perlocutionary the effect of what is done when saying

In the context of this distinction Austin introduces speech act theory, which distinguishes five types of speech acts:

- Declarations: establish the correspondence between the propositional content of the speech act and reality.
- Directives: they try to get the listener to do something.
- Commitments: commits the speaker to a future course of action.
- Assertions: commit the speaker to something that is the case.
- Expressive: expresses a psychological state about a state of things.

A next step is taken by Searle, who develops the illocutionary structure of speech act theory. Let us remember that Searle, advancing his conception, rethinks the illocutionary structure of the theory of speech acts. He introduces the input condition, the sincerity condition and the essential condition for each type of speech act. He differentiates the illocutionary dimension from the perlocutionary, to establish meaning as agreement.

An integrative development in the field of speech act theory is a universal pragmatics of Habermas. It implies that in an ideal speech community, every ideal speaker-hearer is

capable of using all speech acts. He includes Searle's distinctions in illocutionary structure and proposes a theory of commitment in language. He integrates the dimensions of communicative competence, according to the functions of language (Bühler, 1934/2011): representational, appellative and expressive ("... who communicates with another, about something"). According to the principle of universal pragmatics, just cited, an ideal speaker-hearer is competent to restore understanding in the shared background.

CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY

Frege's distinctions, referent meaning, established to overcome the subject-object paradigm, are developed by Husserl's phenomenology, who integrates the notion of meaning into the sphere of intentionality. In relation to a subject, which constitutes the referent as a presentation of meaning in consciousness. However, Husserl's position is linked to the tradition of the intended object. Husserl has proposed immediate access to the world through consciousness. And he has centrally considered phenomenological reduction as a methodology to question the assumptions or prejudices with which we access the world.

His famous bracketing of the natural attitude, which gives way to the phenomenological attitude, is recognized as a way to phenomenologically access meaning in consciousness. It centrally presents the role of reflection through reduction.

Husserl's work has recently been complemented with the publication of unpublished aspects. This recognizes what is called genetic phenomenology, which succeeds transcendental phenomenology. In the stage of genetic phenomenology, Husserl complements his previous approaches by distinguishing against active synthesis, where the ego is present, a passive synthesis. He also integrates the pre-

reflective dimension, thus allowing distinctions to be introduced from emotion and affects. In this area, he proposes a way of behaving in the world not guided by intentionality directed towards an object. It is the so-called operational intentionality. In a next stage Husserl integrates the notion of generative phenomenology, where he addresses the world of life and intergenerational connection in a culturally shared horizon of meaning.

HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY

Hermeneutics (Gadamer, 1975) addresses the interaction between the horizon of the text and the interpreter to establish meaning. Interpretation emerges as a prejudice or pre-understanding, anchored in historicity that refers to tradition in society. They accept what they call the inevitability of the hermeneutic circle. The meaning of the text is contextual and is brought to hand from the horizon of the interpreter, a horizon that in turn is historical and that represents interactions in the language that refer back to pre-understanding.

Along these lines, the question about the role of interpretation in the interaction of the person with the text leads from Gadamer to Heidegger in the understanding of the world as a whole.

Following the guidelines of meaning, also in the footsteps of Frege and Husserl, Heidegger's conception proposes an entry into language, questioning the preeminence of the referent in the philosophy of ideal language and in the developments of science, supported by logical empiricism. in science. He maintains a conception of language where the meaning is preeminent to the referent. This is how he proposes a conception of language in which understanding-interpretation precedes the statement. He also systematically opposes the correspondence theory of truth. He develops a conception of the structure of being-in-the-

world according to which meaning is presented in a background, as availability, as opposed to an object being represented as a presence to be represented before the eyes. In accessing the background, he faces unavailability as an imperative to return to the background.

It questions the tradition of philosophy and science, anchored in the subject-object and object representation paradigm. His development of hermeneutic philosophy proposes that access to the world is presented or given pre-reflectively, through a state of mind or emotion, such as anxiety. The understanding of the meaning of existence is accessed in a pre-theoretical, pre-conceptual way.

