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TOWARDS A NEW EPISTEMOLOGY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES IN LATIN AMERICA

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Abstract: This is a theoretical reflection on the classical epistemology of the social sciences, arguing that, based on the natural sciences in Europe, it is not in a position to study the real expression of the lifeworld in Latin America. The construction of the ideas of the human sciences, based on the natural sciences, made this, the human sciences, assume typical ingredients of the natural sciences. It is important to remember some key moments in the historical process of the construction of modern epistemology, giving special attention to the period from the 17th century in Europe, when modern epistemological reflection has its origins and reaches one of its high points at the end of the century. nineteenth century, in the period of emergence and consolidation of industrial society, science and technology. This article analyzes this mismatch between the expression of the practice of life in Latin America and the process of the advent of the precepts of truth and the origin of modern science in Europe.

INTRODUCTION

This article aims to carry out an analysis of the classical epistemology of the social sciences, arguing that, based on the natural sciences in Europe, it is not in a position to study the real expression of the lifeworld in Latin America. . The construction of the ideas of the human sciences, based on the natural sciences, made this, the human sciences, assume typical ingredients of the natural sciences. It is important to remember some key moments in the historical process of the construction of modern epistemology, giving special attention to the period from the 17th century in Europe, when modern epistemological reflection has its origins and reaches one of its high points at the end of the century. nineteenth century, in the period of emergence and consolidation of industrial society, science and technology.

In other words, the analysis carried out in this text assumes that the production of knowledge, using modern reason as an epistemological and methodical parameter, can, in the context of the contemporary world, produce a segmentation, benefiting social segments more than others in the world. which refers to the recognition of the rationality of their respective knowledge produced within the scope of the production of life, which would not be socially fair.

In order to answer this question, some paths are necessary, such as a brief recall of the classical epistemology of modern science; the crisis of modern reason; the advent of a new context with new knowledge and the production of knowledge today, when there is a need to create a new epistemology of knowledge of the human sciences independent of the epistemological parameters of the natural sciences.

The argument used as the central focus of the analysis carried out in this text may even seem professorial due to the fact that it uses a very new sociological and philosophical knowledge, that of the relationship between the epistemology of modern reason and the production of knowledge in the contemporary world of life. In fact, this writing aims at something more than arguing that modern epistemology, used as a parameter of truth and scientificity, does not welcome the unique knowledge produced in the world of life. The aim of this text is to raise a debate that goes beyond the walls of the academy, a political debate, because it is understood that to alienate from rationality the knowledge originated in the scope of the production of the life of popular social segments designates a political act of segmentation of access to the production of rational knowledge.

When talking about epistemology, moving through the field of philosophy, one does not dare to delve into the study of this concept,

making it important only to clarify what is being said, thus using the concept of “modern epistemology” as a method of analysis. And, as Boaventura de Souza Santos (1987, p. 19) says, “...it will not be unreasonable to ask: what is epistemology after all (...) epistemology is the branch of philosophy that investigates the origin, structure, methods and the validity of knowledge”.

When talking about the production of knowledge itself, it refers specifically to its production process, especially in relation to epistemological principles and the method, from which parameters of rational recognition of the knowledge produced in the context of the production of life are established. Can it be guaranteed that the epistemological principles and methods used in contemporary times as parameters of scientificity provide shelter for the unique knowledge produced in the context of the production of life? This question reflects the fundamental concern that motivates the analysis produced in this text. That is, it starts from the suspicion that the parameters of scientificity practiced nowadays, that is, the institutionalization, the set of rules, norms and values, of knowledge and what is understood as truth today, is still based on epistemology. modern, which does not manage to attribute rationality and scientific veracity to the unique knowledge produced in the ambit of the world of life.

When talking about epistemology, moving through the field of philosophy, one does not dare to delve into the study of this concept, making it important only to clarify what is being said, thus using the concept of “modern epistemology” as a method of analysis. And, as Boaventura de Souza Santos (1987, p. 19) says, “...it will not be unreasonable to ask: what is epistemology after all (...) epistemology is the branch of philosophy that investigates the origin, structure, methods and the validity of knowledge”.

