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METAPHOR AS A COGNITIVE AND DISCURSIVE FOUNDATION: THE POSSIBLE DIALOGUE BETWEEN DISCOURSE ANALYSIS, EXPERIENTIAL REALISM AND COMPLEX SYSTEMS

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Abstract: Commonly, it is understood that the epistemology of the French Discourse Analysis (AD) is irreconcilable with studies of human cognition. This paper aims to deconstruct this perspective, recovering, therefore, some of the AD canonical texts with the purpose of discussing the potential of a review of its epistemological tradition that can approach the AD of the current studies of cognition. Taking it for granted, we divided the work in four sections, which aims to: (i) demonstrate that the debates about the relationship between language, thought and metaphor are constitutives of the perspective of the subject in AD since its conformation as a field of study; (ii) approach the AD and the Experiential Realism focusing on the similarities between the perspective of metaphor in Gadet and Pêcheux (2010) and Lakoff & Johnson (1985); (iii) approach the perspective of discursive metaphor of that of Complex Systems, summarizing the relationship between metaphor and thought in Lakoff and Johnson (1985) and the emergent view of metaphor in Cameron and Deignam (2009); (iv) corroborate the discourse perspective as supported by Pêcheux (2009) and Orlandi (2005; 2009), the Paveau (2006) perspective on the importance of the Embodied Mind for the discourse studies and the analysis of Hall (2008) of the contributions of the althusserian philosophy to associate the ideology to Complex Systems, we propose a theoretical discussion of the metaphor as a privileged link for the rapprochement between the Discourse Analysis, the Experiential Realism and the Complex Systems. Finally, we emphasize that the discussions presented in this article can be found most developed and depth in Morais (2015), thesis on which we proposed the categories of «Intangible Thougt» and «Emerging Distributed Metaphors». There, beyond the relevant theoretical approaches to this text, we dialogue about the prospects of distributed cognition and Cognitive Externalism.

Keywords: Metaphor; Discourse Analysis; Experiential Realism; Complex systems.

INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS

It is commonly understood that the epistemology of Discourse Analysis (henceforth AD) is irreconcilable with the studies of human cognition. In this work we assume that this dialogue is not only possible, but also desirable. According to Paveau (2006), the metaphor presents itself as a fundamental category in this sense, given the similarity between the theoretical proposals of Gadet and Pêcheux (2010) and Lakoff & Johnson (1985) about this phenomenon, which they start to consider. it as a founding effect of the meaning itself in language.

This does not mean, however, that this approximation dispenses with rigorous theorization, concealing the singularities and theoretical contradictions existing between these fields of knowledge. In our view, DA epistemology deals with the relationship between language, thought and metaphor since its constitution, although it was deepened in the early 1980s. From there, we aim to base the approximation between DA, Experiential Realism and the Complex Systems, operating, for that, theoretical displacements that can guarantee the coherence between the different fields, especially with regard to the maintenance of an anti-humanist philosophical perspective of the discourse.

METAPHOR IN LANGUAGE (GEM) AND IN THOUGHT: THE FOUNDING CONTRADICTION OF MEANING IN DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Gadet and Pêcheux (2010) argue that, like poetry, metaphor is unlocalizable, not because it does not exist in itself, but, on the contrary,

as a result of its distribution throughout the language, that is, in all and any production of meanings. This way, the metaphor comes to be considered as the organizing structure of the perceived ordinary reality itself, so that it would be responsible for sedimenting and deconstructing the evidence of the world.

For the authors, metaphorical processes are not detached from ordinary language, as if they were figures of speech resulting from the mastery of writers and poets in "mastering" and "inventing" new forms and new meanings through non-evident analogies between words. It is from the porosity of natural languages that the possibilities of (partial) superposition of meanings arise, allowing the same signifier to play between two different semantic chains. In opposition to artificial/ formal languages, in which the meaning is arranged in advance, natural languages are necessarily woven by flaws, demonstrated by mistakes and slips. This means that ambiguity is constitutive of language, insofar as it is configured as a necessarily non-hermetic system, as it is structured by the presence, desired or undesired, of the other and the Other in the thread of discourse (Gadet; Pêcheux, 2010).

