

THE RISE AND THE FALL: AN ANALYSIS OF THE POPULIST AND NATIONALIST RHETORIC IN BOLSONARO'S CAMPAIGN SPEECHES

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ABSTRACT: In October 2018, Jair Messias Bolsonaro was elected president of Brazil. An anti-corruption, socially conservative and neoliberal economic political agenda was able to classify the behavior of the PSL (Social Liberal Party) candidate as what the specialized literature calls right-wing, authoritarian or reactionary populism. However, studies have pointed out that the populist discourse of Bolsonaro's campaign was overshadowed by the nationalist rhetoric that the candidate used to carry, specially at his brand that would claim "Brazil above all". In 2022, when he was seeking re-election, this time by the PL (Liberal Party), Jair Bolsonaro presented continuous characteristics of nationalist and populist rhetoric in his electoral speeches. Taking these points in consideration, this research

measured the populist and nationalist rhetoric at Jair Bolsonaro's speech finding that the populist was the rhetoric that prevailed in both campaign.

KEYWORDS: Populism; Nationalism; Jair Bolsonaro; Presidential Campaign; Brazilian Election

INTRODUCTION

The rise of political personalities as Donald Trump and Marine Le Pen, in United States of America and France, respectively, so like Brexit, are events that highlight the "populist wave" that has spreaded over the western part of the world. Those political cruzades (Eatwell; Goodwin, 2020) in the name of "the people" carry with themselves a higher level of populism and nationalism, whether in Trump's "America first" or Le Pen's "forgotten France".

In the Southern part of the world, Jair Messias Bolsonaro was elected president of Brazil in October 2018. With the slogan "Brazil above all. God above everyone.", Bolsonaro contradicted the assumptions that for decades elected his

predecessors as the greatest TV time and more campaign money, for example. Bolsonaro won the elections by a tiny party and spending only 2.8 million reais, becoming the first far-right candidate elected president in the Brazilian democratic system.

Before running for president, Bolsonaro already had 28 years of experience as a congress man, so he was not considered a political outsider like Donald Trump, much less he had the transfer of political prestige that Marine Le Pen had in her favor. The historical context in which Bolsonaro was elected demonstrated political instability in the Brazilian scenario. Popular demonstrations were frequent in the streets since June 2013, President Dilma Rousseff was removed from office through an impeachment process and Bolsonaro's possible biggest opponent in the elections, former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, was able to run due to judicial issues.

The rise of Jair Bolsonaro to the highest position in the Brazilian executive political power can be studied in different ways and by different branches of political science studies. However, taking into account the "national-populist wave" that the western world is going through, this research considers it relevant to study the nationalist and populist rhetoric present in the speech of a Brazilian political leader.

To develop this research, we are going to work with the ideational approach of populism and the banal way of seeing nationalism to answer the following question: what rhetoric prevailed in Jair Bolsonaro's speech in his victorious campaign in 2018 and what discursive rhetoric prevailed in his defeated campaign in 2022? It will be used the Holistic Grading method, proposed and adapted by Kirk Hawkins, in which it will be analyzed 20 campaign speeches by Jair Bolsonaro, 10 referring to the 2018 election period and another 10 to the same period in 2022. The speeches were independently analyzed by two graders, who will attribute scores from 0 to 1 points.

We were inspired by a preview studied (Tamaki, Braga and Fuks, 2021) that have reached the conclusion that Bolsonaro was a moderated populist in his victorious campaign in 2018. Following this path, we have analyzed the same discourses by the light of nationalist rhetoric and came to a conclusion that he was also a moderated nationalist. Furthermore, we analyzed ten other speeches, this time from the 2022 campaign, by the light of both rhetoric. It was found out that Bolsonaro was a higher populist but kept being a moderated nationalist.