PATHS OF DISTANCING BETWEEN THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES OF MODERN SCIENCE AND THE EXPRESSION OF LIFE IN LATIN AMERICA

In the context of the historical process of consolidation of modern science in European territory, some epistemological principles of truth are consolidated as universal, which are enormously distant from the expression of the life world of regions such as Latin America. One can cite as an example: a) The precept of measurement presenting itself as a scientific truth for modern rationality, opening the way for the others. Measurement and universalization present characteristics that only they would prevent attributing reason to the singular knowledge that is the result of the world of life. That is, the assumption of homogeneity and the measurement of the real world leads to not considering the complexities, particularities and singularities and dialectical contradictions of the real world. b) Adoption of the mathematical model of the natural sciences in understanding the social world. The mathematical model, together with that of universality, is presented as a parent ingredient in the construction of the trajectory of the construction of the epistemology of modern science. From the 18th century onwards, this model was adopted for the human sciences, emphasizing technique as a synonym for Reason and method in the understanding of the social world: observation, experimentation and calculation. In summary, the scientific parameters of the human sciences, like those of the social sciences today, were constituted associated with mathematical logic, and, therefore, exempt from cultural, religious and traditional realities. This is a major factor in distancing the practice from the lifeworld typical of a region such as Latin America, removing the rationality of

singular knowledge. This is because from this basic epistemological principle of modern science, the mathematician, rationality is not attributed to the cultural and subjective expression of a people. However, it is necessary to understand that in contexts such as Latin America, today, there is a new social configuration, when multiple social, cultural and political dynamics are presented, with the advent of new knowledge and new parameters of truth. Thus, it is necessary to relativize the classic concept of truth and scientificity based on the classic epistemology described above, proposing a new one in the perspective of guaranteeing shelter to the real expression of life and the resulting singular knowledge, adopting, among other paths, rationality to common sense and a new look at the method.

Therefore, in the current context, there is a new social configuration in Latin America, when multiple social, cultural and political dynamics present themselves, with the advent of new knowledge and new parameters of truth, and, thus, the need to relativize the classic concept of truth and scientificity based on Modern Reason, proposing a new epistemology in the perspective of guaranteeing shelter to the knowledge produced in the world of life. In other words, the epistemology of science today, based on modern reason molded in European territory, insofar as it distances itself from the world of life, from culture, from tradition, from the expression of life, it also distances itself from the real expression of life and its knowledge produced as survival strategies, as is the case with common sense. This occurs not only with regard to the parameters of truth, but especially the method associating science with technical truth, with weight in the measurement.

Therefore, the production of knowledge, using modern reason as epistemological and methodical parameters, can, in the context

of the contemporary world, especially in regions such as Latin America, produce a segmentation, benefiting social segments more than others with regard to the recognition of the rationality of their respective knowledge produced within the scope of the production of life.

A BRIEF REMINDER: THE DISTANCE OF EPISTEMOLOGY FROM MODERN REASON AND THE WORLD OF LIFE

The epistemological distance between modern rationality and the practical expression of the world of life constitutes a historical process, which it is necessary to remember.

The first aspect to remember in relation to the classical epistemology of the human sciences concerns its link with the natural sciences. As Grinevald (1975 p. 40) points out, with the advancement of science in the domain of nature, based on the experimental method, physics seems to be the first ingredient to be integrated in the process of formation of the human sciences. Political economy was constituted in England during the Industrial Revolution and the glory of Newton, when it had considerable influence from positivist epistemology. From then on, great theorists of the sciences of economic development, such as Adam Smith, Walras, Pareto and Saint-Simon, wanted to be the Newton of the social mechanics of the production and consumption of wealth. The construction of the ideas of the human sciences, based on the natural sciences, made this, the human sciences, assume typical ingredients of the natural sciences.

For the analysis carried out here, it is important to recall some key moments in the historical process of the construction of modern epistemology, giving special attention to the period from the 17th century onwards

when, in the words of Boaventura de Souza Santos (1987, p. 17) the reflection Modern epistemology has its origins and reaches one of its high points at the end of the 19th century, that is, in the period that accompanied the emergence and consolidation of industrial society and witnessed the spectacular development of science and technology. In this historical period some epistemological ingredients of science and knowledge are consolidated. It is important to remember them and compare them with the dimension of the world of life, for example:

a) The precept of measurement and universalization of the parameters of truth and scientificity.

