

International Journal of Human Sciences Research

NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY AND STRATEGY: AN ANALYSIS OF ITS EVOLUTION FROM 2008 TO 2019

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Abstract: This article aims to analyze the evolution of the National Defense Policy and Strategy (PND - END) in Brazil, from 2008 to 2020, with a view of strategy and public policy, mapping its strengths and weaknesses and correlating them with the internal and external scenario to the country. The focus of the mapping will be the connection of these points with Aerospace Power in all its elements. Among the elements of the Aerospace Power, which will be analyzed, we can mention the Brazilian Air Force (FAB), the Aerospace Industry and Civil Aviation. As for its objective, the research will be descriptive and exploratory. As for the research techniques, it will be bibliographic and documentary, with a quantitative and qualitative approach. To map the positive and negative factors, the research will use the Swot Matrix technique. However, due to the limitation of the text, the research will highlight the points considered most relevant and that can also be related to the declaratory policy versus the policy practiced, whether in the external field or in the budget issue. Regarding the external field, a brief approach to the Grotian tradition of foreign policy practice by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE). As a theoretical framework, the research will use, among others, authors such as Peter Drucker on the issue of strategy as public management; Thomas G. Mankley on aspects of military strategy; Francis Fukuyama in the aspects of the international scenario; and João P. S. Alsina Júnior and José Luis Fiori regarding the connection with declaratory policy and practiced policy.

Keywords: Defense Policy, Public policy, Defense Strategy.

INTRODUCTION

The article aims to analyze the National Defense Policy and Strategy (PND and END), seeking to verify the changes since

the publication of the first document, the National Defense Strategy of 2008, under the management of the then Minister of the Strategic Affairs Secretariat. (SAE) Mangabeira Unger.

The time horizon, 2008 to 2020, was defined according to Complementary Law No. 136 of August 25, 2010, which provides, in its § 3 of art. 9, that the PND, END and the White Paper on National Defense (LBDN) be submitted to a review process every four years, as can be seen from the chronology of the respective editions of 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020 (BRAZIL, 2010).

Consequently, due to the relevance of the subject, the present study will seek to list and discuss the weaknesses, strengths, threats and opportunities, related to the application of Aerospace Power and linked to the strategic objectives that have a connection with the Brazilian Air Force (FAB), over the different versions of the PND and END. The conclusions are presented in the form of a comparative table in SWOT matrix format, for “building a path guided by strategic thinking and converging with future needs” (FERNANDES, 2021, p. 57).

In this study, the National Defense Policy (PDN) of 1995 was highlighted, still in the administration of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, since the context of the time was different from the period chosen, as well as the government of that time did not give continuity to the process of establishing documents dealing with the defense of the country, mainly due to the non-existence of the Ministry of Defense, a body that was created only in 1999.

The research will also observe, with regard to foreign policy, that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has, as the basic foundation of its action, a Grotian rationale, “[...] whose most evident expression is the attempt to justify foreign action. [...] through norms

established by the international community [...]", as well as "[...] to defend the basic principle of International Law of legal equality of States". (GODOFREDO JÚNIOR, 2005, p. 14). The Defense White Paper sent to Congress in 2016 highlights this aspect. (BRAZIL, 2016, pp. 26-31).

Another aspect to be observed is what Alsina Junior (2009, p. 12) highlights as the "instrumentality of military power", one of its components being the Aerospace Power. This factor has to do with the Grotian rationale of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) that Alsina Junior (2009, p. 12) highlighted as "[...] a modality of international insertion that is not supported by the armed force".

This condition reflects Fukuyama's conjecture (1989, p. 18), about a post-Cold War era marked by globalization as a factor of historical inflection, restricting the possibility of large-scale conflicts between States. According to the author, the tendency for violence to escalate would occur in conflicts of an ethnic-nationalist nature.

It also portrays Drucker's conception (2001, p. 64, our translation), which reflects an international insertion with a different focus from the use of force, because:

[...] in fact, we have three superimposed spheres. There is a true global economy of money and information. There are regional economies where goods circulate freely and where impediments to the movement of services and people are being reduced, but not necessarily eliminated. And there are national and local realities, which are economic but above all political. And all three are growing rapidly. And companies – and other institutions, for example universities – have no choice. They have to exist and act in all spheres at the same time. This is the reality on which the strategy must be based.