POPULISM AND NATIONALISM

In recent years, the discussion of populism and nationalism is even more frequently present in political science debates. Populism is a phenomenon that gains strength from the rise of parties and leaders identified with anti-system rhetoric, critics of the current political representation and with a strong capacity to mobilize popular dissatisfaction. However, when understood as a thin and center ideology, with difficulty sustaining itself without other forms of ideology (Hawkins, 2009), populism walks in the light of nationalism in the behavior of various global leaders (Jenne, Hawkins and Silva, 2021).

The advance of globalization and technology is seen as a driving factor in the spread of national-populism. This phenomenon is a long-term process that is perpetuated by different historical contexts such as the weakening of parties, economic crises and cultural changes, factors that fit the political scenario of the election of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, for example (Eatwell and Goodwin, 2020).

Populism: Ideational Approach

Among the various definitions of populism that converge in the specialized literature, the principle of the ideational approach gains prominence in contemporary empirical studies. This approach sees populism as an ideology that divides society between “good”, represented by the pure people, and “evil”, which would be the corrupt elites.

The research line of the “ideational approach” states that, normally, populism is linked to ideological factors (right/left). Mudde and Kaltwasser (2018) argue that populism “should be defined as a set of ideas that not only portray society as divided between “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, but also claim that politics is about respecting sovereignty popular at any cost. The authors highlight four important factors in the rise of populism: economic anxiety, cultural backlash, responsiveness and accountability, and the issue of partisanship and polarization.

In this context, the “ideational approach” presents some approaches to understanding populism: the adoption of economic measures with electoral objectives; a type of regime strengthened by the rise of a charismatic leader who stands up against the system and its ideology; a political strategy associated with mass movements, led by an outsider who appropriates an anti-elite discourse (Hawkins and Kaltwasser, 2017).

Still in the orbit of defining the ideational approach, three conditions are necessary for a discourse to be considered populist: 1) a vision of good versus evil in politics - or a Manichaeic dualism; 2) people-centrism, which implies the existence of a morally good and homogeneous “people”; 3) opposition to an equally inherently evil “elite”, perceived as selfish and an anti-elitism or anti-system.

Banal Nationalism

As in populism, at the core of nationalism lies the dichotomy between “us” and “them” and the understanding of a “people” for which a leader claims to represent. However, despite walking close to each other, nationalism and populism are independent phenomena, which articulate discourses around different dichotomies. While nationalism opposes the idea of people between the “national-self” versus the “national-others” (Billing, 1995), that is, the distinction between those who defend and glorify the nation and others who do not agree with these ideals, populism works on the bipolar relationship between the pure people, the oppressed, and the corrupt elites (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2018).

Nationalism is not only the legitimizing ideology of political government, but also a powerful individual identity, with the unique potential to connect a people with their history, culture, homeland and their descendants (Singh, 2021). The concept of nationalism as the idealization of a nation, in which that same nation is seen as the highest authority that people must submit to is adopted by Mubotter (2021), in which the phenomenon, in this understanding, is seen as something that society's homogeneity prevails, indicating that people would be united in community by ethnicity, culture and religion.

Years before the elections of Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro, the British Michael Billing (1995) presented to the world the theory of Banal Nationalism, in which he defends that nationalism is a temporary phenomenon, with ideological bases, that affects nation-states established in crisis moments. This line of study points out that individuals are routinely affected by various elements, such as flags, sports and national anthems, which remind them that they are part of a nation on a daily basis. It is these same elements that allow the understanding of nationalism as a means by which the nation-states of the West are reproduced.

The central thesis of Banal Nationalism says that, in established nations, there is a continuous signaling or reminder of the individual's nationality, awakened by elements of national identity. In many small ways, citizens are reminded of a national place in a world full of other nations. It is in this context that Billing (1995) will state that nationality serves as a backdrop for political discourses and cultural products.

Nationalist thought includes the conception of "we" (national-self), which would have a unique identity, as well as the understanding of "they" (national-others), which have different identities. In this way, nationalism is understood as an ideology of the first-person plural (we), in which the main issue related to identity is present through the question of how the "we" is constructed and what its construction means.