Heidegger strongly opposes the rationalist tradition and the subject-object distinction, representation and the predominance of reflection, as a form of access of consciousness to the world. He identifies Husserl with the tradition of rationalist developments of reflection anchored in Cartesianism.⁴

From this hermeneutic perspective, criticism of rationalism arises, which is characterized by a type of dualism that distinguishes body from mind, where the objective or physical reality and the subjective or mental reality are presented.

Heidegger, from a phenomenological position originating in Husserl, is oriented towards the investigation of the understanding of being-in-the-world, as a fundamental structure that denies the subject-object separation. Both the interpreter and the interpreted exist in an interdependence. Pre-judgment is the condition for accessing a background, which at the same time allows interpretation.

The hermeneutic circle applies as a whole to understanding, preventing all assumptions from being made explicit.

Heidegger inverts the terms of the theory-oriented rationalist tradition and argues that our primary access to the world is through

4. What precedes the developments of cognitivism according to the critical characterization of Dreyfus (1982).

a practice with what is available-at-hand, at a pre-reflective level. Being situated in the world, acting from a pre-reflective praxis, we are thrown or thrown into a pre-conceptual understanding.

In close connection with what has just been explained, Heidegger questions that the relationship with the world is established from a mental representation in correspondence with the objective world. We act in the world not as a result of a separate theoretical contemplation. The world does not appear before the eyes of an observer who contemplates it separately as a subject that represents it. The representation is derived.

Consequently, he maintains that meaning is social; language does not arise from the individual mind. Social activity is the foundation of intelligibility. Thus, the approach of hermeneutic phenomenology appears to show that there is a transition from the individual mind (which makes it explicit that cognitivism conceives meaning dependent on the individual mind) towards the social dimension of meaning.

The orientation of being-in-the-world, as pre-reflective, also allows us to understand that we act as part of a background of availability at hand. In this orientation, distinguishing an object is not presented as primary, nor is being a subject that faces the world as an object of representation. When availability is broken or unavailability occurs immediately at hand, it is visible, before the eyes. For Heidegger, talking about an object and its properties appears in terms of an activity.

The understanding of being-in-the-world (Dasein, as a way of being-in-the-world that is an alternative name to the traditional subject, which presupposes an individual mind) is understood as understanding possibilities, not a reality before the eyes. Being in the thrown or thrown world, Dasein understands its possibilities and projects itself, in a state of

openness. This opening puts him in front of a factual situation. This structure of being as a thrown project gives way to a differentiation between understanding and interpreting.

Heidegger calls the development of the possibilities involved in prior understanding “interpreting.” What is expressly understood this way, interpretation, is conceived as having the structure “of something as something.” The how is the structure of the expressibility of something as something, which precedes expressibility in the statement. Heidegger thus proposes the thesis of the derived character of the statement, insofar as all ante-predicative seeing is comprehensive-interpreting. Specifically, he proposes that the utterance is a derived mode of interpretation.

PRAGMATISM AND HOLISM

In parallel to the position of the analytical philosophy of ordinary language, the tradition of holism and pragmatism arises. Rorty, criticizing the tradition of reflection and the mirror mind, has invoked Quine’s position, epistemological holism, to oppose analyticity (the idea that privileged representations exist); to Sellars before the myth of the given; and Wittgenstein’s position, facing reference as a unique language game to give meaning.

Develops a critique of the tradition of knowledge as a reflection and of the mirror mind. The focus of his development is the theory of truth as correspondence, which he places in the pictorial tradition of the early Wittgenstein and also in Tarski’s semantic conception of truth. It highlights the linguistic turn and the opposition of philosophy of ideal language and philosophy of ordinary language.

It opposes epistemological foundationalism, which operates with the position that there is a privileged access to knowledge, to the privileged representation of the world as it is in itself, which today would lie in science.

By criticizing correspondence and reference, supported by the Quine-Davidson line of philosophy of language focused on radical translation-interpretation, it turns towards the understanding-interpretation of meaning according to hermeneutics. He recognizes in the tradition of Heidegger, Sartre, and Gadamer a path of understanding that he connects with the project of being in the world. His central thesis is to propose that there is an alternative choice of vocabulary, analogous to Sartre's conception in *Being and Nothingness*, who has proposed the central notion of choice of self, to characterize human reality.