According to Gadet and Pêcheux (2010, p. 70. Our emphasis): "the consequence is that *language* dominates *thought,* imposing on it the order of the negative, the absurd, the *metaphor*. This is where the science of language relates to the recording of the unconscious." Now, if one can only think about something that can be thought of (the thinkable/domains of thought, according to Pêcheux (2009)), and this something is meant by its overflow in relation to the symbolic itself in/of the subjects, the real is prevented to be duplicated, either through the creation of a solipsistic subject or through an objectivist scientific description. For DA, although <u>the real only</u> acquires meaning through

subjectivity, its possibilities are external to it, as they belong to the social order, that is, the confluence between the real, the symbolic and the imaginary (Henry, 1992). Thus, the manifest signification is necessarily linked to the irruption of an "other" (interdiscourse) in the same, that is, the meaning arises from the obligatory remission of the discourse, materialized/chained in the form of text (intradiscourse), to the exterior (Henry, 1992; Pêcheux, 2009).

According to Pêcheux (2010, p. 96. Emphasis added): "We will call *a metaphorical effect* the *semantic phenomenon* produced by a *contextual substitution* to remember that this slippage of meaning between x and y is constitutive of the 'meaning' designated by x and y". Therefore, it is in the relationship between what is not said and what is said, between *nonsense and meaning,* that the real means and is perceived by the subjects. In this bias, subject and metaphor emerge together and maintain tenuous and fluid boundaries between them, insofar as thought, language and metaphor intertwine in a given discursive event, which erupts in/through the encounter between an actuality and a memory (Gadet; Pêcheux, 2010). In this regard, Orlandi [1](2005, p. 11) points out:

> According to Michel Pêcheux, words do not have a meaning linked to their *literality,* meaning is always one word for another, it exists in *metaphor relationships* (transference) happening in *discursive formations* that are its provisional historical place. In such a way that, as a result, every description "is exposed to the misunderstanding of language: every utterance is intrinsically susceptible of becoming other, different from itself, discursively displacing its meaning to derive another" (PÊCHEUX, 1983 [2005], p. 53). Going further, we can say with the author that every utterance, every sequence of utterances is linguistically describable as a (lexico-syntactically determined) series of possible points of derivation, offering room

1 Pêcheux (1983, p. 53) in Orlandi (2005, p. 11) refers to Pêcheux (2008) in our work.

for interpretation.

Thus, studying metaphor implies studying the very organization of language as a discursive phenomenon, since metaphorical occurrences exist in the same proportion as possible encounters between language and history in the different areas of knowledge called FD's. Given a specific context, it is possible to deal with metaphorical effects generated by the organization of the language, being, however, impossible to isolate, classify and study all its forms under the proposal of normative formalization of the same. Linguistic forms and lexicons circulate through different areas of knowledge (FD's), acquiring, according to these, meanings that can be interpreted as more or less evident (Pêcheux, 2009). Therefore, the literal/metaphorical dichotomy gives way to the effects of literality and the effects of metaphoricity generated by each utterance. It can be understood, therefore, that this slip/this contradiction between the same and the other functions as the explanatory basis of the phenomenon of metaphor and, consequently, of the constitutive failure of/in the sense in this discursive approach (Gadet and Pêcheux, 2010).

METAPHOR AND EXPERIENTIAL REALISM: FUNDAMENTALS OF THE EMBODIED MIND PROPOSAL

For Lakoff and Johnson (1985), when categorizing, schematizing, associating, producing meanings, from the simplest to the most complex, in the uses of/in language, human beings would base themselves on metaphorical organizations arising from embodied experience. By treating the mind as embodied, researchers project a constitutive relationship for the understanding of the concepts of mind and body, which means that the conception of mind is no longer tied to the description of pure reality to be diluted in the midst of cultural practices that create. Thus, only from the perceptions of the world envisaged by the human body, thought would become capable of "attributing" meanings and the subject, of acquiring new knowledge.

Thus, the activities of everyday life are governed metaphorically, organizing our perceptions, thoughts and the way we enter into relationships with others. This does not mean, however, that we are fully aware of this, given the limited access or control that humans have over most of their knowledge and intellectual activities. In other words, most actions performed on a daily basis are unconsciously performed (otherwise, it would not be possible for language to be organized as a system of thought) by concepts internalized throughout life through the relationships of subjects with themselves., with others and with the situations in which they come into contact with different social knowledge.