It can be considered that the precepts of measurement and universalization present themselves as stars of modern epistemology, as parameters of truth and scientificity, opening the way for the others. Measurement and universalization present characteristics that only they would prevent attributing reason to the singular knowledge that is the result of the world of life.

As Jacob Bronowski (1978) says in the book "The origins of knowledge and imagination":

Galileo and his successors think of science as capable of discovering the global truth of nature. Not only is nature written in a mathematical language decipherable by experimentation, but that language is unique; the world is homogeneous: experimentation discovers a general truth. The simple phenomena that science studies can immediately provide the key to the whole of nature, whose complexity is only apparent: the diverse is reduced to the unique truth of the mathematical laws of motion.

That is, the assumption of homogeneity and the measurement of the real world leads to ignoring and not considering the complexities, particularities, singularities and dialectical contradictions of the real world.

b) Adoption of the mathematical model of the natural sciences in understanding the social world.

As mentioned above, the mathematical model, together with that of universality, is presented as a basic ingredient in the construction of the trajectory of modern epistemology. But it is important to highlight an important milestone in history, the 18th century, when this principle was also adopted as a model for the human sciences, mathematics and technique as synonymous with Reason in the social world.

This argument is highlighted by Habermas (1987, p. 161) in the book *Theory of Communicational Action*, Volume 1, when recalling that the main philosophical assumptions of modern reason are found in the work of Condorcet (2004), written in 1794, "Esboço de Agir a Historical Framework of the Progress of the Human Spirit" where the model of rationality is represented by the mathematical sciences of nature: observation, experimentation and calculation. In this book, the construction of the model of rationality is presented in four ways: associating the concept of perfection (art, psychology, etc.) to the model of scientific progress; focusing on superstition and pre-judgment as opposing elements of scientific progress, thereby cutting off the religious, philosophical, moral and political representations coming from tradition; emphasizing the conviction that the sciences of nature also serve the moral improvement of man; the progress of knowledge, which assumed by the human sciences in the same way as the knowledge of nature, will contribute to the development of the individual and the collectivity.

c) The replacement of the idea of movement and transformation by the idea of evolution:

The exercise of stopping to think about reality in the Greek world, in a dialectical

perspective from the parameter of movement and transformation, supplanted in the medieval period, is rescued in the discussion about the method by Bacon and Descartes and put into practice in the studies of Galileo Galilei among others. However, in the 19th century, Saint-Simon, as well analyzed by Pierre Ansart (1970), proposes to replace the idea of criticism and change for the consolidation of order, based on the rational model of industrial society, based on technique. This assumption is very well used by Augusto Comte in Positive Philosophy, translating the idea of change into the expression of progress, thus consolidating the positive epistemology of science and the institutional organization of capitalist society. This means that from then on, in the new industrial society, science, technique and industry begin to share the same epistemology.

This leads, according to Boaventura de Souza Santos (1987):

1) the alienation of common sense knowledge and aesthetic discourse from the parameters of scientificity (p. 13).

2) to establish a relationship between objectivity and subjectivity. "... social subjectivity is increasingly the product of scientific objectification" (p. 13).

3) the existence of the dogmatization of science as a mechanism for representing the world: "Logical positivism represents, therefore, the apogee of the dogmatization of science, that is, of a conception of science that sees it as the privileged apparatus of the representation of the world." (page: 23).

4) the emergence of epistemological ethnocentrism: "... it is important to know whether, similarly to the anthropological debate, characterizing the social sciences based on the natural sciences is or is not a form of epistemological ethnocentrism. In my opinion it is..." (p. 70).

In summary, the scientific parameters of

the human sciences, like those of the social sciences today, were constituted associated with mathematical logic, exempt from cultural, religious and tradition characteristics and, therefore, from the world of life, removing the rationality character of singular knowledge.