WE PROPOSE TO ESTABLISH SOME SCOPE FOR THE METATHEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF THE ENACTIVE POSITION IN LANGUAGE

Firstly, the conception of enaction is raised in discussion with the assumptions of correspondence-reference that compromise the traditional vision of cognitive sciences, both in cognitivism and connectionism.

In the original approach to enaction, Varela refers to Rorty's (1979) position, where the discussion with the image paradigm is widely raised and the point is made against representation. We could see the approach of enaction, aligned with the pragmatic position that questions the theory of truth as correspondence, in the sense that it opposes the tradition of privileged representation in the field of cognitive sciences.

At the same time, Rorty opposes privileged representation, but not representations themselves. In the same sense, resorting to embodied representations can be a way that is not incompatible with the notion of enaction, if a perspective of holism is adopted to address perception and emotion.

Varela argues against the tradition of representation in the context of the world and the mind as something pre-given, which reminds us of Sellars. The questioning of correspondence appears in relation to representing what is given. His opposition to foundationalism would lead him to question whether there is anything there, such as data with which to correspond.

But centrally, enaction is questioning the tradition of reference as the game of cognitive science. We can say that it is introducing a broader perspective of meaning in a conception of enactive and neurophenomenological cognitive science by trying to expand the focus of the vocabulary to include the dimension of meaning in the first person.

In the position of enaction in language versus cognitivism, the linguistic correspondence argument aims to critically characterize the position of natural language understanding programs in artificial intelligence (at the cognitivist stage). According to this position, it would be possible to determine the reference in the background linguistic system. By proposing the critique of reference correspondence, the enaction is directed against the idea of determining reference in a background linguistic system. The break with that tradition leads to seeking an alternative in hermeneutics and performativity. Precisely along the lines of non-primarily referential meaning.

It must be noted that a first attack in this area was given by Dreyfus's criticism of Artificial Intelligence attempting to model human intelligence. Dreyfus's argument proposed that the assumptions of Artificial Intelligence rested on a formulation derived from logical atomism. His alternative consisted of proposing Heidegger's vision, being-in-the-world, to show a person situated in the changing world, rather than an abstract intelligence program based on decontextualized rules.

Along the same path, the position of Winograd and Flores, questioning the understanding of language based on a system of linguistic rules, opposes the notion of a being-in-the-world, in the domain of being available-at-hand, facing breaks of unavailability. The language of the background involves understanding-interpretation according to an embodied life practice, with others.

Understanding in language does not occur through the abstract representation, in a mirror mind, of a pre-given world. It is not primarily a statement. This appears when a break cannot be returned to the background and the practical attitude is left to give way to reflection. Then the object present-before-the-eyes appears.

The understanding of meaning arises in a world lived, pre-reflectively, and not present-before-the-eyes in reflection.

In line with Winograd and Flores, Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology would allow access to the expressive dimension, also of expressive speech acts. In our opinion, the critical version of Dreyfus, who characterized Husserl as a protocognitivist, computationalist, precursor of cognitivism, influenced the initial version of enaction in language. For Dreyfus, speech acts represent a representational, internal mental state, which would be externalized in the expressivity of expressive speech acts.

According to the perspective we examined in a previous section, expressive speech acts are situated in the present-before-the-eyes dimension, not as expressiveness that arises in the background of availability. They fall, therefore, into the mind-world opposition or duality. It seems to us that here lies a possible reason for the exclusion of expressive speech acts from Winograd and Flores' model of enaction in language.

They are in the line of opposition of Heidegger in language (hermeneutics) against Husserl (phenomenology) cognitivist.

In light of the new developments made explicit in relation to genetic phenomenology and generative phenomenology, a dimension of Husserl's phenomenology appears that is not in opposition to Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology. Consequently, the notion of being-in-the-world is related to the idea of the world of life and the horizon of meaning. Openness from the pre-reflective dimension implies access to the world of life not initially mediated by reduction and reflection. Similarly, the possibility of crossing this unified perspective of phenomenology and hermeneutics with the tradition of language in the perspective of the use of language, as language games connected with forms of life, allows a transition regarding performativity, illocutivity and expressivity. Which opens up to an integrated consideration of the functions of language, along the lines of Habermas.