Consequently, the National Defense Policy (PND) declares that Brazil will act primarily on the diplomatic front and will only use its

Military Power in the event of aggression or when diplomatic means are exhausted in the face of a possible escalation of conflict. The country's strategy is one of deterrence. (PND 2012; 2016; 2020).

These aspects are also connected to one of the objectives of the PND that deals with the protection of national resources abroad, bringing to the discussion the declared policy factor (which is described in the respective defense documents) and what is actually carried out. (BRAZIL, 2020, p. 25).

As a delimitation of the research, the factors mentioned are primarily related to the Aerospace Power, a factor that is highlighted in the PND 2020 sent to Congress.

2.2.15. In the same way as the continental and maritime dimensions, **the aerospace environment is characterized as of fundamental importance for National Defense** (BRAZIL, 2020, p. 15, an excerpt highlighted by us).

In order to visualize the connection between the mentioned factors and the Aerospace Power, the definition proposed by DCA 1-1/2020 Air Force Doctrine of 2020 stands out, which points out the following constituent elements: the Brazilian Air Force, the Civil Aviation, Aerospace Infrastructure, the Aerospace Scientific and Technological Complex and Human Resources Specialized in Aerospace Activity (BRAZIL, 2020a, pp. 28-30).

Therefore, the study sought to connect the constituent elements of Aerospace Power, detailed in terms of strengths, weaknesses, threats and opportunities (SWOT Matrix) with what was defined by defense documents, especially with regard to strategic objectives, assumptions and capabilities described or stipulated.

THE PROCESS OF THE EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY POWER

In order to analyze the PND and the END in terms of strengths and weaknesses, with regard to the use of Aerospace Power, it is also necessary to outline the chain of documents that make up the process of military employment and verify the coherence of the concepts and definitions that make up these respective documents, since the PND and END are the basic documents, of which the Strategic Conception of the FAB is one of the documents arising at the Subsectoral level (of the Armed Forces).

Initially, through Figure 1, it will be verified how the hierarchy and components (expressions) of the National Power are established, since the theme is restricted to the use of the Military Power, especially the Aerospace Power.




Figure 1 - Expressions of National Power.

Source: Adapted by the authors of the Military Doctrine Manual – MD 51-M-04/2007 of the Ministry of Defense.¹

As a subsequent step in the analysis of the process, it is necessary to verify how the process of formation of the documents that make up the defense structure unfolds and how the planning process was conceived so that the Armed Forces of Brazil can fulfill their constitutional purpose of defending the motherland. As described in the Military Strategic Planning System (SPEM), the PND is “[...] a State policy that establishes the national posture in the face of predominantly external threats and with an emphasis on military actions. The PND contains the political conception of defense and establishes the OND” (BRAZIL, 2018, p. 16, excerpt that was highlighted by us). This conception is reaffirmed by the PND 2020 sent to the congress in July 2019 (BRAZIL, 2020, p. 7 e 11).²

Therefore, it is observed that, from the conception of a scenario (analysis), the Ministry of Defense (MD), in accordance with Complementary Law n° 136/2010 (BRAZIL, 2010), via the Presidency of the Republic, forwards to Congress National, every four years, the review of the National Policy and Strategy³. The process can be seen in Figure 2, which highlights the chaining of documents from the formulation of the PND and END to the writing of Subsectoral documents.

1. The authors inserted Air Power instead of Military Aerospace Power, as described in MD51-M-04/2017 (BRASIL, 2017), considering that it better reflects the Air Force as the military instrument of Aerospace Power, in line with the concept of Brazilian Air Force, presented at the 2020 FAB DCA 1-1 Basic Doctrine (BRAZIL, 2020a; 2020b).

2. The difference between the Systematic Strategic Military Planning document (SPEM) and the PND is that the SPEM states that the PND is a “state document”, while the PND just says that it is “the highest level document” that conditions the country’s defense planning.

3. “The PND and the END are prepared by the highest government level, under the coordination of the Ministry of Defense, appreciated by the National Congress and approved by the President of the Republic.” (BRAZIL, 2018, p. 16). SISPEM.

