“BRAZIL ABOVE ALL, GOD ABOVE ALL”: POLITICAL DISCURSIVE FORMULAS AND HATE SPEECH IN CONTEMPORARY BRAZIL

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Abstract: In the present text, we will quickly resume the cognitive, interdiscursive and transdiscursive aspects, as developed in Morais (2018; 2019), to reflect on the slogan of the presidential campaign and the elected Federal Government of Jair Bolsonaro, namely: Brazil above all, God above all. To this end, we structure the present text as follows: in the first section, we will briefly discuss the relationship between nation and religion based on Anderson (2008); in the second, we define the concept of hate speech from the Agency for Fundamental Rights of the European Union (FRA, 2019), the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI, 2019) and Lakoff (2017); in the third, we make use of the contributions of Krieg-Planque (2010) regarding the concept of discursive formula to analyze the slogans in question. Anossover, this crystallized expression condenses a political project focused on a fundamentalist reading – in the dogmatic sense – of the concepts of nation and God in the country, reorganizing militarist and liberal thoughts.

Keywords: Political discourse, far right, discursive formula, intolerance.

INTRODUCTION

In the present text, we will analyze the slogan of the Federal Government of Jair Bolsonaro, Brazil above everything, God above everyone, also used in his presidential campaign in 2018. we will define the category of hate speech, anchoring ourselves in the Agency for Fundamental Rights of the European Union (FRA, 2019), in the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI, 2019) and in Lakoff (2017). Finally, in the third, we will investigate these political slogans as a discursive formula (Krieg-Planque, 2010).

1 – The nation as a sacred community

According to Anderson (2008), any political community is established as a group through the creation of shared images that can generate feelings of belonging and fraternal relationships between the individuals who compose it., “the value of greater universal legitimacy in the political life of our times” (Anderson, 2008, p. 28). Therefore, for Anderson (2008, p. 33-4), the idea of nation is fundamentally an imagined reality (capable of creating bonds between individuals who have never known and will never know each other), limited (endowed with finite borders in relation to others), sovereign (full autonomy) and community (regardless of asymmetrical and exploitative relationships, it grounds the feeling of horizontal “comradeship”, foundation of the idea of an “I/us” against a “them”).

From the 18th century onwards, with the decline in the importance of the religious imaginary in the elaboration of community bonds, the idea of nation began to supply a certain demand of peoples to signify themselves in relation to experiences lived collectively in the past, opposing arbitrariness, fatality and the chance of social ties.. The national condition, therefore, similar to religious thought, began to contribute to the re-signification of the situation of man-in-the-universe and his sense of existence, leading to social cohesion more through emotions than through rationality (Anderson, 2008).

Understanding the centrality of the concept of nationhood for the definition of political discourse in modern societies, we are interested in understanding how the idea of nation relates to the idea of Christianity in the foundation of discourses of political hate in contemporary Brazil.

A. Non-ontological definition of the Right, defining it as a political spectrum associated with different historical projects for the maintenance of social inequalities, sustaining, therefore, the inviolability, naturalness and acceptability of essentialist
distinctions, in opposition to the Left, which continually seeks to denaturalize hierarchies and processes of exploitation.] individual or collective actors, currents of thought, patterns of behavior and attitudes that oppose, in the most different contexts, to projects of this order [maintaining inequalities];

B. Fascism as a “language game”. For Wittgenstein (1999, § 66): “What is common to all of them [games]? […] [If] you contemplate them, you won’t actually see something that was common to all, but you will see similarities, kinship, and even a whole series of them”. Different from the notion of Wittgenstein of a game. Games are different activities that exhibit only a ‘family resemblance’ […]”;

C. Distinction between “people” and “rabble”. According to Arendt (2012, p. 102): “[and] while the people, in all great revolutions, fight for a truly representative system, the rabble always cry out for the ‘strong man’, for the ‘great leader’”. araé, conformedestaca Arendt (2012, page 103), “is fundamentally a group in which residues of all classes are represented. This is what makes it so easy to confuse the rabble with the people, who also comprise all social strata.” In moments of crisis, elites leverage their political forces by aligning themselves with the rabble;

D. The political unit is dynamic and contradictory. For Hall (2003), ideologies are organized in an analogous way to complex systems, articulated through a double movement: contradiction and overdetermination. This would allow the existence of both “units in difference” and “differences in itself”, avoiding deterministic analyzes of ideological processes.

Furthermore, with Morais (2018), we proposed the category of transdiscourse, as a kind of inversion from the point of view of interdiscourse. Instead of the “other name”, we were interested in evaluating the “same in the other”. That is, to describe and explain some concepts apparently transversal to different discourses, which function as a kind of rigid semantic nucleus that crosses the set of discourses in a given spatio-temporal cut of the knowledge of a society. Signs are privileged for the occurrence of interdiscursivity as a result of their centrality in the organization of the groups’ perception of the world, as is the case of the attempt by social subjects to attribute order/meaning to the experienced world, as opposed to the absurd/ non sens.