In the theory of speech acts, Habermas has highlighted the triple perspective to consider speech acts, as it involves me (first person) communicating with someone (second person) about something (third person). What is called expressive function, appellative function and propositional function respectively. Considered holistically, the semantic dimension of each of the functions is recognized and the expressive one is presented as a bodily affective unit in the context of the theory of speech acts.

The expressive function of language is bodily embodied and is expressed in gestures and movements. It's synchronized. In the performative, illocutionary language game, expressiveness is connected to a way of life. It is in action, it is embodied.

EXPRESSIVITY AND SOCIAL APPLICATION OF ENACTION

The background of the position of enaction in the work of autopoiesis makes it necessary to take into account what is meant by the thesis according to which living systems are autonomous systems that generate their own way of living. They reproduce their form or generate identity, which does not depend on external inputs. In this sense, the system is determined by its structure. This system does not discriminate in the illusion of perception experience. At the same time they produce the components that reproduce their way of life.

This notion of autopoiesis allows us to question the idea that a system is instructively oriented, determined by the environment. It is questioned whether there is an external reference to the system. This consideration in relation to the notion of a closed system allows us to establish a simile with a social system in terms of a closed system or network of closed conversations.

These conversations are not understood according to the tradition of the language of correspondence-reference, but in a hermeneutic framework, they would give rise to a system that constructs its own meaning without the need for the outside world. That is, without external reference.

However, Varela (2000), in a self-critical development, questions extrapolating the idea of autopoiesis beyond biological systems, to the cellular level at which they were proposed. He thus resorts to a new proposal, which has to do with the birth of the position of enaction. There is an emergence in a system that accounts for a level of complex organization that is not reduced to neural components. This point is crucial, because the enactive position, although it has a background and origin in the studies of autopoiesis, surpasses that position considering that an extrapolation to

a living human system, a social system, is not possible. Respect the level of organization in which the human phenomenon occurs in the relationship at the cultural level. He argues that meaning emerges in an enactment of both system and environment, according to a history of structural coupling.⁵

We can see in this approach then, an advance with respect to linguistic correspondence and reference-correspondence in the sense of questioning the position of accessing an outside of the system. An autonomous system will not be guided from the outside; and by analogy, a hermeneutic social system as a closed network of conversations according to the metaphor of structural coupling, does not recognize an objective outside. Varela is precisely going to develop a conception of co-determination analogous to being-in-the-world with others in language. The notion of structural coupling and emergence is at play here, which involves two levels of complexity for an integration of an enactive system perspective into language.

In this domain we conceive of language functions holistically, including expressive function and therefore expressive speech acts. This makes it possible for emotions, affects and moods as enactive phenomena to be expressed, not translated, in language. An expressive experience can be made explicit in an expressive speech act as self-reference, not representational. In the context of an illocutionary language game, expressive speech acts take part as part of the coordination and "Self-Other co-determination" (Varela, 2002, p.251).

Therefore, a cognitive context understood as generative enaction is expressive. This is an alternative that opens up the study of enaction in the intersubjective social dimension in psychotherapy, mindfulness meditation and in the field of social sciences; neurophenomenology in the line of Husserl.

5. This is how the stage of enaction is presented in the cognitive sciences, addressing the dimension of the first person.

What is worth reflecting on in this regard is how a conception of enactive language addresses the context of co-determination in a system, the relationship between human systems mediated by language. What appears to us is the alternative of an enactive use of language guided expressively, emotionally.

IMPLICATIONS OF STRUCTURAL COUPLING AND LINGUISTIC OPENNESS OF THE SOCIAL WORLD

The underlying position in Winograd and Flores' approach leads to establishing a close parallel between the notion of structural coupling as a metaphor for the hermeneutic approach to language, where it is proposed that structural coupling would allow an analogy to be made with design based on the commitment in the language to make recurrent breaks ineffective. With the assumption of the linguistic openness of the world, according to the structure of being-in-the-world, availability-at-hand (Heidegger), precedes the position of the break and the present-before-the-eyes position, where what is (before) sight appears.