7.1 ESTRUTURA

O processo de planejamento se desenvolve em quatro fases:

- 1*. Análise;
- 2*. Formulação da Política e Estratégia Nacionais;
- 3*. Formulação da Política e Estratégia Setoriais;
- 4*. Formulação de Planos.



Figure 2 - Structure of the planning and formulation process of Defense documents.

Source: BRAZIL, 2015, p. 8. SISPED.

The subsectoral documents are the documents prepared by the respective forces (Navy, Army and Air Force) in line with the documents emanating from the MD and its guidelines.

From figure 2, it would be expected that the process would be chained in such a way that the subsectoral documents reflect the deterrence strategy and its components outlined in the PND and END, a factor even highlighted in the 2018 SISPEM document. “Military strategic planning is intended to define and organize activities related to the preparation and use of military power [...]” (BRAZIL, 2010, p. 15).

Brazilian military strategic planning goes through, as seen in Figure 2, three levels: national (higher authorities in the country), sectoral level (MD), which is based on the PND, the END, and the Military Defense Scenario (CMD and sub-sectoral level), whose planning is based on documents generated at higher levels.

However, although the documents are in force, it is observed that they are outdated with regard to the update, since the SISPED is from 2015, the SPEM is from 2018 and the MD51-M-04/2007 Military Defense Doctrine is 2007 (BRAZIL, 2015; 2018; 2007).

In the case of the Air Force, the subsectoral documents to be analyzed are: DCA 11-45/2018 Strategic Conception of the FAB, the PCA 11-47/2018 Strategic Military Plan of the Air Force and the DCA 1-1/2020 Military Doctrine of the FAB. (BRAZIL, 2018; 2018a; 2020a; 2020b).

Analyzing the documents, in addition to the time lag, there is a conceptual lag, since the military doctrine is from 2007 and the Air Force doctrine is from 2020. Therefore, this is a gap that needs to be filled so that the planning process can meet the established criterion that subsectoral documents are based on the documents that precede them.

The sequence of documents is relevant, since the importance of the Air Force (Aerospace Power) has been highlighted since the 2008 END in the aspects of surveillance and sovereignty. However, the 2008 END is more assertive and, in fact, establishes guidelines on how to conduct and achieve these goals. These aspects, from the 2012 PND and END, become more fluid and less assertive. These details are observed in the descriptors of the 2008 END and the 2020 PND-END.

To exercise surveillance of the air space, over the national territory and Brazilian jurisdictional waters, with the assistance of space, land and maritime resources, is the first of the Air Force’s responsibilities and the **essential condition for being able to inhibit the unimpeded overflight of space.** national air force by the enemy (BRAZIL, 2008, p. 20, excerpt highlighted by us).

AED-10 To develop capabilities to monitor and control airspace, cyberspace, territory, Brazilian jurisdictional waters and other areas of interest (BRAZIL, 2020, p. 63, excerpt that was highlighted by us).

While the 2008 END characterizes an action verb (exercise) the 2020 END places a verb for obtaining capacity in an undefined future, either in PND or END.

In this way, it is observed that this lack of

assertiveness in relation to the use of Military Power and, in particular, the Aerospace Power, is a consequence of what Fiori and Alsina Júnior highlight as jurisdicism and realism (FIORI, 2009; ALSINA JUNIOR, 2009) of Brazil by establishing a certain form of subordination of military power to diplomacy. This factor was made explicit in the 2016 White Paper on National Defense (LBDN), which emphasizes that Military Power will only be used if negotiations become unfeasible.

National Defense, therefore, gives substance to Security and acts in line with the Brazilian policy of privileging the peaceful settlement of disputes between countries, so that **the use of force through the Military Expression of National Power will only be implemented when, when national interests are threatened**, the possibilities of negotiation appear unfeasible, aiming at the preservation of sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interests (LBDN, 2016, p. 16, excerpt that was highlighted by us).

However, Ferreira (1986, pp. 548-553, excerpts that were highlighted by us) warns that:

It is not conceivable, from the point of view of the rationality of actions, that the military chief is only offered a single party of action: to wage war under the conditions created by diplomatic action carried out without attention to the military aspects of the grand strategy of the State.