In this bias, intolerant groups are distinguished from others by sharing a unique cognitive, discursive and aesthetic organization, producing a dogmatic and extremist sensitivity in relation to the idea of “order” and its subsidiary concepts: purity, associated with origin, in which the divine, nature and the good are opposed to the profane, to the ideological and to the evil; tradition, associated with memory, in which the long imaginary temporality seems to reflect the very laws of nature within the scope of morality; distinction, associated with the singularity of subjects and groups (I/We), in which the particular, clarity and limit are opposed to miscegenation and hybridization; hierarchy, associated with axiologies in the ordering of the world, in which the ontological distinction of values and functions between groups seems to reflect an essential and necessarily non-egalitarian world; sacredness, associated with mythical veneration, in which violence itself can function as a guarantee of a duty to be that prevents subversion to the
norm. As an ideological manifestation, the current political discourse of the Brazilian extreme right is based on the following assumptions:

(a) the individual and the group as ends in themselves; (b) private property as a sacred right; (c) wealth as an index of freedom and individual and social progress; (d) the Christian family as guarantor of values and morals; (e) the corporate/hierarchical disposition as a principle of social organization of the nation/people; (f) the (re)approximation between State and Religion as a guarantee of political hegemony of dominant groups; and (g) violence as a structuring condition of discipline, order and progress (MORAIS, 2019, p.156).

Finally, in Morais (2019), we evaluated the interdiscursive organization of the far right through the approximation between political discourse, as a voice in the social arena that seeks to legitimate and deliberate on group proposals, even if intolerant of otherness; neoliberal discourse, as hegemonic economic knowledge that preaches the destruction of the common in favor of the market, with a focus on competition to the detriment of solidarity; Brazilian (1964 to 1985) and the meaning of violence as a solution to social conflicts and a purifier of society; and the conservative Christian discourse, as a dogmatic reading of Christian precepts by conservative Catholic and Evangelical (neo)Pentecostal groups, anchored more on “revenge” and “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth” than on forgiveness.

2 – Intolerance and hate speech

The Fundamental Rights Agency of the European Union defines hate crime as violence and crimes motivated by racism, xenophobia, religious intolerance or prejudice against a person’s disability, sexual orientation or gender identity (FRA, 2019). The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, however, considers that hate speech represents serious dangers for the cohesion of a democratic society, for the protection of human rights and for the maintenance of the rule of law. If not addressed, these acts of violence can lead to the development of conflicts on broader scales (ECRI, 2019).

Lakoff (2017) defines hate speech as the association between a particular social group and inherent highly negative qualities, such as immorality, intellectual inferiority, criminality, lack of patriotism, laziness, lack of confidence, greed, and attempts or threats to dominate their “natural superiors”. According to Lakoff (2017), for this to happen, it is necessary to develop a method of defamation that consists of (1) selecting individual examples that are too terrifying and reprehensible to be exploited and sensationalized by the media; that is, to homogenize the characteristics of a group from rare and extremely negative examples; (2) attributing to the group considered superior all the virtues that supposedly lacking in the inferior groups, making the former the main responsible for the advances of civilization; (3) using metaphors based on fallacious arguments, assuming that the group considered superior is more evolved than the others; and (4) endorsing oppressive postures on behalf of government and institutions.

President Jair Bolsonaro continually revisits the aforementioned aspects in the organization of his political rhetoric, so that (1) he explores new social media to publicize specific and outstanding cases from their context to homogenize his “enemies” and shock his supporters, strongly aligned with the so-called agendas. morals (EMPOLI, 2019); (2) it attributes to its group a natural superiority in relation to its antagonists, through the use of the concept of “good citizen”, which disregards any conflicting political perspective (AVRITZER, 2020; NOBRE, 2020); (3) it uses fraudulent news (Fake News) – therefore,
of fallacies – as a way of gathering political support (see BUCCI, 2019); (4) it endorses and encourages violent attitudes by both civil groups and state institutions (AVRITZER, 2020; NOBRE, 2020).

3 – Brazil of everything, God above all: a transdiscursive interand water

The approximation between national and religious imaginaries in the management of reasons and emotions seems to be fundamental in order to understand the resurgence of authoritarian thinking in Brazil today, having, however, a remarkable singularity in relation to Anderson's proposal (2008): in contemporary Brazilian society – and possibly in the United States – the feeling of national community is strengthened in parallel with the feeling of Christian community, associating with it, rather than rivaling it.

Thus, to operationalize the analysis proposed here, we will make the following adjustment to Anderson's (2008) conceptualization: instead of opposing national imaginary to religious imaginary, we will oppose political imaginary – of a more secular content – to religious imaginary –deutorally more sacred–, allowing the national imaginary will encompass two.

According to Krieg-Planque (2010), discursive formulas – as is the case with political slogans – are linguistically fixed or crystallized expressions that circulate in the public space in a given society. Despite the rigidity of its composition, so that it makes sense as a whole, but not necessarily in parts, such forms are fundamentally related to a historical context, from which they manage to condense a set of circulating social meanings and expectations into a concise symbolic structure. Assessed positively or negatively by the ideological positioning of the social actors with whom they dialogue, the formulas acquire a polemical character, in which antagonistic social groups dispute their meanings, endorsing them, deconstructing them or resignifying them.