In the same sense, the observer position (of Maturana) that establishes distinctions in language, appears as in a derived position with respect to the previous structural coupling. This conception of language is equivalent to the proposal of enactive social cognition in language. The action conversation appears as a network of conversations in terms of conversational design where the dimension of social exchange is presented as a conversational sequence of roles in different states or stages of the conversation. The question of design becomes crucial to opening up possibilities for action.

In this space, it is proposed that everything happens in language and that meaning appears in speech acts with the potential to access the background.

However, this is where being able to make some distinctions appears to be central. Although the application of an enactive perspective in language is important for social action as a type of conversation or conversation networks, it is worth asking whether this approach reproduces a communicative conversation system oriented towards understanding between participants or an instrumental one, oriented to success. This consideration is important because it affects the attempt to elucidate the social character of the enactive approach in language.

Here it seems pertinent to bring to hand the dimensions of language indicated at the beginning, semantic openness and the pragmatic communicative function. The perspective of the linguistic opening of the world, following the assumptions introduced by the position of enaction of Winograd and Flores based on Heidegger, leads towards holism and towards the thesis that the meaning determines the referent. On the other hand, we maintain that the discussion of the hermeneutical position of Winograd and Flores must take into account the position adopted regarding the notion of background. This is because the notion of background (assumed in the position of Heidegger and also Habermas) incorporates the notion of holism, which leads to the impossibility of distinguishing between the knowledge of meaning and the knowledge of the world in the scope of the theory of indirect reference.

If the assumption that the meaning determines the referent is adopted, when moving towards the notion of background, there is no means for distinguishing between these types of knowledge.

If we ask ourselves about the model of communicative action proposed by enaction in the language of Winograd and Flores, in light of the theory of communicative action, we see that it does not meet the validity criteria of universal pragmatics.

This is equivalent to saying that it does not put communicative competence into action if it does not comply with the spheres of validity. By suppressing the dimension of expressive speech acts, it fails to meet expressive validity. The action communication system must be able to provide the alternative of updating expressive communicative competence, through the recognition of that expressive dimension in language. Which would allow veracity to be mobilized, that is, for speakers to take a position in the first person about what is expressed in what was said. However, addressing the dimension of linguistic competence is not enough to establish meaning.

When addressing the process of social planning and contemplating the structure of the organization, we can clearly see that the design of conversation for action is proposed by segmenting communicative competence by types of speech acts. So it is the case that top management decides the vision or direction when declaring. While middle management can make directives or ask. While the operational base makes commitments or promises of action. Although a division of labor may seem inevitable, the social segmentation of language functions and the restriction of the expressive and propositional dimension, while maintaining only the normative, appellative dimension, shows an imperative and non-communicative type design (Aristegui, 2002, 2006).

According to the approach of communicative action (Habermas), if the decoupling of the world of life and system must be addressed by methodologies of communication or communicative action oriented to understanding, the approach of Winograd and Flores does not appear to take charge of the critical dimensions of the dimensions of openness and communication in language. Its implementation would

produce communicative distortions and lack of communicative competence to access the background.

Moving towards the analysis of the dimension of openness in language, we find assumptions of holism that would need to be addressed in the synthesis of Hermeneutics and Speech Acts by Winograd and Flores. This dimension appears unexamined, even in the background of communicative function. It does not seem possible that the mere factual performance of the spheres of validity allows for an answer to the problem of intelligibility posed by the assumptions of linguistic openness. The theory of enaction as a synthesis of hermeneutics and speech acts presents a structural problem in that it introduces a conception of language according to which reference is determined indirectly. It assumes that a meaning or meaning is previously proposed to propose the reference.

The approach that everything is in language and that meaning appears in speech acts and in the potential for access to the background to make breaks infrequent refers to an indirect, derived referential conception.