In any circumstance in which he is called to act, if the diplomat does not have in his role this notion typical of Aron, the State will run the risk of not being able to assert its national interests, as diplomacy will tend to disarm the State.

Analyzing the PND and END over the period, it can be seen that Ferreira's observations in 1986 are projected in time and are reflected in the country's defense documents.

Another important factor is the strategy established in Brazil's PND and END. Since 2008, the strategy established for the country is that of deterrence.

In this factor, the 2008 END was more assertive and outlined the "how to do it", even though it also emphasized the need to obtain specific capabilities, while later documents continue to list this strategy, also highlighting the aspects that the country and its Armed Forces they must establish "capacities" in order to allow and ensure deterrence, but in a more general view. Deterrence is described in the PND 2020 as follows:

CAPACITY OF DETERMINATION - it is configured as an essential factor for National Security, insofar as it has the purpose of discouraging possible aggressions. It is based on the conditions that the Nation has to gather and apply its Protection and Prompt Response Capacity, in the event of any hostile actions against the sovereignty and legitimate interests of Brazil. (BRAZIL, 2020, p. 75).

The 2008 END, with regard to deterrence, did not establish a concept, however, for the Navy and Army it set some guidelines, and, in the case of the Navy, it highlighted the use of a submarine force.

Preferably and whenever the tactical situation allows, the surface force will be engaged in the conflict after the initial deployment of the submarine force, which will act in a coordinated manner with space vehicles (for monitoring purposes) and with air assets (for focused fire purposes).). (BRAZIL, 2008, p. 14).

In the highlighted quotes, there is no question of whether the "how to" of the outlined 2008 strategy is correct or not. It only focuses on the issue of being more assertive than the documents that followed.

Another factor is that when the need for "capacities" is highlighted in the PND 2020, the MD is assumed to refer to capacity-based

planning (PBC). In this type of planning, it is necessary, through public policy guidelines (the PND), to detect and close or mitigate the gaps observed within a known budgetary framework. Professor Peterson of the War College (ESG),⁴ put what would be a synthesis of the PBC.




Figure 3 - Synthesis of the PBC Methodology.

Source: Lecture given to UNIFA master's and doctoral students. 24 June 2021.

In a still generic way, the 2020 END highlights, in Defense Strategy 2 (ED-2) Strengthening Deterrence Capacity, five Strategic Defense Actions (AED), where only AED 63 and 64 are more specific, highlighting the need to expand expeditionary capacity (AED 63) and participation in operational exercises with other countries (AED 64). Even so, as shown in Figure 3, it is not possible to verify what would be the possible gaps to be filled with these capacities. Regarding known fiscal restrictions, the 2020 PND is more assertive, as it highlights, in ED-2, AED-14, the need for defense spending to be at a level of at least 2% of GDP. (BRAZIL, 2020, p. 63).

In this item 2, we sought to highlight the need for the PND and END to be more assertive in their proposition of employing the Military Power, and the Aerospace Power, outlining, in

4. Lecture given by Professor Peterson (ESG) to students of the postgraduate course (masters and doctorate) at the University of the Air Force on June 24, 2021.

fact, guidelines so that the Brazilian Armed Forces can institute actions that contribute for the Grand Strategy of the country of deterrence. Alsina Júnior emphasizes this aspect by highlighting that “[...] the need to reassess the role of the Navy, Army and Air Force as instruments to support foreign policy is urgent” (BRAZIL, 2009, p. 149).

Ferreira (1986, pp. 548-553, excerpt highlighted by us), in the mid-1980s, already warned of the problem of having a deterrence strategy that may not have an effective result:

[...] to speak of deterrence is to speak of the effective existence of a Strategic Deterrent Device (DED). This is because either deterrence is recognized as a threat to employment, or it will be cheap rhetoric.

The next item will analyze the use of Aerospace Power.

THE USE OF AEROSPACE POWER

The directive of the Air Force Command, called DCA 11-45/2018 Conceição Força Aérea 100 (BRAZIL, 2018, p. 11) states that the relevance of the Aerospace Power is linked to the historical aspect, because:

[...] Since the dawn of more organized warfare, controlling the higher ground has been vital to the success of military action on the surface. The evolution of wars brought air assets into this context. The first thinkers of the use of Air Power quickly identified the value of the air weapon and its decisive influence on other weapons. Airpower did not change the essential nature of warfare, but it did introduce innovative elements into the methods of combat.