The body, in the same way, is not constituted as an autonomous concrete reality in relation to the mind, it only exists because it is understood as such, adjusted by metaphors that describe it and make it (mentally) discreet. Words and concepts change according to the culture and society that create them. The truths of science, sometimes taken for granted, are made possible by the same phenomena that make ordinary language possible, that is, by metaphors, action schemes and historicized conceptual organizations.

Thus, Lakoff and Johnson (1985) maintain that the human representational system, responsible for the organization of our thinking, is shaped in/by the relationship between thought and action, between reason and experience, so that they are neither purely intellectual in nature (as in rationalism), nor purely corporeal (as in empiricism). The structuring of this system occurs through metaphor, which, we reinforce, considering the way in which experiences are organized in/

through concepts and acquire systematicity in the interface between our conceptual system and our linguistic system. In order to analyze the first, one must also consider the second, since they can reveal the way in which human knowledge is organized.

As the acquired knowledge works as a basis for the acquisition of new ones, not only the "old" makes the "new" possible, but also the "new" is categorized from structures prior to itself, that is, by the "old". Thus, the "new" must not be understood as a creation from nothing, devoid of relations with previously acquired knowledge. In the words of the authors themselves: "the essence of a metaphor is that it allows understanding something (and experiencing it) in terms of something else" [2](Lakoff; Johnson, 1985, p. 15).

Furthermore, according to Lakoff and Johnson (1985), metaphor is not located only in words, since it is the very foundation that organizes the language in use. The way in which we can define such a category, as researchers, already presupposes the way in which we use conceptual schemes to describe it in the scope of language, aiming to make it a discrete entity: the metaphor.

Like Gadet and Pêcheux (2010), North American authors do not define this phenomenon as a figure of speech, a way in which we can generate certain poetic or imaginative meanings for a given utterance. In this bias, the metaphor is configured as the mechanism that makes it possible to give meaning to the everyday world, so that, ultimately, there is no literalness, because, if it acquired the characteristic of totality, it would not be the understanding of a word through the another, from one structure to another, but from the superposition of the so-called-metaphorical-structure by the other-structure itself. If this were to happen, the "death of metaphor" would occur, resulting from the erasure of the relationship between the parts that generate a given meaning, the meaning-relationship.

Lakoff and Johnson (1985) propose three types of metaphor, namely: *structural metaphors, orientation metaphors* and *ontological metaphors,* defined as follows: (i) *Structural metaphors:* these would assume the best known definition regarding the concept, would then be "a concept that is metaphorically structured in terms of another concept" [3]; (ii) *Orientation metaphors:* according to the authors, these refer to metaphors that are organized in order to establish a spatial parameter to give values to certain concepts. In general, they associate the "more", the "higher", the "at the top" with positive values, to the detriment of their opposites, the "less", the "lesser" and the "below", which assume a negative valuation; (iii) *Ontological metaphors:*in this case, they refer to those that allow us to nominalize entities, emotions and substances, enabling us to understand them in terms of discrete categories, thus allowing us to categorize, make references, group and quantify. According to the authors, the most common ontological metaphors are those that treat physical objects as persons, in which non-human entities are understood in terms of human motivations, particularities and activities.

Evidently, the three types are interconnected, although they can assume different functionings. Briefly, we can say that, in order to represent the world, making it understandable, men impose, in/through language, to physical and social phenomena, conceptual limits (imaginary, in terms of AD) that make them perceptible, including us in

2 Here is the quote in French: « L'essence d'une métaphore est qu'elle permet de comprendre quelque chose (et d'en faire l'experience) en termes de quelque chose d'autre » (LAKOFF and JOHNSON, 1985, p. 15. Our translation)

3 Here is the quote in French: «Un concept est métaphoriquement strucutré en termes d'un autre concept» (LAKOFF; JOHNSON, 1985, p. 25)

relation to ourselves. Without this, learning would be impossible, because, for it to occur, at the same time, we need to make sense of what we learn and organize language by discrete entities, attributing relationships between them. The most elementary experiences obtained in dealing with our own body and with life in society allow us to put things in perspective from their relationships with others (*structural metaphors)*; defining values through this correspondence (*orientation metaphors)*, one can attribute coherence to things in the world, making it possible for them to become discrete and described (*ontological metaphors)*.