In the same sense, by proposing (compared to Habermas) that it is necessary to go beyond the possibilities of a counterfactual dialogue and propose the metaphor of structural coupling to found the social agreement, he affects the function of language opening understood as a displacement of the designative function.

The design that Winograd and Flores propose for access to the background involves modifying the essential condition of the assertion and proposing a background of illocutionary forces over the propositional content. The F(P) structure turns out to be a condition of preeminence of illocutionary force over propositional content. It accounts for the dimension and function of communication, but does not address

the assumption of indirect reference in the dimension of openness in language.

Taking the determination of meaning back to the background leads to holism, via the thesis of the preeminence of the meaning over the referent. He presupposes that in addition to the treatment of communication via speech acts, he proposes to overcome the hypothesis of literal meaning. The preeminence of the background where the meaning takes precedence over the referent, articulates the knowledge of the meaning with the knowledge of the world, not allowing the reference to be differentiated.

Consequently, the move to a position such as that held by Winograd and Flores, which are based precisely on Heidegger Gadamer and Habermas, at a intersection of hermeneutics and speech acts, is based on the idea that meaning is established in the commitment through speech acts and that the content is articulated in recurring models of rupture and potential for access to the background. Meaning or everything that exists is established through language. Which means that the function of openness of language is developed and interpreted considering that language is constitutive of the world.

ENACTION IN LANGUAGE, NEUROPHENOMENOLOGY AND HOLISM OF MEANING

The possibility of establishing social conversation, communication at an intersubjective level, leads us to think that it is necessary to recognize this function or dimension of language as a designative use, as a way to sustain an agreement regarding the dimension in which we communicate. Thus, being able to agree intersubjectively regarding whether we communicate in the scope of norms, or the state of the world, or an experience.

If we return to stating that the entry into the agreement approach is developed through an intermediary (intensional) entity, we plunge into the problem of not being able to distinguish between knowledge of the world and meaning.

A central function of the criticism of the assumption that meaning is preeminent over reference is given by the possibility of generating an intersubjective position against an individualistic conception, which rests on the idea of multiple individual mental accesses as valid.

Social cognition understood within the framework of the theory of enaction in language according to Winograd and Flores affects these individualistic assumptions. In this sense, the application of social models according to said scheme of social action does not address the problem of the sustaining agreement based on jointly accessing a determination of what is understood to guide the action.

The enactive conception in the language of Winograd and Flores, the synthesis of Hermeneutics and Speech Acts, which uses the metaphorical framing (as metonymy) of structural coupling, is subject to this critique of individualistic assumptions. When interpreting the previous understanding, according to one's own point of view, it does not allow access to the dimension of distinction between the internal-external, between what comes from one's own position and what another maintains, crucial to being able to intersubjectively agree about what is said.

The position of the observer who arrives late to establish the distinctions of something already previously performed, situates the relation of reference as derived. The previous, available, already elucidated or settled by the metaphor of structural coupling, was proposed as the simile to establish the meaning, in the field of the company and in the social organization.

Going one step further, the designative, referential function allows a semiotic approach to learning, in that our dealings with images of the world, anchored in the body, as embodied cognition, opens us to establishing recursive orders, in communication, as expression. of recursive levels in social learning. Self-referentiality, at the communicative level, allows us the process of intersubjective communication. At a social level, we can propose the orders of learning, (Bateson) in a confluence with the Bateson Project in the area.

If Bateson is looked at from the indirect theory of the referent, the meaning must be placed on the referent as a reality of the second order.

However, in an enactive perspective, in the world and in addition a theory of direct referent, we access meaning, recognizing that being able to directly refer to something in the world would allow us to access the distinction of logical types and not only logical levels. Bateson accepts metacommunications by type.

Here, Bateson and the theorists of semantic holism open up possibilities of differentiating the problem of linguistic competence from the extensional dimension, which is addressed in enaction.

UNDERSTANDING TERMS IN FIRST-PERSON REPORTS IN NEUROPHENOMENOLOGY

In this context, it seems relevant to us to address the connection with the dimension of understanding the terms used by the participants in the first-person reports, as the axis of Varela's proposal of enaction and neurophenomenology.