Initially, the assignments listed for the FAB will be addressed, in order to enable the establishment of weaknesses and strengths linked to the application of Aerospace Power. As stated by Alsina Júnior (2009b, p. 153), “[...] although power is one, it manifests

itself in the most diverse forms, in the most different circumstances”. Thus, the application of Aerospace Power will be studied based on a comparison of the strategic objectives assigned to the FAB, throughout the different versions of the PND and the END, in order to discuss:

[...] the instrumentality of Brazilian military power in the context of foreign policy [...], in what could be called an external insertion based on the concept of a “peaceful power” (ALSINA JÚNIOR, 2009b, p. 77).

In 2008, we observed the assignment of four strategic objectives, namely:

a) the priority of aerial surveillance; b) **the power to secure local air superiority** [...]; c) the ability to take the fight to specific points of the national territory, together with the Army and the Navy, constituting a single fighting force, under the discipline of the theater of operations [...]; d) Brazil’s peaceful nature does not eliminate the need to assure the Air Force the domain of a strategic potential that is organized around a capability, not around an enemy [...]. (BRAZIL, 2008, excerpt highlighted by us).

The 2012 version presented significant changes, from a doctrinal point of view, regarding the strategic objectives assigned to the FAB:

a) the priority of aerial surveillance [...]; b) power to ensure control of the air to the desired degree [...]; c) The ability to take combat to specific points of the national territory, together with the Navy and the Army, constituting a single fighting force, under the discipline of the theater of operations [...]; d) The mastery of a strategic potential that is organized around a capability, not around an enemy. (BRAZIL, 2012a, emphasis added).

It is observed that the 2016 version suppressed the designation of strategic objectives, transforming them into a concept of FAB employment, representing a partial replication of the Basic Doctrine of the FAB

- DCA 1-1/2012 (BRAZIL, 2012), in force at era:

The operational architecture to maintain sovereignty in the airspace must be oriented around the Military Capabilities of the Brazilian Air Force, observing the doctrine, focusing on its characteristics and based on the principles proper to the use of Aerospace Power. [...] It is important to consider the dual character of the attributions entrusted to the Air Force: aerospace defense and airspace control. As a result of international agreements, the Air Force is responsible for controlling the airspace and providing search and rescue service in the airspace overlying the national territory and the ocean area under the responsibility of Brazil, carried out jointly with the Navy.[...] The Brazilian Air Force will be maintained as a relevant pillar in the context of National Defense, since, due to its operational capacity, it contributes significantly to the strengthening of Aerospace Power. It will play an essential role in carrying out any missions in the joint operations environment (BRAZIL, 2016, emphasis added).

It is observed that, although the PND highlights the Aerospace Power as important and touches on the issue of Search and Rescue, it emphasizes only the military component, that is, the Air Force, while Search and Rescue is also linked to Civil Aviation and the agreements international bodies that regulate this issue.

In the 2020 version of the PND/END, the same text as the 2016 version was resumed, with only one significant change, considering the possibility of acting in international maneuvers: “it will fulfill an essential role in the performance of any missions in the environment of singular operations, joint or combined”. (BRAZIL, 2020, p. 55, emphasis added).

According to the precept of “observation of doctrine”, contained in the 2016 PND (BRAZIL, 2016), the reissue of the Basic Doctrine of the FAB (DCA 1-1/2020)

(BRAZIL, 2020) listed four generations of theorists, in particular Boyd in the third and Warden III in the fourth, the evolution of the Aerospace Power employment concept is ratified, demonstrated by the phasing applied in the 1st Gulf War of 1991.

In the early days of the campaign [of the 1st Gulf War], the focus was on dismantling the Iraqi command and control capacity, including the attempt to decapitate its leadership. The air superiority phase eliminated the Iraqi Air Force, destroyed on the ground. Once mastery of the air was gained, the effort turned to the destruction of armored forces, field artillery and concentrations of the Iraqi Republican Guard. (BRAZIL, 2020, p. 22).