METAPHOR AND COMPLEX SYSTEMS: FROM THE MENTAL CONCEPT TO THE SOCIO-INTERACTIONAL EMERGENCE

According to Cameron and Deignam (2009), if, on the one hand, the cognitive turn of metaphor studies enabled the approximation between linguistic expressions and cognitive representations, on the other hand, it seems to have marginalized existing historical and experiential issues in the construction of new ones. metaphorical expressions. Regarding the association between metaphor and thought, for Cameron and Deignam (2009), although the conceptual metaphor by Lakoff and Johnson (1985) has brought remarkable advances with regard to the incorporation of metaphorical processes as the basis for the production of meanings in language, his conceptualist approach still seems to be linked to a certain dichotomy that sets historical explanations apart from physical explanations, giving priority to the latter over the former.

According to the scholars, the perspective of these authors ended up defining metaphors as a kind of homogeneous conceptual mapping, which would allow new creative extensions according to each culture. In this bias, they propose the perspective of an emergency metaphor, seen as an intersubjective processual production. In addition, they defend the need to advance the analysis of metaphor beyond strictly literary texts, giving priority to its uses in oral discourse through *corpus analysis.* Despite the criticisms, the authors emphasize its proximity to the Cognitive Theory of Metaphor by Lakoff and Johnson (1985), in which the relationship between causality, metaphor and emergence is already discussed, to a certain extent, and this category is consolidated as a susceptible phenomenon. to be evaluated by the relationship between the conceptual and the linguistic. According to Cameron and Deignam (2009, p. 148. Emphasis added):

> Discourse is seen as the result of the interaction of multiple complex dynamic systems that operate at various levels and chronological scales [...]. Complex systems include minds/brains, language and conceptual resources (CAMERON, 2003). Complex dynamic systems are systems of connected and interacting elements that are in constant flux. *In such systems, it is not only the elements that change over time, but also the relationships between them and this is what defines a system as "non-linear".* As a result of non-linear dynamics, some changes in the system occur abruptly and drastically, as the system undergoes a so -called *"phase shift"* into a different activity pattern (these activity patterns are sometimes referred to as "phase shifting" into a different activity pattern). *attractor"*). Other times, the system changes continuously, without a phase change. When passing through phase changes, the system appears to "self-organize", with new patterns or attractors developing, stabilizing for a while, and then changing again. *Emergentist approaches emphasize nonlinear change and the self-organizing behavior of complex systems and focus on the "emergence" of new patterns of system activity after a phase change.* The process of emergence through the non-

linear interaction of system elements is very different from a modification that can be explained on the basis of the interaction of elements considered to be fixed in relation to each other.

One of the fundamental shifts of this emergency approach to metaphor stems from the possibility of expanding "the idea of thinking to speak to 'talking-and-thinking-in-interaction', with the purpose of describing the complex dynamic system of online spoken discourse., in which language and thought are interdependent" (Cameron; Deignam, 2009, p. 148). Thus, emerging products from interactions in different cultures, which do not need conceptual mappings of "source" that would work as unidirectional starting points in relation to the "target" domains, and anchored primarily in the functioning of the interactants ' mother tongues, metaphors can take on countless forms according to each culture and vernacular language. This way, mother tongues would be the source of our "repertoire of linguistic resources", including emerging metaphorical expressions, the result of different situations of interaction of subjects in society.

It is through what they call "dialogical use and reuse" that it becomes possible to agree on the different aspects involved in the *online dynamic-interactive conformation* of new metaphors, namely: ideational contents (that is, the expression by/through/in the language of contents arising from the concrete experiences of the speakers, including the contents referring to their subjective interiority), values, grammatical and pragmatic forms and affections. This implies that metaphor evolves through continuous local adaptation of (re)uses, acquiring stages of relative stability in a given group of speakers. These semi-stable forms encompassing these different aspects involved in the "maturation" of a new metaphor are called *metaforms.*

METAPHOR AS A LINK BETWEEN DISCOURSE ANALYSIS, EXPERIENTIAL REALISM AND COMPLEX SYSTEMS

In a similar way to Cameron and Deignam (2009), but based on the theoretical framework of Paveau (2006) expresses that he shares globally the principles of the Cognitive Metaphor Theory, although he considers that the studies of Lakoff and Johnson (1985) are insufficient in the regarding the consideration of social and historical parameters in their analyses. However, according to the French author, although scarcely worked, there is room for the development of analyzes that give greater relevance to the socio-historical aspects of the metaphorical organization of language, given that the term "incorporated" seeks to encompass the totality of human experience., understanding, therefore, also the organization in society.