It seems to us that the task of understanding the use of language in the first person confronts from the outset the dimension of translation and interpretation. In this specific context, we refer to the position of semantic holism of Quine and Putnam, insofar as they

have developed a position that confronts the positions of the intensionalist theory of meaning. Quine has developed holism and indeterminacy, while Putnam agrees with holism and introduces a critical path to intensionalism with a development of the theory of direct reference.

The position of the thesis of the Indeterminacy of Radical Translation (IT) by Quine (1960) leads us to consider that consistent with the same evidence there is more than one translation manual, although not logically equivalent to each other. In the context of radical translation, there is no fact of the matter. In the same context, the reference appears behaviorally indeterminate. Translated to the mother tongue, the inscrutability of reference (IR) is also presented. What makes sense is not to say what objects the terms of the theory are for, but how they are interpreted or reinterpreted in a background theory, which gives rise to the doctrine of Ontological Relativity (OR). In a translation context, at a pragmatic level, an equivalence of meaning is sought, rather than a radical translation.

According to this theoretical context, the theses of indeterminacy allow us to question the assumptions of reference correspondence and linguistic correspondence. In this respect, we agree with the critical perspective of enaction. By advancing the approach through the semantic dimension of linguistic openness and the pragmatic communicative dimension, from the position of holism of meaning, we converge with the position of enaction in language in Varela's neurophenomenology based on the previously delimited pointed out against the assumptions of the synthesis of hermeneutics and speech acts of Winograd and Flores.

Thus, we propose that an alternative is to differentiate the understanding of descriptions in their designative or referential use from

their attributive use. From a conception of the theory of direct reference (Putnam, 1988), designative use versus attributional use in a pragmatic context allows reference to be differentiated from identification (Putnam, 1988). By understanding a term in an attributive way, it is included in the identification corresponding to a classification that generically predicates membership in a class of descriptions. On the other hand, referential use allows specifying the referential uniqueness of a thing, without the need to comply or satisfy membership in a description. That is, belonging (identification) to a core of descriptions implies a prior property or meaning, as a means of reference. While direct reference proposes access to the thing, not mediated by compliance with the conditions of the description.

This distinction allows an alternative to the thesis that intension determines extension. This is what allows us to question Heidegger's assumption assumed by Winograd and Flores that the meaning determines the referent.

This assumption must be questioned if the position of neurophenomenology is to be maintained. We propose that the field in which Varela's central thesis that affirms the basic working hypothesis is proposed is made explicit in the following "for a circulation between external and phenomenological analysis:

Phenomenological references about the structure of experience and their equivalents in cognitive science are related to each other through mutual restrictions" (Varela 2002)

It means differentiating the dimension of meaning as a prior meaning (symbolizations, concepts) with respect to the referent, which we have pointed out with the distinction between attributive use with respect to referential use in language that points to experience. Applied to the understanding of reports of first-person experience, we propose that enaction in

language in the neuro-phenomenological way allows us to differentiate these uses and face the epistemological consequences of irrevisability of the core of meaning that emerges from assuming analyticity or position of an a priori meaning (or the given, as Varela points out).

On the other hand, assuming a radically enactive position in the use of first-person language, it is worth asking how the meaning emerges from the experience situated in a context of interaction with the second person. What we propose, in line with the meaning established from the direct referent as an expression of a lived experience, is the understanding of the use of words emerging from the background of a process of bodily interaction, in the complexity of action sequences in the totality of the context. Meaning as an experienced felt sensation, although not yet expressed in concepts, is preconceptual and needs congruent verbal symbols for its conceptualization. The terms are ordered with respect to the core of implicit meaning, which is greater than what is explicit. This dimension of the felt sensation as a pre-conceptual background, as well as the implication and articulation in the use of language of the direct referent, develops the consequences of the articulation that from the beginning differentiates enaction: motor-guided perception, in this case, by the felt sensation at the base of experiential meaning. Taking the discussion beyond the tradition of meaning as public use, use as what is done to the to say expressively by the first person in relation to another, in our case, what is expressed as -the most... of Gendlin (1997, 2017), in confluence with Varela- the meaning in doing. If performativity is what is done when saying, this approach, which is more than doing, what doing means, appears as an expressive enaction, also in language, an action with meaning.