It was demonstrated that “the ability to obtain “[...] Aerospace Control (C Aepc) is the highest priority in any military operation” (BRAZIL, 2020a, p. 14), associated with the fact that

[...] the effective use of the Aerospace Power recommends the concentration of efforts, avoiding fragmented employment even in an attempt to meet the legitimate demands in an operation or campaign” (BRAZIL, 2020, p. 39).

DCA 11-45, Conceição Força Aérea 100 (BRAZIL, 2018, p. 12, emphasis added), ratified the indispensability of mastery of the air by stating that:

[...] even recent, when used together with the other forces, its application, in the 20th and 21st centuries, has proved indisputably that joint actions need air and space superiority (especially with regard to intelligence gathering and communications). Thus, the freedom of action of surface forces is much greater when they are not threatened by air means.

However, due to the subordination to the paradigm of “peaceful power” (ALSINA JÚNIOR, 2009b, p. 77), it was found that, although the PND and END versions have evolved, they still do not recognize the

importance of a concept of employment of Aerospace Power, such as the proposal of power projection aimed at obtaining the strategic paralysis of Boyd and Warden III (FADOK, 1997), carried out in the 1st Gulf War (BRAZIL, 2020).

Consequently, the military expression was exclusively emphasized, but limited to the perspective of “peaceful power” (ALSINA JÚNIOR, 2009b, p. 77) as seen in the political conception of defense in the latest version of 2020, characterizing the realism and jurisdicism of the political of defense.

VIII- without prejudice to deterrence, give priority to cooperation at the international level [...] with a view to finding integrated solutions for issues of common or similar interest;

IX – act under the aegis of international organizations, aiming at legitimacy and international legal support, according to the commitments in international conventions, treaties and agreements and always respecting the constitutional principles. (PND, 2020, p. 13).

This condition was replicated in DCA 11/45 Conceição Força Aérea 100 (BRAZIL, 2018, p. 25, emphasis added), when portraying the conditions of deterrence to be achieved by the Aerospace Power:

[...] at the international level, Brazil acts in accordance with the principles listed in art. 4 of the Federal Constitution, among them the “defense of peace” and the “peaceful solution of conflicts”. **Brazilian foreign policy considers international dialogue and cooperation to be essential instruments** for the overcoming of obstacles and for the rapprochement and the strengthening of the trust between the States.

An evolution can be seen in the last version of the 2020 END, regarding the application of Aerospace Power, with an emphasis on interoperability, although linked to the modeling of “peaceful power” (ALSINA JÚNIOR, 2009b, p. 77), because:

[...] in the face of the peculiarities of modern armed conflicts, **must consider, primarily, the joint employment of the Forces**, rationalizing means of all kinds and increasing the capabilities of each one of them, through the synergistic use of their characteristics and potential, without disregarding, however, the possibility of their use in a unique way (END, 2020). (excerpt highlighted by us).

This condition was ratified by the essentially military concept, as stated in the Doctrine of Joint Operations of the Ministry of Defense (BRAZIL, 2020b, p. 46):

[...] although the planning is joint and the synergy of the actions is a goal to be pursued, to protect the principles of simplicity and economy of means, each means awarded must be used according to its type of preparation, encompassing doctrinal aspects, of training and equipment.

As pointed out by Alsina Júnior (2009), the diplomatic prevalence model left important gaps, both in the PND and in the END versions, related to the guidelines for the other constituent elements of Aerospace Power, namely: Civil Aviation, Infrastructure Aerospace, Aerospace Industry, Aerospace Scientific and Technological Complex, Specialized Human Resources (BRAZIL, 2020; 2020a). That is, these documents are practically silent on this issue.⁵

The points highlighted in this item supported the construction of the SWOT Matrix (FERNANDES, 2012), in Table 1, in a comparative way, where the main points were highlighted based on concepts and conceptions presented throughout this research.

5. The 2020 PND (BRASIL, 2020, p. 13), item 2.2.5, highlights the need for investments in Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Health, Education and Communication. However, it does so with a view focused on the components of the National Power and does not specify, even in the END, details for the components of the Aerospace Power. In other words, although the PND uses the expression Aerospace Power, the focus is on the Air Force, its military component.