For the author, the thesis of *the embodied mind* is fundamental for overcoming the philosophical problem of mind/body duality, opening space to rethink both instances under the prism of post-dualism. The metaphorized cognitive structures are the necessary means for us to exist, understand and perceive ourselves as beings. According to his proposal, the possible *a priori* is that of the organized perception of experience through discourse (*pre -discourses)*. It does not pre-exist in the experienced world, as an essence of non-material nature, but subsists in it as a historical material reality.

Having this as a presupposition, Paveau (2006) argues that the category of metaphor works as an organizer of the discourse in its most diverse instances, considering, therefore, the integrated cognitive and discursive aspects, namely: a) psychic organizer, the from shared schemas; b) cognitive organizer, based on knowledge and beliefs; c) discursive organizer,

based on cultures of a given period and a given community; d) textual organizer, mobilizing transphrastic chaining procedures. For us, this reinterpretation of the metaphor enriches the epistemology of DA, remaining coherent with its theoretical assumptions. Similar to the pre-constructed ones by Pêcheux (2009), Paveau (2006) sustains the impossibility of describing the systemic relations of the discursive reality itself, that is, of the pre - discourses.

Nevertheless, our approach to the discursive formations and practices in Foucault (2008), to the approach to thought in Pêcheux (2009) and to the proposal of paraphrase and polysemy in Orlandi (2009) guides us towards a different path from that taken by Paveau (2006). *Roughly speaking,* our dialogue with these authors impels us to consider that encyclopedic knowledge must be treated with regard to the discursive appropriation of information, that is, through the relationship between subjects and DF's.

In addition to this, Paveau (2006) does not engage in Complex Systems, a means by which we consider it possible to advance in the conception of the subject in relation to the individual and in the indeterminacy of language and senses. For the researcher, Complex Systems give an overly pragmatic connotation to interacting subjects, to the detriment of the theoretical scope of AD. In disagreement with his reasoning, we understand that it is possible to operate a discursive displacement of the Theory of Complex Systems through the reinterpretation of the Althusserian philosophy carried out by Hall (2003). According to the author's proposal, Althusser (1969) makes it possible to evaluate ideology(ies) as emergency properties responsible for the production of meanings in/through language in/by the emergence of subjects.

According to the sociologist, "Althusser convinced me, and I remain convinced, that

Marx conceptualizes the set of relationships – Marx's 'totality' – not as a simple structure, but as essentially complex" (Hall, 2003, p. 176).). In his words, the Algerian philosopher managed to demonstrate the best intuitions about a complex theory of ideology, which would be supported by the relationship of contradiction (*determination)* and overdetermination (overdetermination) that organizes the imaginary relationships of human beings with the real lived. With these concepts, it is possible to break with the possibility of historical determinism, based on the unilateral causality between the social position of the subjects and the imaginaries that question them, a perspective that generated a kind of *Spinozist structural machines,* defined, according to Hall (2003), as the systems driven by an internal self -drive.

Through the bias of contradiction and overdetermination, the existence of the "different in the same" and of the "unity in the difference" is guaranteed, so that the overdetermination of a signifier over the others does not cancel out the different imaginaries present in this chain as symbolic and imaginaries with their own independent organization. Thus, overdetermination makes it possible to think of ideology as an imaginary unit of historically contingent meanings (overdetermination) that maintains the contradictions that are internal to it as a result of the contradictory multiplicity of imaginaries (contradiction) that it aggregates in order to constitute itself as one. This movement occurs through what Hall (2003, p. 184. Emphasis ours) defines as "double articulation" between "structure" and "practice".