METODOLOGY - HOLISTIC GRADING

This article will be developed using the quantitative method. For better qualification of political speeches, textual analysis by capturing keywords and identifying the context of sentences is pointed out by Jenne (2021) as a good methodological solution. Thus, to measure the nationalist rhetoric in Jair Bolsonaro's speech, the quantitative method of the Holistic Approach, developed by Hawkins (2009), will be applied.

The Holistic Approach is a discourse analysis technique adapted from educational psychology, which consists of coding texts. In political studies, it was originally thought to measure populist discourses in Europe and North America. The process is developed by attributing scores to the analyzed documents, based on an anchor text, which guides the key values for classifying the speech, as well as the score indicated for a given characteristic.

Despite being a methodology developed to measure populist speeches, the Holistic Approach is also used to measure the degree of nationalism in the speeches of national leaders (Jenne, 2021). For this purpose, the methodology presents rubrics that will guide the measurement of the speech. Following the idea of populism and nationalism as discourses (Hawkins, 2010; Jenne, 2020), 20 speeches from Jair Bolsonaro's campaigns were coded and analyzed, with ten pronouncements referring to the 2018 campaign and another ten referring to the 2022 election.

To do so, we follow the lines of analysis of populist rhetoric proposed by Hawkins (2009), which consist of six categories: 1) The Manichean view between "good" and "evil"; 2) Morality gains cosmic proportions in its meaning, being linked to national or religious leaders; 3) The embodiment of the national ideal in the will of the pure people; 4) "Evil" is embodied in a minority whose specific identity varies according to context; 5) The "evil", represented by the corrupt elites is or was recently in power and has subverted the system for its own interests; 6) The use of non-democratic means can be used on behalf of the "people" to fight the "evil" of corrupt elites.

In the case of nationalism, the analysis rubrics are proposed by Jenne (2020) and worked in two categories, the "national-self" and the "national-others", as the methodology considers it important to understand these two forms for a more accurate classification of nationalist rhetoric. The "national-self" category is codified based on six premises: 1) Exaltation of the nation's virtues and singularities, in addition to boasting of its past triumphs and victories, as well as prioritizing the health and well-being of the future; 2) Discourse with the presence of family metaphors such as brothers, motherland, etc.; 3) Mentions of past traumas, national heroes and historical moments; 4) Speech that praises the restoration of the nation to its rightful position; 5) Reference to national sovereignty and self-assertion; 6) Presence of elements of national identity in the discourse. The "national-other" is encoded in five premises: 1) Threats posed by minorities from within or outside the nation; 2) Threats can come from international organizations or nations; 3) Nations and groups can be stereotyped; 4) Threats can come from immigrants, refugees or historical minorities; 5) Aversion to citizens considered disloyal to the nation. The end result of encoding nationalism will be the calculation of the relationship between the two categories.

The speeches will be classified with a score that varies between 0 and 1, where 0 corresponds to the absence of the categorization elements of populism and nationalism adopted for the research; 0.5 if the speech presents elements of populism and nationalism in a less emphatic way; and 1 if all classifying elements are present. Decimal numbers such as 0.4 and 0.7 will be used in the measurement of speeches based on the approximation of the reference scores, with decimals close to 1 being considered more populist and nationalistic than decimals close to zero.

ANALYSIS

Table 1 contemplates the score achieved from the coding of ten speeches by Jair Bolsonaro, referring to the 2018 presidential campaign, in the light of populist and nationalist rhetoric. The numbers that emphasize populism in the analyzed speeches refer to the codifications presented in the article “A drop in the ocean or a change in the weather? Populism in Bolsonaro’s campaign revisited” (Tamaki, Braga and Fuks, 2021), being the numbers of nationalism, a result achieved by the authors of this research.