STRONG POINTS	WEAK POINTS
Prioritization of obtaining Aerospace Control.	Lack of assertiveness for the use of Military Power.
Adaptation to the Doctrine.	Subordination to diplomacy.
Capacity-Based Planning (PBC).	Focus on airspace surveillance.
Visualization of the fiscal restrictions scenario (Need to apply 2% of GDP for Defense).	Focus only on FAB, the military component of the Aerospace Power. Other components are not observed.
Importance of the Aerospace Scientific and Technological Complex.	
OPPORTUNITIES	THREATS
	Defense Policy does not support Foreign Policy.
	Process of updating defense documents. Tendency of sub-sector level documents to connect directly to PND and END.
Duality: air traffic control/air defense	Absence of requirements and/or guidelines for Capability-Based Planning (CBP).
Strengthening Aerospace Power as a unified component.	Secondary position of Military Power: indispensability versus protagonism.
	Absence of strategic projection conception for aerospace power: Air Force limited to national territory

Table 1 – SWOT Matrix.

Source: authors (2021).

The matrix reveals that a relevant point of the PND lies in its lack of assertiveness for the use of Military Power in order to, in fact, support diplomacy within the deterrence strategy, as the PND even predicts when highlighting that “[. ..] power relations play a relevant role in state interaction, so that no state can be peaceful without being strong” (BRAZIL, 2020, p. 13). This factor is connected

to the threat highlighted in the matrix of keeping the Military Power in a secondary position, without protagonism, “[...] resulting from a national identity whose self-image favors non-confrontationism in foreign policy [...]” (ALSINA JÚNIOR, 2009, p. 74), resulting in Armed Forces incompatible with the country’s international stature.

CONCLUSION

This study was prepared with the objective of analyzing the application of Aerospace Power, from the attribution of strategic objectives to the FAB, as designated in the different versions of the PND and END.

Initially, a brief historical context was presented, with the objective of justifying the nature of the PND and the END, focused on the strategic conceptions limited to actions linked to Defense matters.

Subsequently, a contextualization, on the respective versions of the PND and END of 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020, demonstrated the evolution of the application of the Military Power and, more specifically, of the Aerospace Power. This condition motivated the present study, relating it to the construction of a comparative framework, following the model of a SWOT Matrix.

Seeking to understand the contexts of the writing of each of the versions of such documents, it was verified the orientation of the Grotian paradigm of legal equity between States, added to the conception of a peaceful power, with the prevalence of diplomacy to the detriment of the Armed Forces.

As strengths, the Prioritization of obtaining Aerospace Control, Adaptation to the Doctrine, Capacity-Based Planning (PBC), Visualization of the fiscal restrictions scenario (Need of application of 2% of GDP for Defense) and the Importance of the Aerospace Scientific and Technological Complex.

The strengths need to be leveraged to mitigate threats, focused on external factors: the Defense Policy does not support Foreign Policy, the absence of requirements and/or guidelines for Capacity-Based Planning (CBP), the position secondary importance of the Military Power in relation to diplomacy, the indispensability versus the protagonism necessary to the international stature of the country and the absence of a conception of strategic projection for the Aerospace Power: Air Force limited to the national territory.

As weaknesses, intrinsic to the design of Aerospace Power, were observed: the lack of assertiveness for the use of Military Power, the subordination to diplomacy and the focus on airspace surveillance, highlighting the vision of peaceful power, reflected in the conciliatory posture derived from the realistic vision and jurisdiction expressed in foreign policy and in the PND itself.

Weaknesses can be reversed by investing in opportunities: in the duality of air traffic control/air defense and in strengthening Aerospace Power as a unified component and not just centered on military expression.

In this way, the relationships between the respective quadrants of the SWOT Matrix were established, demonstrating that there is room for improving the application of Aerospace Power, within the appropriate theoretical model, such as the strategic paralysis performed from a planning based on capabilities, of in order to allow the use, in fact, of a deterrence strategy.

It was also demonstrated that the recent editions of the Doctrine of Joint Operations (BRAZIL, 2020b) and of the Basic Doctrine of the FAB - DCA 1-1/2020 (BRAZIL, 2020; 2020a) already bring concepts that will probably allow the improvement of the PND and of the END in the next review cycle.

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