In this sense, based on Foucault (2008), we understand that the anti-humanist discursive perspective of DA does not propose the denial of *a priori instances,* but the differentiation between historical a prioris and *formal* a *prioris.* In the case of the first, the philosopher

argues that they are not separated from historical reality, as a kind of "unalterable universe" or "timeless structure". Its rules are in a relationship of immanence with the discursive reality itself, composed of different areas of knowledge organization, being, therefore, alterable according to the historical contingency. Through this reasoning, Foucault (2008) sustains the very fluidity of the boundaries of a given discursive practice. In the case of the second, the formal *a prioris* are those commonly associated with the axioms of the laws of nature or logical-mathematical systems, that is, capable of being understood in a non-contingent way.

If, on the one hand, history cannot be explained by *The* formal *prioris* (that is, by a natural or mathematical approach), such as laws that govern human social organization and the production of meanings, on the other hand, the abstract structure formulated by certain areas of Science, which are anchored in hypothetical-deductive methods, cannot be fully explained by history (that is, by a historical approach). However, it would be wrong to consider them in the context of a complete separation, as is the case with the very relationship between language and history. Despite being of different "orders", it is through the crossing of both that we can perceive the possibilities of irruption of formal *a priori* in different domains of knowledge, as well as "understand how history can be not an absolutely extrinsic contingency, not a necessity of the form that develops its own dialectic, but a specific regularity" (Foucault, 2008, p. 145). When we propose to bring AD closer to Complex Systems, we must, therefore, avoid reducing historical *a priori to the a priori.*formal *prior.*

Having said that, we will resume the quote from Cameron and Deignam (2009, p. 116. Emphasis added) as follows: "Discourse is seen as the result of the interaction of multiple complex dynamic systems" → "Complex dynamic systems are systems of connected elements and interacting agents that are in *constant flux* [...] and this is what defines a *system as 'non-linear'*" → "some changes in the system occur abruptly and drastically, as the system passes through the so-called ' *phase shift'* to a different pattern of activity (' *attractors')*" → "[...] the system appears to 'self-organize', with new patterns or attractors developing, stabilizing for some time, and then, changing again" → "[...] highlight *non-linear change* and the *self-organizing behavior* of complex systems and focus on the 'emergence' of *new patterns of* system activity after a phase change".

For Hall (2003), human representational systems would be in a recursive relationship with economic, social and political systems, and not with a reality outside themselves (the world itself, for example). That said, if we shift the reasoning of Cameron and Deignam (2009) to an anti-humanist discursive epistemology, we can understand that discourses, because they are dynamic and refer to different cultural systems and groups, are necessarily indeterminate, as they never return to the same (non-linear system). The transitory works, then, as a fundamental characteristic, and the systemic maintenance or transformation stems from the way in which history makes it possible for a dominant structure to emerge as a contingent practice and imaginatively experienced. Therefore, language would always return to the interface between the real of language and the real of history, guaranteeing its uniqueness as a real, symbolic and imaginary system, to use the reasoning of Henry (1992) and Pêcheux (2009).

Thus, we can embark on the relationship between Complex Systems and the radical historicity of discourse. In this regard, we understand that dialogue is possible if we

affirm that discourses are not creations of the order of the subject, but of history. There are different semantic/metaphorical possibilities to the extent that historically discourses cross, resume and reorganize themselves to constitute new discursive practices. The lack of fixity of/in the factors that allow a given emergence in a given discursive practice makes it impossible to define which structure itself triggered it, given that there is an indeterminacy of the cause in relation to the consequent processes and the discursive interactions develop as semi-stabilities. It is, therefore, an absent cause [4].

Considering the "impasse" between the possibility of maintenance or semantic rupture in relation to the rules that make this practice possible (hence the semi-stability), we can say that this is a reasoning similar to what Orlandi (2009)[5]develops about the tension between paraphrase (semantic maintenance) and polysemy (semantic rupture), so that the production of meanings in/through language is limited and regulated in/by the relationship between these phenomena. Appropriating a reasoning developed by Foucault (2008, p. 146), "we have, in the density of discursive practices, systems that establish utterances as events (having their conditions and their domain of appearance) and things (comprising their possibility and their field). of use)".