Title	Date	Populism	Nationalism
1 - Official launch of his political campaign.	July 22, 2018	0.5	0.7
2 – Araçatuba.	August 23, 2018	0.6	0.5
3 – Porto Velho.	August 31, 2018	0.1	0.4
4 – Juiz de Fora.	September 06, 2018	0.3	0.4
5 – After being Stabbed.	September 16, 2018	0.3	0.4
6 – Av. Paulista.	September 30, 2018	0.4	0.5
7 – One day before the 1st round of elections.	October 06, 2018	0.3	0.1
8 – Right after the 1st round of elections.	October 07, 2018	0.7	0.2
9 – Av. Paulista.	October 22, 2018	0.9	0.8
10 – The day before the 2nd round of elections.	October 27, 2018	0.9	0.5
Total average		0.5	0.45

Table 1 – Bolsonaro’s campaign speeches scores 2018


Source: Tamaki, Braga and Fuks, 2021; Authors coding

From the analysis of speech encodings, it is possible to infer that both Bolsonaro’s populist and nationalist rhetoric were moderate, reaching an average of 0.5 and 0.45, respectively. In a comparison, it is noteworthy that of the ten codified speeches, five had the prevalence of nationalist rhetoric and another five-populist rhetoric, with nationalism prevailing in the first months of the Bolsonarist campaign.

In Brazil, presidential elections can take place in up to two rounds, a fact that happened in the 2018 election. Our analysis shows that Jair Bolsonaro’s populism was intensified in the second round of the elections, coinciding with the events after the stabbing attack that then took place. candidate suffered on September 6, in the city of Juiz de Fora.

In the scenario prior to the first round of elections, we highlight two speeches by the candidate: the one held at Av. Paulista - São Paulo (September, 30) and the live broadcast the day before the vote (October, 6). On Av. Paulista, both populism and nationalism were rhetorics that reached a median score, 0.4 and 0.5, respectively. The pronouncement made through the live reached low scores, with 0.3 for populist rhetoric and 0.1 for nationalist

rhetoric. With regard to the environment of the second round, Av. Paulista (October, 7) achieved a score of 0.9 for populism and 0.8 for nationalism. In the case of the live that preceded the day of the election (October, 27), populism reached the same score of 0.9 and nationalism showed a drop, continuing to a score of 0.5, as shown in graph 1.



Source: Authors

Table 2 presents the result of coding Jair Bolsonaro’s campaign speeches in the search for reelection in 2022. The score shows that in the 2022 election the rhetoric that stood out in Bolsonarist discourse was populist, reaching an average of 0.74, while the rhetoric nationalist had an average of 0.5.


Title	Date	Populism	Nationalism
1 - Official launch of his political campaign.	July 24, 2022	0.8	0.5
2 – Juiz de Fora.	August 16, 2022	0.9	0.6
3 – São José dos Campos.	August 18, 2022	0.8	0.6
4 – Brasília.	September 07, 2022	0.8	0.55
5 – São Paulo.	September 07, 2022	1.0	0.55
6 – Palmas.	September 09, 2022	0.9	0.6
7 –Natal.	September 14, 2022	0.8	0.45
8 – Belém.	September 22, 2022	0.6	0.25
9 – Right after the 1st round of elections.	October 02, 2022	0.3	0.25
10 – Belo Horizonte.	October 06, 2022	0.5	0.75
Total average		0.74	0.5

Table 1 – Bolsonaro’s campaign speeches scores 2022

Source: Authors


From a first analysis of the codifications of Bolsonaro's speeches in his campaign for re-election, it is possible to see that the populist rhetoric overlapped the nationalist rhetoric in the candidate speech. Taking into account the chronology of the pronouncements, it is noticeable that Bolsonaro maintained a more populist position at the beginning of his campaign. We emphasize that some historical events may have influenced the reach of 0.74 for Bolsonaro's populist rhetoric. The second speech analyzed took place in the city of Juiz de Fora, where Jair Bolsonaro was stabbed four years earlier, in the 2018 campaign.