When we get in touch with the slogan “Brazil above all, God above all”, we immediately perceive the association between “Brazil” and “God” in the same utterance, condensing the two main emotional experiences of modern, national and religious subjectivity. In this way, we seek to eliminate distinctions between patriotic and spiritual sensations of the sacred. In common, both are capable of producing a feeling of union and social cohesion to the detriment of the imaginary of disorder and chaos, of decadence and crisis. In this perspective, the search for a greater good must be superior to fractures, disputes and social conflicts, represented by the ideological.

As implied, its enunciation implies the denial of an antagonistic political project: Brazil and God were not “above everything and everyone” for the Opponent, but “the enemy”, which was in power until then. For the enunciator, the political left symbolizes internal disputes and immorality. As implied, the country is going through a moment of decadence, in which the main collective beliefs – values – are being put in question, in a way that the country would be taken by subversion and corruption.

“Brazil” represents the secular, collective institutions, which must be transparent to the “people”, since it is a republic (res + publica). In addition, the representativeness of the majority must be regained, since it is a democracy (demos + cracia). “God” shifts the public good to the spiritual good, focusing no longer on worldly needs, but on the salvation of souls. God would be, ultimately, the guarantor of the truth against the lie characteristic of politics, the cause of misconduct due to personal ambitions. With God, it is hoped to resume the purity of political purposes, a project, at the same time, profane and divine, but not secular,
given that the divine must overcome the profane, as well as God over men.

Whether in the political or religious aspects, it is, therefore, about representing the majority of the Brazilian population, which means the non-representation of minorities in the public sphere. Ultimately, such thinking would lead to the destruction of the Rule of Law, which represents its citizens not by proportionality in the social composition, but by the capacity for law that is inherent to each and every individual in the country, national or foreign.2

In this way, political discourse guarantees institutional hegemony in the public arena, endowing the leader’s sayings with authority and credibility in the chosen collective paths. In the opposite direction, the religious discourse guarantees the spiritual power of the same leader. In this discursive interface, the political opponent transforms himself either into an “enemy” or into an “infidel”, his persecution being legitimate. But how are these discourses associated with the others – military nationalist discourse (authoritarian and security, linked to public security) and neoliberal discourse – in the organization of the semantic whole?

As the nation’s greatest representative is also a military figure, his power allows him to reinforce the rigidity and impassability of the social hierarchies, in an analogous way to the military structure. The military authority also allows efficiency in dealing with public security and the – literal – defense of tradition, whether it is secular (nation) or sacred (Christian).

To each group its role in the social order (similar to military corporations), as well as in a spiritual crusade carried out by the hero (myth) against evil.

As the President’s path is an expression of individual merit (he is a supposed outsider) in the face of the structures of political power, the very idea of meritocracy is legitimized. This imaginary is associated with that of “strength” and “predestined” to face the structures of the State, and from within the State itself, to guarantee an idea of individual freedom that fosters competition as the highest value, as opposed to solidarity, and social exclusion instead of inclusion. Thus, the role of the State in the exercise of social justice is destroyed and business logic is associated with economic efficiency in the face of corruption.

Finally, the strong sense of identity of the people, via nationalism, and the fundamentalist perspective of religious belief, via religious community, seems to have allowed a society so asymmetrical in social and economic conditions to be able to unite in favor of a project as violent and exclusionary as the one presented in 2018.

Roughly speaking, the slogan can symbolize, for the poorest social strata, the fight against human rights as a solution for public security; for sectors of the middle class, the fight against corruption as a way of improving public services; for the elites, the fight against the inefficiency of the State

2. I refer to Mounk (2019, pp. 44-5) on the difference between democracy and liberalism. Based on this difference, the author analyzes the contemporary emergence of models of illiberal democracies and anti-democratic deliberations. The first occurs when political leaders, although representing the majority of a people, do not respect the liberal principles of the Democratic State of Law, which postulate universal and inalienable natural rights, including those of minorities. Today’s Brazil seems to fit this case. The second is when a State, even guaranteeing the basic rights of citizens, is unable to represent the desires of popular sovereignty as a result of pressure from macro-state institutions such as the European Union, for example. “[The liberal democracy – that unique blend of individual rights and popular sovereignty that has long characterized most governments in North America and Western Europe is falling apart. In its wake, two new forms of regime gain projection: illiberal democracy, or democracy without rights, and anti-democratic liberalism, or rights without democracy” (MOUNK, 2019, pp.44-5). equal before the law, without distinction of any nature, guaranteeing Brazilians and foreigners residing in the country the inviolability of the right to life, liberty, equality, security and property”.
as a way of “modernizing” institutions. There is no full convergence between all proposals and interests, but a “unity in difference” and a “difference in the same” adhering to a “structure in dominance”. For everyone, the demonization of politics, as a corrupted place of ideological dispute, and the sacralization of violence, as the main tool for the resumption of order and the purification of the country. The persuasive merit of the slogan, finally, seems to be condensing the concepts that we define as transdiscursive, namely: tradition, hierarchy, distinction and sacredness, which cross the political, religious, military and economic.

REFERENCES