THE CRISIS OF THE CLASSICAL EPISTEMOLOGY OF MODERN SCIENCE FROM A NEW FACE AND EXPRESSION OF THE WORLD OF LIFE

Two factors justify a moment of crisis in the classical epistemology of modern science, its own theoretical foundations and the advent of a new configuration of the world originated from historical events involving the social world.

The criticism of the classical epistemology of the social sciences of man fundamentally concerns the alienation of the world of life insofar as it uses measurement and exemption from tradition, cultural and religious traits as a parameter of scientificity. Among numerous thinkers who base the critique of classical epistemology of modern rationality, Habermas (1987, p.159-160, take I, summarizes the essence of this critique by considering that among classical thinkers, the one that brings reason closer to the world of life would be Max Weber as a result of the structure of symbols contemplated by this thinker, but Habermas questions him for the fragmentation of his theorization around reason by limiting himself to associating reason with capitalist rationality: capitalist form of economic activities. "Technique and Science as Ideology" Habermas (2001, p. 46), in dialogue with Marcuse, states that:

"Marcuse is convinced that, in what Max Weber called "rationalization", "rationality" as such is not implanted, but in the name of rationality, a determined form of hidden political domination... Marcuse comes to this conclusion: The concept of technical

reason is perhaps also ideology in itself. Not only the application, but the technique itself, is a methodical, scientific, calculated and calculating domination (over nature and over man).

But the advent of the crisis of Modern Reason is much more due to the social context itself, from a new configuration of the expression of the world of life. Particularly in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, contradictions emerged in relation to the advent of modern reason, particularly in relation to the Enlightenment assumption associating technique with human redemption. The theoretical contradictions of the German revolutionary movement, particularly Marxism, the rise of Nazism, the first and second world wars, human and environmental destruction are factors that make these contradictions explicit. As Boaventura de Souza Santos (1987, p. 139) says with regard to the political use of science: "At the international level, in Germany, since 1933, a policy of demeaning science, of submitting it to the objectives social and political aspects of Nazism".

It is a crisis that gives rise to an unrest that is expressed in the academic world. An example of this concern can be cited the Frankfurt School. As Matos (1995, p. 6) says, "The rise of Nazism, the Second World War, the post-war "economic miracle" and stalinism were the factors that marked the Critical Theory of Society, as it developed from 20s to mid 70s", or even from the same author (p. 7): "In the name of a growing rationality, social processes are dominated by the perspective of scientific rationality, characteristic of positivist philosophy." Certainly, Habermas (2001) in his book *Technique and Science as Ideology* clearly expresses the central focus of the concern of the thinkers of this school, that of questioning the premise combining technique with Reason.

In general, the advent of a new social context raises the need for the reconstruction of reason from the world of life. It is understood that the process of globalization can be a process of interaction (change) or disjunction (conflict). This means that a social process does not always bring positive results for the population, it can bring it to some people, but not to others. The social process alters the form of social life and with it alters the trajectory of people's lives. The production of new knowledge, for example, can bring great benefits to people who have access to this newly produced knowledge. But for people who do not have access to this new knowledge, they can suffer a process of disjunction, of exclusion, because the knowledge they have is no longer valid for the new social moment.

According to the analysis made by Tavares dos Santos (2007, p.19), the globalization process can simultaneously derive from: a) integration through homogenization. From the perspective of world economic production, there is a perspective of an integration process through homogenization, especially of cultural consumption habits and work skills; b) Tensions, Inequalities, Differentiation and Exclusions.

At the same time that this process of expansion of global economic relations constitutes an integration process through the homogenization of cultural habits and work skills, it provokes another force in society, one that brings tension, inequalities and social exclusion. Every process of social homogenization causes disintegration. This is because, among other factors, the homogenization process implies the acquisition of new knowledge, new skills for work, etc. devaluing previous skills and knowledge; c) Modifications in the notions of space/time. The new technologies, especially the worldwide computing network, brought people together in the sense of simple

communication, creating a new dynamic in economic production, research, studies, etc.; d) In terms of work organization. Undoubtedly, one of the biggest changes that have taken place in recent decades has been in relation to the organization of work, which has constituted a social process of great impact, largely disjunctive, that is, causing unemployment and social exclusion; e) Mutation in sociability relations. The set of economic, political, cultural and social transformations that characterize global society today, provoked changes in sociability relations, provoking a simultaneous process of community integration and social fragmentation, massification and individualization.