We draw special attention to the speeches given in Brasília and São Paulo, both of which took place on September 7, the commemorative date of Brazil's Independence Day. Due to the date being a reminder of the Brazilian national identity, it was expected that the degree of nationalism would be higher, however, what was noticed was that populism reached its highest rates in these two speeches. Graph 2 demonstrates the prevailing behavior of candidate Jair Bolsonaro's populist rhetoric, with only a slight drop in the pronouncement made shortly after the result of the first round, followed by a slight improvement in the speech given in Belo Horizonte, which had the highest index of nationalism of speeches referring to the 2022 elections.




Source: Authors

Graph 3 shows the comparison of the measurement of Jair Bolsonaro's populist rhetoric in the 2018 and 2022 elections. In the first election, that is, Bolsonaro intensifies populism in his pronouncements at the end of his campaign. In the 2022 campaign, on the other hand, the movement is the opposite. Populist rhetoric has a higher score at the beginning of the campaign and a drop in the last weeks before the election.



Source: Authors

The coding of Bolsonaroist discourse in the light of nationalist rhetoric shows that this category presented greater linearity than populist rhetoric when comparing the two presidential elections contested by Bolsonaro. In 2018, populism gained strength in the final stretch of the campaign, in 2022, nationalism gained prominence in the final stretch.



Source: Authors

Populism Rubrics

As we have showed before, our coding of the populist rhetoric was made through six rubrics proposed by Hawkins (2009). Right below, we identify elements of a speech we consider to be part of each rubric. The discourse presented were given by Bolsonaro on September, 7 2022, in São Paulo. The speech was coded and scored a number of 1, which means that it got every single one of the six populist rubrics. The definitions of the rubrics below were entire taken from Hawkins (2009).

1- According to the ideational approach of populism a Manichaeian vision of the world need to be considered. In this category every issue has a strong moral and dualistic dimension, in other words, everything is in one category or the other, “right” or “wrong,” “good” or “evil”. The good/right in Bolsonaro’s vision was personified in the people who walked by his side, those considered by him and his supporters as patriots. Evil/wrong, on the other hand, was seen in individuals or groups contrary to Bolsonarist policy. In the case of the speech analyzed, the evil is represented in the person of Minister Alexandre de Moraes.

Bolsonaro: *“We have a minister on the Supreme Court who dares to continue doing what we do not admit. Soon a minister who should watch over our freedom, democracy, the Constitution does exactly the opposite.”*

2- The moral significance of the items mentioned in the speech is heightened by ascribing cosmic proportions to them, that is, by claiming that they affect people everywhere (possibly but not necessarily across the world) and across time. Bolsonaro used to say that everything he does is in the name of the people and driven by them. As it is described in the passage below, Bolsonaro consider himself and the good people as the holder of the moral.

Bolsonaro: *“Our people have always prioritized freedom. We respect the laws and our constitution. This president who is speaking to you has always been on the side of our constitution. He has always been within its four lines. But now the time has come for us to tell these people who abuse the force of power to subjugate, tell those few that now everything will be different. We continue to play within the 4 lines, but we will no longer allow any of these other people to play outside the 4 lines.”*

3- Although Manichaeian, the discourse is still democratic, in the sense that the good is embodied in the will of the majority, which is seen as a unified whole, perhaps but not necessarily expressed in references to the will of the people. In this situation, Bolsonaro used to see the Brazilian people as a group with conservative ideas, and everyone who agreed to these thoughts would be the real Brazilian people and he would be able to speak in them behalf.

Bolsonaro: *“We must, because I speak on your behalf, determine that all political prisoners be released.”*

4- The evil is embodied in a minority whose specific identity will vary according to context. Domestically, in Latin America it is often an economic elite, perhaps the “oligarchy,” but it may also be a racial elite; internationally. Bolsonaro spread the idea that the left-wing, specially the Workers Party, is the evil that has destroyed Brazil. At the speech we analyze in this section, the evil is embodied in Alexandre de Moraes, a minister of the Supreme Court who defend the Brazilian Electoral System, which Bolsonaro consider a fraud.