With this, it can be said that discourse, from the perspective of AD, seems to function as a kind of historicized "non-linear system", in which not only can the component elements of a given discourse (signs) be altered, but the relationship that establishes its rules of enunciation. The sudden ruptures in history, markers of the discontinuity of a new system of knowledge organization, with new discursive rules, end up resembling "phase changes", as described by Cameron and Deignam (2009). These ruptures result from the emergence of a new relationship in the lexical chain, in which the semiotic components mobilized function as a kind of "attractor", that is, *a metaphor* for Cameron and Deignam (2009), a *discursive event* for Foucault (2008), Pêcheux (2009) and Orlandi (2009) and *overdetermination*[6]for Hall (2003), so that the new emerges/ erupts from the old through the double articulation between practice/use (event) and system/norm (structure), even though such articulation is incapable of annulling the internal contradictions, responsible for both by the fluidity as well as by the indeterminacy of the system itself.

In summary, this "attractor" (i) emerges in/by the tension between paraphrase and polysemy, (ii) is semi-stable and (iii) is determined by the way the system necessarily points to the exterior, that is, to history, so that interactions in a given environment are necessarily related to those established by social groups or institutions. Causality tends towards opacity and the system's rules are inaccessible due to its constant movement and the different possibilities that each historical event can trigger in the whole (the cause is imagined as well as the interdiscourse).

This self-organization is not recursive neither in the Chomskyan linear sense, nor in the Piagetian logical-transcendent sense, but marked out by historical determinations that

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4 In the words of Althusser (1978, p. 98): "'absent cause' therefore means, in Historical Materialism, that the 'ultimate contradiction' *is never personally present* on the scene of history ('the hour of determination in the last instance'). never sound') and one cannot submit it directly to 'a person present'. It is a 'cause', but in the dialectical sense, which determines *what,* in the scene of the class struggle, is 'the decisive link' to which it has been subjected".

5 According to Orlandi (2009, p. 189-190. Our emphasis): "The game between *paraphrase*– which in this case would be the reproduction of what the author meant, the recognition of the meaning given by the author – and *polysemy* – which would be the attribution, by the reader, of other meanings to the text – is articulated, that is, the existing relationship between paraphrase and polysemy posits itself as self- *limiting,* one setting the limits of the other.

6 As a structure in emergent dominance, at the same time, as a practical structure and structured practice.

condition the possibilities of reorganization of the system, therefore, of sayings and doings. Neither the rules nor the components are fixed, given that they are discontinuous, contradictory, contingent and distributed in the materiality of the relationship between the real of language and the real of history. It follows, then, that meaning neither emerges entirely with each new practice, nor does it break entirely with what is external to it: this guarantees, in one step, its non-randomness and its non-determination. In the meantime, "new patterns" of system activity emerge.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

In our view, the resumption of the relationship between metaphor, language (gem) and thought in DA can deconstruct the way in which a kind of opposition between discursive studies and studies of cognition was sedimented. If Cartesian philosophy was fundamental for the establishment, consolidation and expansion of certain cognitive perspectives, it must be assumed that the overcoming of the Cartesian subject does not prevent the development of some domains of cognitive studies, which are in line with DA in terms of regarding the overcoming of what became known as a centered subject. In this bias, the Cartesian mind/body dualism does not exhaust the theme of cognition, and it is because this concept extrapolates that reasoning that the approximations of AD with the proposals of Experiential Realism by Lakoff and Johnson (1985) and the emerging metaphor by Cameron and Deignam (2009) have become possible, coherent and desirable, even more so if we consider Hall's (2003) reinterpretation of Althusser's (1969) work.

As a guiding principle of the dialogue, we seek to maintain the central proposal of the adopted discursive epistemology, namely: the historical determination of human social formations, among them, that of thought itself.

If we consider thought as the real thought, this approach makes it possible to understand that cognitive processes are externally determined by history, thus overcoming the naturalistic determinisms of the human being proposed by reductionist theories. There is, therefore, a fruitful space for dialogues based on DA, not because they are new, but because they are present, either through criticism or through incorporation, since its "foundation". This means that we try to (re)read in order to (re)see in the discursive tradition itself the possibilities of dealing with cognition and experience.

Finally, it must be noted that, for reasons of space limitation, we only outline the general issues relevant to this dialogue. For a deeper understanding of this proposal, we suggest the reading of Morais (2015), work on which we base ourselves for the writing of this text.

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