From this new configuration of the expression of the social exposed above, one can ask whether the classical epistemology of modern reason, as it was also exposed above, presents itself in a position to fairly absorb the new knowledge arising from this new world of life?

In the Brazilian case, this new context begins with the “bourgeois revolution”, as expressed by Florestan Fernandes (1976), dismissing the bourgeois cultural model as synonymous with civility, truth and individual behavior. With the advent of a new notion of culture, the one associated with the accumulation of educated and erudite knowledge, as observed by Denys Cuche (2002), in “The Notion of Culture in Social Sciences” for the anthropological notion, that of the expression of life, in the molds of Clifford Geertz (1989) originates a new look at the social context.

The arrival in Brazil of ethnographic, sociological and anthropological scientific studies, for which the cultural world began to have another focus, contributed to this event. As an example, we can mention the structural studies of culture by Lévi-Strauss and the functionalist analysis of culture by

Malinowski, as an expression of life in the present, removing the historical relationship between culture and social evolution. These facts became important in the removal of a bourgeois cultural model as a synonym of civility.

Undoubtedly, the Modern Art Week of 1922 contributed significantly to breaking the precept of formality as a synonym for culture and class distinction in Brazil.

Also contributing to this movement around a new notion of culture was the arrival in Brazil of the repercussion of typically urban social movements, products in the context of the industrial revolution and urbanization, as was the case of the “hip-hop” movement, the arts, music, literature, as a contesting expression to the practices of annihilation of black people. An example of this is the musical movement generated in the USA under the influence of African, Jamaican, Latin roots, especially deriving from Blues and Jazz, with strong influences on Brazilian urban peripheries. These musical movements had political synchronicities, as for example, in the sixties, the movement led by Luther King. This is a new Brazilian cultural context as analyzed by Carlos Guilherme Mota (1980) in the book: *Ideologia da Cultura Brasileira*.

PATHS TO AN EPISTEMOLOGY COMMITTED TO THE PRACTICE OF LIFE IN LATIN AMERICA

An epistemology committed to the practice of life in Latin America would be one that contemplates the expression of the lifeworld, with rational recognition of the knowledge produced in the practice of the lifeworld. Certainly Boaventura de Souza Santos (1987, p. 52) expresses a look at the paths of this new epistemology when he says that: “Scientific knowledge is only scientific to the extent that it is attack and confrontation. Science only exists as a critique of reality from

the reality that exists and with a view to its transformation into another reality”.

Thus, it is understood that an epistemology committed to the world of life, based on the reality of the contemporary world and with a view to social transformation, is built especially from the following paths:

a) With the reconstruction of the idea of reason from the union of theory and practice.

Certainly, the reflection made by Habermas (1987) in the perspective of the reconstruction of reason from the union between theory and practice constitutes a path to be considered in the construction of a new epistemology of knowledge. According to Habermas (1987, p. 25 Tome 1):

a) It is clear that there is an objective reality and that the natural sciences have enough tools to explore it; b) But it is clear that the logic of the natural sciences is not the same logic for applying the human sciences. Why?: society and culture are domains structured around symbols and symbols require interpretation; any methodology used in understanding a social reality that neglects the structure of symbols, fails.

Habermas (1987, p. 25-26, T. 1) also states that the expression rational is used assuming that there is a relationship between rationality and knowledge. People who have knowledge and symbolic expressions, language or not, communicational or not, that embody knowledge can be more or less rational. There is talk of a rationality of a conduct of life. In the context of a sociocultural condition of a way of life, perhaps the rationality of the practical world is reflected, assumed not only by individuals, but by the collectivity. The rationality of its expressions is measured by the internal relations between the content of the meaning, the conditions of validity and the reasons in case of needs that can be reproduced to justify the announcements or the effectiveness of the rules of action. Rationals, therefore, are subjects capable

of speaking and acting, who also delude themselves, as soon as possible, about the effects and the means-ends relations. Rational is also that in the face of an existing norm, it can justify its action, in the face of criticism, explaining a given situation in relation to legitimate (expected) behaviors. Habermas considers that knowledge (associated with interest) arises from problems that humanity faces for which it has to give answers.

b) With a new look at common sense.