Bolsonaro: *“We cannot allow a person, a man, to cloud our democracy and threaten our freedom. Tell that individual that he still has time to redeem himself. He still has time to archive his investigations. Or rather, his time has run out. Get out, Alexandre de Moraes¹. Stop being a scoundrel. Stop oppressing the Brazilian people.”*

5- Here the evil minority is or was recently in charge and subverted the system to its own interests, against those of the good majority or the people. Thus, systemic change is/was required, often expressed in terms such as “revolution” or “liberation” of the people from their “immiseration” or bondage, even if technically it comes about through elections. Bolsonaro understand that the Workers Party has been for too long in power and, due to its history with corruption, the good people of Brazil wouldn’t vote for them again, so he always question the security of the elections in the country.

Bolsonaro: *“We cannot accept an electoral system that does not offer any security at the time of elections. Also say that it is not a person from the Superior Electoral Court who will tell us that this process is safe and reliable because it is not.”*

6- Sometimes non-democratic means may be openly justified or at least the minority’s continued enjoyment of these will be seen as a generous concession by the people; the speech itself may exaggerate or abuse data to make this point, and the language will show a bellicosity towards the opposition that is incendiary and condescending, lacking the decorum that one shows a worthy opponent. Bolsonaro is a former captain of the Brazilian Army and sympathetic with the Military Dictatorship that happened in Brazil. He has always support that non-democratic form of government in the country.

Bolsonaro: *“To tell you that any decision by Mr. Alexandre de Moraes, this president will no longer comply with. Our people’s patience has already run out.”*

¹ Alexandre de Moraes is a member of the Brazilian Supreme Court and he was the presidente of the Supreme Electoral Court at the 2022 elections.

Nationalism Rubrics

The nationalist rhetoric at Bolsonaro's speech was almost the same when it's compared the elections he ran (2018 e 2022). However, it's important to highlight that the medium score this rhetoric reached was a calculation of both "national-self" (we) and "national-others" (they), following the rubrics introduced by Jenne (2020), which means that to measure the nationalism we had to work with eleven rubrics. We understand that this form of measure the nationalist rhetoric is not very much effective in Brazil, specially when we consider the "national-other", a category that brings a lot of aversion ideas of other countries.

On the other hand of what happened in our coding of populism, it was not found any speech scored with 1 in the nationalist rhetoric. To exemplify the national-self rubrics, it is going to be worked the São Paulo speech (September 7, 2022), the same one we used for the populist rubrics.

National-self Rubrics

1- The discourse of nationalism or dominant nationhood extolls the virtues and distinctiveness of the core nation and proclaims their past triumphs and victories, and/or prioritizes its health and future well-being. There may be considerable sentimentality associated with these claims. Bolsonaro's campaign speeches are full of these kinds of felling. He claims that the future well-being of Brazil will only be happening with him in power.

Bolsonaro: *"We believe in the future of our Brazil and together, as a team, we will build the future we deserve. We have the best people in the world. The best land on the planet, and we will, with this new political class, build what we deserve."*

2- Nationalist discourse is often peppered with family metaphors like "brothers," "motherland," "homeland" or "founding fathers.". We did not find any sentence or expression in the speeches we coded mentioned by Bolsonaro that carry metaphors of family.

3- References may be made to the historical pain and trauma caused by national defeats. There may be references to national heroes or key turning points in national history. In this case, Bolsonaro believes that the biggest trauma Brazil has ever faced was the sixteen years the Workers Party was in charge. He also understands that the group of people that follow his ideas, the so-called patriots, are the real national heroes, alongside with the military forces.

Bolsonaro: *"These people have always stood up in the nation's most difficult moments precisely to save it. You from Paulista, you who demonstrate throughout Brazil. You are saving our nation."*

4- Calls for restoring the nation to its rightful position, at home and abroad. As we said before, Bolsonaro has the idea that the parties that precede him in charge have destroyed the nation by accept a lot of progressive ideas.