The social consequences, indicated in the previous section, lead us to emphasize that in a context of construction of social agreement in conversation, the dimension of direct and recursive self-reference in language allows access to a situational structure where we can articulate what we feel. In a position of feedback and a position of fallibility if the designative dimension of the terms is assumed. The confluence between enaction and Bateson's perspective, in this perspective of enaction, would allow an approach with direct referential uses, with the social consequence that it is not necessary to impose a prior vision as a condition of social dialogue in situations of communication breakdown. Enactive communication is a choice compatible with communicative self-reference.

IN CONCLUSION

A. When examining the assumptions of the conception of language in enaction, a criticism of external referentialism appears, from the hermeneutic phenomenology of enaction in language. The conception of language games articulated with forms of life - of the direct referent type as the possibility of going deeper by crossing between different language games in a possibility that opens up to make explicit the method of full presence-mindfulness and open awareness- awareness of enaction.⁶

What we see is the partiality of language developments in the cognitive sciences, which presuppose the traditional view of language as representation, with respect to the three functions of language recognized in the performative theory of speech acts.

In the same line of argument, the initial perspective of enaction in language does not include the expressive function of language, being also a partial development.

From the perspective of the intersection of hermeneutics and speech acts, we find a way to integrate hermeneutic phenomenology with genetic and generative phenomenology, which allows integrating the expressive dimension of speech acts.

From this background, a path of holistic integration of the functions of language in the theory of speech acts that includes expressive acts is opened, which opens possibilities for a new discussion of social enaction in language.

B) The position of enaction, in the path of Varela's neurophenomenology, allows us to propose an alternative to the dimension of the indirect referent. We argue that the position of enaction in language can address the dimension of openness in language considered as a type of direct enaction in language, not mediated by prior meaning, or concepts or prior social meaning. It seems to us that in this direction, a conception of the direct referent allows us to face the dead end

6. We are interested in clarifying, although for reasons of space we cannot address it in this study, but rather point in the direction of a next treatment... that mindfulness meditation can be characterized as a practice that exceeds the dimension of linguistic competence. Traditionally, words and symbols are understood as limited to the position of surface structure and deep structure. Which is equivalent to meaning. However, we propose the level of experience in mindfulness in a dimension of depth understood as a felt sensation, experientially lived, therefore susceptible to articulating a direct referent from the order of implicitly felt sensation. This way, it assumes a pre-conceptual level of access, not verbal or corresponding to the representation of something external. Simultaneously, from the experiential level, it is possible to involve the levels of words and symbols, without being reduced to them. It corresponds to a non-conceptual, involved, holistic functioning, which involves a total functioning of the person. This way, we can maintain that mindfulness meditation, as a methodological axis of the first person of enaction, can be understood from a pre-conceptual framework that also implies the access route of the direct referent expressed in the language of enaction. With which, we affirm that mindfulness meditation as a form of enaction that integrates implied meaning, can be understood as susceptible to expression, neither as a reduction to language, nor elimination of said dimension of meaning. It also allows the use of language and direct relational references that arise in communities of practice to be expressed and communicated. This is a "more..." that results from the conjunction of enaction in language and direct referent anchored in the experience that we have introduced beyond an objectivist conception of language of the external referent.

path that leads to a conception of the indirect reference in line with the position of Winograd and Flores who try to merge the theory of Maturana and Varela with the assumptions of the hermeneutics.

In a vision of neurophenomenology consistent with the theory of direct reference, the turn of language can be integrated, without the consequences of influencing a linguistic openness of the world. Therefore, the attempt to overcome that previous dimension of language does not need to be countered with a conception of derived reference, such as

an attempt to put a previous non-linguistic understanding before it.

In the same sense, we open a parallel to address enaction and neurophenomenology in the line of understanding emotions and affective states from direct reference, without previously formulated meanings, accompanying the emerging one. Here a position of integration appears between the propositional content and the formulation of emotion (expressivity) in language, without reducing it to language.

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