From the classical epistemology of knowledge, the view that is still implemented today on common sense is not fair, as it alienates it from the rational capacity, disregarding its origin from the practical production of life. As Boaventura de Souza Santos (1987, 43) says:

“... It is necessary to bear in mind that the characterization of common sense is usually made from science and that, therefore, it is not surprising that it is saturated with negativity (illusion, falsehood, conservatism, superficiality, bias, etc. If, however, it is done an analytical effort to overcome this scientific ethnocentrism, the characterization that is arrived at can be quite different and much more positive.

But regardless of the method, dialectical or positivist, our thinkers in the human sciences tend to evaluate common sense from the classical precepts of modern science, thus distancing this knowledge from the rational scientific dimension. Especially in the educational field, thinkers who define themselves as aligned with the dialectical precepts of analysis, interpret common sense as something fragmentary and simplistic and therefore distant from representations of truths of reality. However, Karel Kosik can be said to have another look at common sense, reducing his distance from scientific knowledge, insofar as he associates the production of knowledge with the concrete world, with the real production of life. Karel Kosik says that (1995, p. 19):

The phenomena and phenomenal forms of things are spontaneously reproduced in common thought as reality (reality itself) not because they are the most superficial and closest to sensory knowledge, but because the phenomenal aspect of the thing is a natural product of everyday praxis.

On the other hand, this same thinker does not fail to make his reservations, thus differentiating common sense from scientific knowledge when he says that:

“...immediate utilitarian praxis and the common sense corresponding to it put man in a position to orient himself in the world, to become familiar with things and to handle them, but they do not provide an understanding of things and reality.” (KOSIK, 1995, p. 15)

However, it is necessary to recognize new readings in contemporary sociological thinking about common sense and its relationship with scientific knowledge. Among these, it can be said that Gramsci presents himself differently when considering the existence of intellectual production in the practical world of life. This is how Gramsci (1991, p. 3) expresses it:

Each social group, born in the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates for itself, at the same time, in an organic way, one or more layers of intellectuals that give it homogeneity and awareness of its own function, not only in the economic field, but also in the social and political: the capitalist entrepreneur creates with himself the technician of industry, the scientist of political economy, the organizer of a new culture... (that is, intellectual)”

In contemporaneity, other perspectives appear in a perspective of conjugating common sense to the production of knowledge, however, always safeguarding differences. As Michel Paty (2003, p. 11) says in his article entitled “Science and the comings and goings of common sense” he considers

that knowledge has its origin in common sense, but that it has its origin in the measure in which it dethrones it, but that it in a second stage, this new recognition is assimilated even by the general public, thus reconstituting a new common sense. As this author says: “... common sense is enriched by the assimilation of scientific knowledge and, in general, by human experience”.

In summary, from a classical perspective, regardless of the method used, thinkers tend to construct dichotomous differences between common sense and scientific knowledge, despite some approximations, such as Gramsci and Karel Kosik. In contemporary times, however, there is a tendency to build approximations between common sense and scientific knowledge, safeguarding differences, not yet attributing rationality to common sense, which, to a certain extent, can be considered unfair.

c) With a new look at the “theoretical” method.

Why “theoretical” method? From a more positive perspective, the method is summarized in the technical procedure for collecting information from the social environment studied. But it is understood that the method, regardless of naming it, is, above all, the theoretical view that the researcher has of the real that is being investigated and that, from this theoretical perspective, the technical procedures of data collection are decided.

However, in the human sciences, especially in the case of Sociology and Educational Science, the tradition of investigation is presented in the prism of technique, of the understanding of seeing the method as a set of technical procedures for collecting information, especially from the perspective of measurement. This is part of the classical epistemology of modern science as already analyzed in this text. The principle is adopted that scientificity is associated with good

measurement technique. Bajoit (2006 p. 15) observes that the classical epistemological foundations of sociology originate in the natural sciences and it is from these foundations that the investigation method is thought, associating scientificity with measurement and “neutrality”.