Bolsonaro: *"We are the majority. We are the real Brazil. Together with these Brazilian people we will build a new nation."*

5 - May be references to importance of national sovereignty and self-determination. Bolsonaro believes that the financial support the Workers Party gave to other Latin American countries like Cuba and Venezuela were nothing more than corruption and a support to left-wings government.

Bolsonaro: *"Brazil will be respected abroad. Brazil will no longer be a laughing stock in the world. Here, there will be no more room for corruption."*

6- Presence of elements of national identity in the discourse. It's possible to identify a lot of Brazilian national identity's elements in Bolsonoro's speeches. He frequently mention expressions like "green and yellow", colors of the Brazilian Flag, and "order and progress", words printed on the national flag.

Bolsonaro: *"We are one country, one homeland, one nation. We are a green and yellow heart"*

National-others Rubrics

1- This discourse is focused on the purported threat posed by minorities or "national-others" outside or inside the state. Bolsonaro understands that the biggest threat to Brazil are the progressive minority inside the state.

Bolsonaro: *"We all know what we got rid of in 2018 and what we will get rid of now on October 2nd. We are going to definitely get rid of the communism that threatens our Brazil."²*

2- Externally, threats may take the form of foreign (sometimes "enemy") nations, international organizations (UN or EU) or anti-national elites perceived to be aligned against the nation. Bolsonaro doesn't see big threats coming from other nations. Actually, the passage below was the only part in our coding that we noticed Bolsonaro talking about some kind of international threat.

Bolsonaro: *"we heard about international greed for the Amazon region. It is a reality. We know how much she represents to the world. But the Amazon is ours. It is a reality. We know how much she represents to the world. But the Amazon is ours. We can't help but worry about it and know that some countries are interested in taking over this region."³*

² Speech gave at the city of Palmas (september 9, 2022).

³ Speech gave at the city of Belo Horizonte (october 6, 2022).

3 - Nations and groups may be stereotyped. Bolsonaro likes to use Cuba and Venezuela as examples of failure, due to the left-wing that rule those countries. In the passage below, he mentions Argentina as well. However, it's important to say that during our coding it was not found trace of xenophobia in Bolsonaro's speeches.

Bolsonaro: *"We are slaves to our decisions. Our neighbors like Argentina and Venezuela chose their representatives wrongly. They suffer a lot now. We can't go wrong. We know it's a fight of good against evil."*⁴

4- Migrants, immigrants or refugees or on threats posed by historical minorities with a long history in the state. Some minorities may be framed as potential fifth columns or Trojan Horses for hostile outside actors. Nevertheless, it was not found any sentence or expression during our coding that would be classified in this rubric.

5 - "National-others" may also include disloyal citizens or traitors, who serve as a conduit for the influence of hostile outside forces. This was the rubric of "national-other" we could see the most at Bolsonaro's discourse. He's got a special view for Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva e Alexandre de Moraes as disloyal citizens.

Bolsonaro: *"And we will no longer allow people like Alexandre de Moraes to continue to flog our democracy and disrespect our Constitution. He had every opportunity to act with respect to all of us, but he didn't act that way and he still doesn't."*⁵

CONCLUSION

The link between populist and nationalist rhetoric in Jair Bolsonaro's speech in his two campaigns seeking the presidency of Brazil (2018 and 2022) shows that in his first election, the runner candidate was considered a moderate populist (Tamaki, Braga and Fuks, 2021), reaching a score of 0.5 on the rubric analysis scale proposed by Hawkins (2009). Moderation was also present in Bolsonaro's nationalist rhetoric, reaching an average of 0.45 on the scale proposed by Jenne (2020).