With this perspective, researchers in the human sciences adopt as a principle the need to define, a priori, the investigation method, interpreting it as a set of procedures and techniques for collecting information. This is a common procedure among researchers in Sociology and in Education Sciences, especially among researchers who adopt a more positivist line of investigation and, thus, understand that the researcher’s distance from the studied reality constitutes a principle of “neutrality” and, therefore, of scientificity. In fact, as Hannah Arendt (2002 p. 263) says, “The greater the distance between man and his environment, the world or the earth, the more he can observe and measure, and the less mundane and earthly space he will have”.

However, from the perspective of seeing the real world of life as a partner in the process of knowledge production, it is necessary to detach from the classical tradition of the method, assuming that the method is built on the combination of the researcher’s academic training and his scientific experiences, his theoretical readings, with the investigated universe. Thus, it is possible that the same social universe can be investigated in a different way, with different information, depending on the theoretical perspective of the researcher. This means that when it comes to investigations associated with the human sciences, one cannot consider there to be an absolute truth from homogeneous research procedures, but at least two different theoretical perspectives, each indicating different procedures for collecting information. That is, looking at the social environment from the perspective of

functionality, understanding as real what is presented to the eyes and that, in this case, a mere statistical study explains it, or looking at the social environment from the perspective of dialectical contradiction and that only the Statistical measurement of the stuff of life does not account for the real explanation.

Another important aspect to be considered is the moment of choosing the method, even if, as mentioned above, the history of the researcher’s academic training, his theoretical option and his readings constitute an essential element in the choice of the method, this cannot be made a priori without there being an interrelationship between the researcher and the researched world. Certainly, in the analysis that is constructed here, one does not dare to make considerations about the existence or not of the method, as Paul Fayeraben (1989) did, but it is necessary to consider, first of all, that the investigated real is not something static, which can be established in advance, but constitutes a joint finding between the researcher and the researched world. Thus, it is necessary to consider that this relationship presents variations and contradictions and that the advent of information does not occur in a functional way.

Another important element to be considered is what concerns the knowledge involved in the investigation, the a priori knowledge and the posterior knowledge. From a positive perspective, there is no a priori knowledge, there is only new knowledge produced from the investigated matter. In this case, knowledge would be understood as the new, the result of research, simply. But when the investigated universe is theoretically seen, in a dialectical perspective, it is considered the existence of knowledge on both sides, the theoretical and bibliographic knowledge of the real investigated on the part of the researcher and the knowledge that the investigated world holds of those who investigate it and

of your own investigated world. This means that from this methodological perspective, the realization of the investigation process is materialized from two knowledges that are presented at different times: the a priori, of the researcher and his theoretical world, and the investigated and the knowledge new produced from this relationship, a dimension that materializes in a dimension of subject X subject.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

From the analysis carried out in the course of this article, it is possible to conclude that the process of knowledge production itself has an approximate relationship with the practice of social justice. The practice of social justice or “injustice” is related to the epistemological parameters of science, truth and rational knowledge, sensitized or not with the expression of unique knowledge produced in the world of life.

It appears that the epistemology of science today, based on modern reason, insofar as it distances itself from the world of life, from culture, from tradition, from the expression of life, it also distances itself from the real expression of life and its knowledge produced as survival strategies, as is the case of common sense. This occurs not only with regard to the parameters of truth, but especially the method associating science to technical truth with weight in measurement. In practice, the “injustice” in the knowledge production process may be related specifically to the method and the non-recognition of rationality of the singular knowledge produced in the practice of the production of life. In other words, the distance from the world of life with alienation of religious expression, tradition and cultural expression, can, in the context of the contemporary world, produce a segmentation, benefiting social segments more than others in terms of the recognition

of the rationality of their respective knowledge produced within the scope of the production of life, which would not be socially fair.

It is also noted that the theme of this article, in addition to an academic debate, constitutes a political debate, being related to the social development itself, especially of social groups in conditions of poverty. This theme also represents a political debate because there is a need to create a new epistemology of knowledge in the human sciences, independent of the epistemological parameters of the natural sciences.

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