At his first campaign, it should be noted, Bolsonaro's populism rested on the dichotomy of "us" versus "them", in which the "them" represented the corrupt elite that had been in power for some time, visualized in the image of the Workers' Party. In the case of "us", the people, Bolsonaro's supporters, known as patriots, were considered included.

The cosmic proportions in which Bolsonaro's speech exuded found fertile ground in the then scenario of Brazilian politics. The worn-out image of the Workers' Party, driven by the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff and the arrestment of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, as well as the unpopularity of the ruling president Michel Temer (MDB - Brazilian Democratic Movement) and the popular movements that often took to the streets of the country in protest. It was in this situation that Bolsonaro put himself on the spotlight of the only savior

⁴ Speech gave at the city of Belo Horizonte (october 6, 2022).

⁵ Speech gave at the city of São Paulo (September 7, 2022).

of Brazilian politics and who would do the will of the people who were protesting on the streets. Jair Messias Bolsonaro was elected president of Brazil, in the second round, with 55% of the votes, defeating Fernando Haddad of the Workers' Party.

In the re-election campaign (2022), Bolsonaro found a different scenario from the previous election. As the country's incumbent, he is on his way to economic crises and the Covid-19 pandemic, in addition to Lula's return as the main opponent in the presidential race. Ranked second in most election polls, Bolsonaro has laid bare the war of "good" against "evil" in his populist rhetoric. In the 2022 dispute, he reached a score of 0.75 on the populism measurement scale, approaching the numbers of Edorgan (Turkey) and Lukashenko (Belorus) (Jenne, Hawkins and Silva, 2021).

The "good" in 2022 continued to be represented by conservative patriots. "Evil", in turn, lost a little of the collective sense that pointed to the Workers' Party and gained two human faces. The role of "evil" in 2022 was played by Lula and Alexandre de Moraes. Despite getting a higher number of votes than in the previous election, Bolsonaro lost the presidency to Lula, becoming the first president to fail re-election since the country's redemocratization.

In light of the nationalist rhetoric, Bolsonaro was moderate in the two presidential elections he contested, reaching averages of 0.45 and 0.5, in 2018 and 2022, respectively. Most of the nationalist characteristics that Bolsonaro presented in 2018 remained present in 2022, with the exception of the discourse on the future of the nation, which was previously forged in the idea of rebuilding the country through conservatism and right-wing economic neoliberalism, already in the second This year, the idea that prevailed was that the Brazilian people could not allow the enemies of the nation, represented by members of the left, to return to power and bring communism to Brazil.

In Bolsonarist nationalism, the relationship of "us" versus "them" is personified in the "us", represented by conservative patriots, and in the "they", the enemies of the homeland, represented by leftist defenders of communism, disarmament and the ideology of gender. Therefore, leftists are the main enemies of the Brazilian nation.

Unlike other countries in Europe and North America, which see xenophobia as a counterpoint to nationalism (Tamir, 2020), Bolsonaro's nationalist rhetoric did not see direct threats to Brazil from other nations. What is exposed in the speeches are stereotypes of other nations like Cuba and Venezuela, which are countries that Bolsonaro understands are governed by communist dictatorships. However, these stereotypes demonstrate an aversion to the form of government of the countries, not to its people.

The codification of elements of national identity is not a rubric used by Jenne (2020), it was our inclusion due to previous observations that indicated evidence of these elements in Bolsonaro's speech. However, despite this work being carried out through discourse analysis, it is noteworthy that the analysis of Bolsonaro's use of national identity, based on Billing's propositions (1995), would be better worked through content analysis. The

development and conclusion of this research allow us to point to new future paths that nationalist and populist rhetoric can point to, such as the analysis of the discourse of the four years of Bolsonaro's government or a comparative study with other leaders both in Europe and the United States as well as in the Latin America.

We also emphasize that throughout the codification of the twenty speeches that composed the corpus of this research, elements of social conservatism proposed by Lakoff (2014) were abundantly identified, such as core values, social vision, the idea of the good society, law and order and so on, which point out path for us to follow.

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